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Chapter 1 
THE PROBLEM AMD ITS IMPORTANCE
Prison riots have long been recognised as persistent and 
pervasive problems in American society. However, the general 
orientation of prison administrators and correctional organizations 
has led them to view the riots as dysfunctional and disruptive, and 
to disregard their positive functions.
In reviewing the literature on prisons, it became increasingly 
clear to the writer that an adequate science of prison violence must 
depend heavily upon the research skills and theoretical insights of 
sociologists who will bring them to bear on the prison community. 
Perhaps no more compelling evidence can be found of the failure of 
sociologists to taka advantage of the rich research potential of the 
field of corrections than the nearly total disregard by sociological 
Investigators of the series of prison riots that occurred in 
correctional institutions throughout the United States during the ya<nrs 
1968 to 1971. Yet these riots ware among the more striking phenomena 
of collective violence which have occurred in the nation.
THE PROBLEM
Statement of the Problem.
Of special interest to the writer are the functional, as con­
trasted to the dysfunctional, consequences of violence. Accordingly, 
the present, study examines some of the functions of violence*- in terms 
of the changes which it brings about in social structure. Since 'the
1
terms violence, change, and social structure subsume so much, attention 
will be focused on prisons as a special type of social institution and 
structure, on prison riots as a major form of violence, and on prison 
reform as a specific type of change. The purpose of the study, then, 
is to identify and analyze some of the functional consequences of prison 
riots in terms of the changes or reforms which result therefrom. Con­
comitantly, the study' is an attempt to relate violence as a causal 
factor in terms of the kinds of changes it brings about in the social 
structure of the prison. In linking violence and change, they will 
necessarily be treated as contingent factors, for it is obvious that 
violence ..may be a result as well as a source of change.
Importance of the Study
No one engaged in thought about history can remain unaware of 
the role violence has played in human affairs. It is at first glance 
rather surprising that violence has been singled out so seldom for 
special consideration. In fact, it did not even rate an entry in the 
1968 edition of the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
A cursory examination of the contemporary work of American sociologists 
indicates that violence has been a very much neglected field of inquiry. 
As a result,-much less is known about the causes and consequences of 
violence, and especially the consequences, than about the scope, 
intensity, and duration of violence under various circumstances. 
Moreover, the literature that does exist has not been noteworthy for 
attempts to relate violence and change, although a number of studies 
on conflict (e.g., Coser, 1956? Dahrendorf, 1959) have tried to do 
this by explaining structural change in terms of group conflict.
The American Correctional Association points out in its Manual 
1 of Correctional Standards (1966) that no complete and definitive survey 
has "been made of the effects of riots on the prisons in which they 
occurred or, for that matter, on prisons in general, Many of the 
studies (e.g., Flynn, 1953; MacCormick, 195^; Conrad, 1966; Fox, 1971) 
which have “been done on prison riots have dealt with the causes, rather 
than the consequences, of the riots. The importance of these studies 
notwithstanding, research into the causes and consequences of collective 
violence in correctional institutions has, for all intents and purposes, 
been ignored or at least passed over with little consideration. The 
present study will serve to illustrate the need for more research con­
cerning the relationship between violence and change in correctional 
institutions because, at best, it forms only a small, visible segment 
of a phenomenon which lies largely beneath the surface of official 
recognition.
THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM
Although much of Lewis Coser’s work is concerned with the wider 
subject ox social conflict rather than with the narrower topic of 
violence, it will nevertheless serve as a convenient springboard from 
which to launch an investigation into the functional consequences of 
violence. Implicit if not explicit in some of Coser’s works is the 
notion that violence (which he calls social conflict) is not only 
inevitable, but may actually have important functional consequences. 
Somewhat in line with this, Conrad says: ", . , there is no denying
that mass violence in prison sometimes gains objectives which inmates
could not otherwise hope to achieve'1 (1966:115). Or, as Loveland 
writes: "It is frequently true that desirable and necessary improvement
in prisons ccmes about as the result of disturbances, riots, and mass 
escapes" (1966:6). As many advocates of change will no doubt agree, it 
often takes the unusual event, with loss of life and property, to 
stimulate the thought processes of men* Thus, it will be the thesis of 
this writer that prison violence can be functional to the extent that 
it brings about certain types of desired change in the social structure 
of the prison.
To focus on the functional aspects of violence is not to deny 
that other aspects of violence are destructive of group unity or that 
they lead to disintegration of specific social structures. One need 
not look far for examples.
An article in Life magazine has been entitled, "A Riot Is An 
Unnecessary Evil” (1952:138). The theme of the article is that prison 
riots are evil, horrendously so. They are economically wasteful. They 
are destructive of life, limb, and property. They destroy the morale 
of inmates and prison employees. They destroy public confidence in 
penologists and prison systems. One could further trace the far- 
reaching extent and character of the evil that these disturbances 
create.
But, are riots unnecessary? The answer depends, perhaps, on 
how one looks at the question. For example, as one author writes:
« . without riots our prisoners would be treated with the barbarity 
of uncivilized tribes; or the cruelties of.the dark ages" (Wallack, 
1953:7). According to this point of view, riots can be considered an
5antidote against the maltreatment' of prisoners and, hence, a necessary
evil* One could, of course, counter this theory by saying that prison
riots should not be necessary to bring about humane conditions in penal 
institutions in a civilized society. However, as Wallack says:
. . .  none of us who have observed the situation could 
be so smug as to discount the effect riots have had in 
improving the shameful and inhumane conditions chac often 
prevail in penal institutions. They have served this pur­
pose more than once (1953:7).
RESEARCH METHODS AND PROCEDURES
This study takes the form of a secondary analysis of qualitative
data. The data were gathered from a variety of sources, the most
important of which are as follows: (a) correctional journals, reports,
and monographs; (b) informal discussions with prison officials, 
correction officers, and former inmates; (c) newspaper and magazine 
accounts of prison disturbances; (d) direct communication with forty- 
three state departments of correction; and (e) to a limited extent, 
nonparticipant observation. These, of course, were supplemented by a 
review of other relevant literature, particularly that dealing with 
violence and change.
Attention is focused almost exclusively on state penal 
institutions as distinguished from federal institutions. Intermingling 
of state and federal institutions was purposely avoided in an effort 
to hold the number and types of variables to a minimum. Further, the 
writer concentrated primarily on those riots which occurred during the 
period January 1, 1968 to December 31, 1971. This period was considered 
particularly appropriate for study as it not only encompassed a series
rD
■K:0f contemporary prison riots and disturbances, but also an era of con-
'V
jjshsiderable unrest in the larger society.
jf' Although prisons tend to isolate inmates from the larger
society, prisons themselves are among the institutional complexes of
fz.-
■" society and, like other social institutions, are caught up in the 
currents of time and place. For this reason, it was felt that certain
‘ of the prison riots which occurred during the period covered by this 
study would reflect some of the unrest which prevailed in the free 
community--"the outside vorldM--and would therefore provide a clearer 
conception of the sociology of the prison community.
There are at least two methodological difficulties involved in 
this study: reliance on official statements and overcoming the biases
of other writers. In Chapter 3, there is a tendency to rely more 
heavily on official statements than on public documents or special 
commission reports. This stems from the fact that the latter sources 
were simply not available or readily obtainable in the majority of 
cases.^ The official statements must therefore be used with a certain 
degree of caution and weighted accordingly.
The writer is also well aware that a valid picture of prison 
riots can be uncovered only by remaining completely objective. Many 
writers, however, have had a tendency to include their own values in 
their discussions of prison violence. They often assume, at least
^The writer attempted to obtain special reports on prison dis­
turbances from the Federal Bureau of Prisons, American Correctional 
Association, state departments of correction, six different univer­
sities, and several notable penologists. However, with few exceptions, 
these efforts met with negative results.
?implicitly, that prison riots are bad. This infusion of personal 
values has undoubtedly colored and limited a gocd deal of the litera­
ture on prison riots. Although occasional doubt may arise, the writer 
has attempted to guard against becoming partisan, either consciously or 
unc onsciously,
If it turns out that the present paper strikes the reader as 
being rather controversial, a further word of explanation concerning 
this unusual approach can be found in Appendix A.
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
Prison
The term "prison” is used as a convenient overall designation 
for adult correctional institutions above the level of the county jail 
and city workhouses. Included under the general heading "prisons” are 
penitentiaries,*- reformatories for men and lor women, road and forestry 
camps, farms, and such special institutions as those for insane and 
mentally defective criminals (Manual of Correctional Standards, 1966:
33). Today, prisons are commonly referred to as correctional facili­
ties, thus suggesting that their goals at least are corrective or 
rehabilitative^ in nature.
Prison Riot
Nhen a disturbance becomes a riot is, of course, a matter of 
definition. Unfortunately, the literature on prison riots has been
^The term "penitentiary,” which derives from the Latin, is 
widely used as a synonym for prison "and suggests a place where a man 
may be sent to do penance for his sins against society” (Leinwand, 
1 9 7 2 :2 ^ ).
8more descriptive than definitive. There is,.it seems, no universal
agreement on a definition of prison riots. As Gary Marx points out:.
’’The numcer of attributes to be used in characterizing riots is large,
and we lack a generallv-agreed-upon set of concepts or measures for
classifying them” (1970:2^). It is also difficult to say whether or
not a riot has occurred in a prison because many revolts defined as
’’minor” disturbances by prison officials are probably viewed by the
public as full-scale riots depending upon the amount of publicity they
are given by the mass media.
In an attempt to arrive at a definition of prison riots which
can gain acceptance by prison officials, the following definition is
taken from the American Correctional Association’s manual on the
Causes, Preventive Measures, and Methods of Controlling Prison Riots
and Disturbances:
A riotous situation may be declared in the event of a 
group of inmates assaulting any constituted official, 
destroying state property, banding together to resist 
authority, refusing to return to cells and wards, or any 
overt act which would be detrimental to the orderly routine 
of the institution (1970:87).
While this statement is more a working definition than a legal defi­
nition of a prison riot, it is important to this study and will serve 
as a useful point of departure. As will be noted, the definition is 
quite general and in need of further amplification.
Of particular significance in the American Correctional 
Association’s definition of a riot is the use of the word ’’group,” 
which is suggestive of collective action or behavior on the part of 
members of the inmate community. In offering a legal definition of a
:.4@-
riot, both the Encyclopedia Americana (19^2) and American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language (1970) state that a riot is a breach 
of the public peace by an unlawful assembly of three or more persons 
for a common purpose. Similarly, Charles Fricke, in his Criminal 
Definitions, Terms, and Phrases, defines a riot as "the assembly of 
three or more persons who disturb the public peace by using force or 
violence to any other person, or property (1968:68). These definitions 
all have one thing in common. They imply that collective action is a 
necessary ingredient in riotous situations. If prison riots are out­
growths of collective behavior, and it appears that they are, they offer 
a rare opportunity for a systematic analysis of the dynamics of collec­
tive violence.
By way of further clarification, an assault is "an unlawful 
attempt or threat to injure another physically" (American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language, 1970). Assault nearly always 
implies physical contact and the application or attempted application 
of force or violence.
A constituted official may include anyone from the prison war­
den or superintendent down to the guard or correction officer.
Taken alone, destruction of property is a rather nebulous term 
for it gives the reader no indication how much destruction of what kind 
of property there must be before it reaches riotous proportions. An. 
inmate who breaks a chair in his cell and sets fire to his mattress 
has most assuredly destroyed property. However, this would hardly be 
labelled a riot. On the other hand, if a group of prisoners break 
chairs and set fires in their cells, a riotous situation begins to 
take form. The amount of destruction done during prison riots varies 
widely and, as might be expected, it is difficult to apply a rule of *
10
thumb in those cases where destruction, of property is the only criterion 
used in determining whether or not a riot has in fact occurred.
Slowdown and sitdown strikes might be considered examples of 
inmates banding together to resist authority. Refusing to return to 
cells or wards is another means of resisting authority, for it repre­
sents willful disobedience of orders, as well as prison rules and 
regulations.
The catch-all phrase, "or any overt act," could Include almost 
anything— from an inmate yelling that there is salt in the coffee to 
the taking of hostages.
Conceivably, prison riots can cover a wide range of acts, and 
many prison disturbances can be properly classified as prison riots 
based on the American Correctional Association's definition.
V iolence
The term "violence" will share a prominent place in this study 
and will be used frequently in referring to prison riots, "In the 
social context violence may be defined roughly as the illegal employ­
ment of methods of physical coercion for personal or group ends" 
(Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 193*0• Group violence, or 
collective violence as it will more commonly be referred to in this 
paper, is defined by the National Commission on the Causes and Pre­
vention of Violence as "the unlawful threat or use of force by any 
group that results or is intended to result in the injury or forcible 
restraint or intimidation of persons, or the destruction or forcible 
seizure of property" (1969:59)• .
11
Change and/or Reform
The terms "change” and "reform" will be used Interchangeably 
throughout this study and will be interpreted to mean any significant 
alteration in the prison's social structure, i.e., its administrative 
organization, communication network, rules and regulations, classifica­
tion procedures, etc. In other words, any deviation in the social 
structure of the prison at a given point in time (T2) from, that of a 
preceding point in time (Tl) shall be considered structural change.
It should be emphasized that the study will be concerned primarily 
with those changes which can be related or attributed directly to the 
riots.
A PREVIEW
In the succeeding chapters, an attempt will be made to show 
some of the causes and effects of prison violence, with special 
emphasis on the positive functions of riots. This will be accom­
plished by drawing examples from available research literature and 
data collected from various state departments of correction.
Chapter 2 will cite some perspectives on violence and social 
change which have been gleaned from the literature and can be 
generalized to correctional institutions. This chapter will attempt 
to show that violence can and sometimes does serve positive functions. 
Chapter 3 reviews a series of prison riots which have occurred in the 
United States in recent years. The discussion in this chapter will 
be largely descriptive In nature, but will identify some of the 
causes and consequences of prison riots as reported by penologists in 
the field. Since it has such far-reaching importance in any study of
prison violence, the riot at New York State’s Attica Correctional 
Facility in September, 1971, will be singled out for special examination 
in Chapter 4. This is intended to provide a microcosmic case study of 
a riot so that the reader can look more closely at the dynamics of 
collective violence at work in a major penal institution. In Chapter 
5, the author will analyze some of the causes and consequences of 
prison riots. Attention will then turn to an examination of seme 
theoretical perspectives on prison riots in Chapter 6. Finally,
Chapter 7 will be devoted to a summary and a discussion of some of the 
conclusions reached during this study.
Chapter 2
SOME PERSPECTIVES. ON VIOLENCE AND CHANGE
To better understand violence and change in contemporary 
American society, it is necessary to place the subject in perspective, 
both socially and historically. In this chapter, some of the social 
functions of violence will be discussed in capsule form--the purpose 
here being to show that violence is not of necessity dysfunctional as 
some of its prophets may lead one to believe. The discussion which 
follows represents an attempt to explain some of the rationale behind 
violence by briefly examining the role it has played in bringing about 
social change. The latter half of the chapter will be devoted to a 
discussion of some of the lesser, albeit'important, functions of 
violence. Some of the perspectives discussed herein will prove helpful 
in analyzing and explaining the dynamics of prison violence in later 
chapters.
One of the things that seems to stand out in much of the 
literature on violence is the notion that many movements of social 
revolt which have proved successful have been compelled to use violence 
at some point in time. In his article on "The Ordeal of Change,” 
Hancock writes: MIn every age since the beginning of man, we have 
experienced recurrent periods of excessive lawlessness and violence" 
(1969:17). He goes on to say: ‘Ve were born in violence, we opened
up the West in violence, our labor movement was conceived and nurtured 
in violence” (1969:22). Although considerable evidence can be mustered 
to document the contention that violence is a persistent characteristic
13
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in American social life, only a few observations will be made in this 
chapter.
LEGITIMACY OF VIOLENCE
Violence constitutes a significant and recurring theme in the 
American value structure. it runs like a thread through the fabric of 
social life. To many people, violence means illegitimate behavior-- 
behavior that is contrary to the mores or against the legal codes, 
behavior that exceeds the limits of tolerance of the society at large. 
However, as the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of 
Violence points out in its report on violence In the United States:
Historically men have not acted on the principle that all 
violence is to be avoided. Our nation is no exception. Like 
all others, our society has recognized some uses of violence 
as necessary and legitimate and some as unacceptable and 
illegitimate (1969:233).
In discussing some of the perspectives on violence in America today, 
Dr. Xialter Menninger states: "Indeed, a major function of society is
the organization and legitimation of violence in the interest of main­
taining society Itself" (1969:10).
The acceptability of violence can be conceptualized as being 
on a continuum ranging from fully legitimate at one pole to completely 
illegitimate at the other. To cite a simple example, the parent who 
spanks a child may be engaging in legitimate violence, but the parent 
who breaks a child1s arm would be engaging in illegitimate violence. 
With respect to the rationality of violence, Arendt has this to say:
Violence . . .  Is rational to the extent that it Is 
effective in reaching the end that must justify it. And 
since when we act we never know with any certainty the 
eventual consequences of what we are doing, violence can
15
remain rational only if it pursues short-term goals.
Violence does not promote causes, neither history nor 
revolution, neither progress nor reaction; but it can 
serve to dramatise grievances and bring them to public 
attention (1970:79).
Whether various forms of violence are considered legitimate or illegiti­
mate is a function of perception; that is, ,it depends on how they are 
perceived in the eye of the beholder.
A great deal of violent behavior in America is legitimate or 
positively sanctioned. Many occupations— e.g., policemen, boxers, 
wrestlers, bouncers, soldiers— allow for and even require violence in 
one form or another. Each has a mandate to use violence under certain 
conditions. Hans Toch, however, says that "no form of violence is more 
accepted and more damned, more ignored and more feared, than collective 
violence’* (1969:195). War may be taken as an example. Until recent 
years, warfare has been an almost noncontroversial feature of the human 
condition. With few exceptions, societies have condoned the violence 
of war and rewarded and decorated those who distinguished themselves 
on the battlefied by inflicting death and destruction.
In battle, violence is committed because the individual's mili­
tary vocation demands it. The soldier is instructed to follow 
destructive routines, and, for the most part, he complies because he 
has learned to do so, and because he accepts his role as defined. Typi­
cally, he may gain no satisfaction from violence beyond those of 
discharging his obligations efficiently and of participating in the 
collective destruction of a consensually defined enemy. To be sure, 
there are soldiers who seek out ’’blood” and ’’gore” beyond the call of 
duty and who gain considerable reward and personal satisfaction from
16
the administration of death and destruction.^ There are those who 
volunteer for elite ''killer units" that operate behind enemy lines; 
there are others Tvho prize assignments as snipers or scouts; and there 
are persons with a penchant for heroic stature in defiance of "sensible" 
odds. As Dr. Menninger so aptly put it: "Man is an animal, one of two 
species in nature which indiscriminately kills its own kind. (Rats are 
the other!)" (1969:6).
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE AS A CATALYST OF CHANGE
Although violence has been a disagreeably persistent character­
istic of American social life, the theme of violence has taken different 
forms in response to America's changing social organization and value 
system. Historical analysis suggests that while much of the American 
violence has been prompted by environmental conditions that no longer 
exist, many of the social tensions that produced violence in the past 
are recurrent and remain relevant. Some forms of collective violence, 
although by no means unique to America, are discussed below.
Internal War (Revolution)
The sanctioning of violence on a national, as opposed to an 
international, level can be seen in the case of internal war. "Internal 
war," says Eckstein, "Is practically the essence of contemporary
^An example of this occurred in March, 1969, when a platoon of 
American soldiers passed through a Vietnamese hamlet called My Lai and 
left more than a hundred Vietnamese civilians, Including small children, 
lying dead. The "massacre at My Lai" was by no means the bloodiest in 
American military history, however. One even bloodier occurred at 
Wounded Knee, South Dakota, in 1890, when more than 200 Oglala Sioux 
Indians were killed by United States cavalrymen.
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political life” (1964:3). 3roadly speaking, internal wars are attempts 
to change by violence, or threat of violence, a government's rules, 
policies, or organization. Regardless of who wins them, internal wars 
always succeed in changing societies, even though the changes may not 
correspond with original intentions.
Revolution (using the term internal war in a somewhat narrower 
sense) is not the same thing as social change, but is a form of it 
(Johnson, 1966:5). However, in order to understand its occasional 
attractiveness as an alternative, it must be studied as part of the 
general phenomenon of social change. The concept of revolution in 
political analysis refers specifically to the form of change that 
occurred, for example, in France in 1789, in Russia in 1917, and in 
China in 1949. While there may be some room for disagreement, many 
authorities contend that the United States, itself, is of revolutionary 
origin.
As a special kind of social change, revolutionary change 
involves the intrusion of violence into social relations, and is an 
acceptable means of change only when purposive policies of change are 
not forthcoming. As Lerone Bennett points out: "Revolutions are
usually the last link in a long chain of events, and they are usually 
preceded by a long period of social unrest" (1965:2). In short, 
"revolution . . .  is the acceptance of violence in order to cause the 
system to change when all else has failed, and the very idea of 
revolution is contingent upon this perception of societal failure" 
(Johnson, 1966:12).
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Social Conflict
In his Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, Ralf 
Dahrendorf writes:
. . .  all that is creativity, innovation, and development 
in the life of the individual, his group, and his society is 
due, to no small extent, to the operation of conflicts between 
group and group, individual and individual, emotion and 
emotion within one individual. This fundamental fact alone 
seems to me to justify the value judgment that conflict is 
essentially good and desirable (1959:208).
"Change and conflict," says Dahrendorf, "are equally universal in
society" (1959:210). Similarly, Eckstein (1964) acknowledges that all
social systems contain persistent social strains that generate social
conflict and provoke social change. Once conflict groups get organized,
they engage in conflicts that effect structural changes. The more
importance the individual participants in a conflict attach to its
central issues, the more intense is the conflict. "The more intense
conflict is, the more radical are the changes likely to be which it
brings about" (Dahrendorf, 1959:236). It may be argued, then, that
the degree of change varies directly with the intensity of conflict.
Lewis Coser, another leading proponent of social conflict 
theory, states that there are occasions for conflict in every social 
structure (1956:152). In his opinion, a certain degree of conflict is 
an essential element in group formation and the persistence of group 
life. He claims that "engaging in conflict with another party means 
that a relationship with that party has been established" (1956:121). 
Once relations have been established through conflict, other types of 
relations are likely to follow. Borrowing from Karl Marx's Poverty of 
Philosophy, Coser has written: . . conflict leads not only to
ever-changing relations within the existing social structure, but the
total social system undergoes transformation through conflict"
(196?:25). A certain amount of group conflict is therefore considered 
necessary, as it not only establishes new relationships, but helps to 
relieve previously existing tension within a given social structure.
Whether given forms of conflict will lead to changes in the 
social system or to ultimate breakdown and formation of a new system 
depends largely on the system’s rigidity and resistance to change. On 
the one hand, conflict tends to be dysfunctional for a social structure 
in which there is insufficient toleration and institutionalization of 
conflict. What threatens the equilibrium of a social structure is not 
conflict but, rather, the rigidity of the structure itself. A flexible 
society, on the other hand, benefits from conflict because such 
behavior, by helping to create and modify norms, assures its con­
tinuance under changed conditions. A rigid system, by not permitting 
conflict, will impede adjustments and, by so doing, will maximize 
the danger of breakdown (Coser, 1956:128-157).
Mass Movements
Mass movements are another conspicuous instrument of social 
change for, as Eric Koffer^ points out: '*. . . mass movements are often
a factor in the awakening and renovation of stagnant societies" (1951: 
1^9). They are preoccupied with the future and, as such, come to change 
the present. Like other types of social movement, mass movements breed
^In his book, The True Believer, Hoffer examines mass movements 
from Christianity in its infancy to the national uprisings of our time. 
His analysis of mass movements is a brilliant ^ tudy of the mind of the 
fanatic— the man whose personal failings lead him to join a cause— and 
is a genuine contribution to social thought.
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enthusiasm and excitement, and generate a proclivity for united action. 
They draw their adherents from many types of humanity, but largely from 
the ranks of the discontented and the frustrated. As Hoffer says:
For men to plunge headlong into an understanding of vast 
change, they must be intensely discontented yet not destitute, 
and they must have the feeling that by the possession of seme 
potent doctrine, infallible leader or some new technique they 
have access to a source of irresistable power. They must also 
have an extravagant conception of the prospects and poten­
tialities of the future. Finally, they must be wholly ignorant 
of the difficulties involved in their vast undertaking 
(1951:20).
The frustrated are particularly attracted to a mass movement's 
call for action, for they sea in action a cure for all of their social 
ills. People with a sense of fulfillment are satisfied with the status 
quo, whereas, the frustrated favor radical change and are quick to join 
a cause. A rising mass movement, suggests Hoffer, attracts and holds 
its following by:
. . .  the refuge it offers from the anxieties, barrenness 
and meaninglessness of an individual existence. It cures the 
poignantly frustrated not by . . . remedying the difficulties 
and abuses which made their lives miserable, but by freeing 
them from their ineffectual selves--and it does this by 
enfolding and absorbing them into a closely knit and exultant 
whole (1951:44).
An active mass movement seeks to instill in its followers a 
propensity for united action and self-sacrifice "by stripping each 
human entity of its distinctiveness and autonomy and turning it into 
an anonymous particle with no will and no judgment of its own" (Hoffer, 
1951:79). Stripped of his autonomy, the individual turns into a highly 
reactive entity and, like an unstable chemical, hungers to combine with 
whatever comes within his reach. In due course, he finds himself a 
part of a homogeneous plastic mass that can be transformed more or less
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at will. ,!The human plasticity necessary for the realization of drastic 
and abrupt changes seems, therefore, to be a by-product of the process 
of unification and of the inculcation of a readiness for self-sacrifice” 
(Hoffer, 1951:79).
Social Movements
While this chapter has thus far dealt with one set of elements 
in collective behavior, a few additional comments concerning social 
movements as agents of change are in order. Herbert Blumer observes:
Social movements can be viewed as collective enterprises 
to establish a new order of life. They have their inception 
in a condition of unrest, and derive their motive power on 
one hand from dissatisfaction with the current form of life,
and on the other hand, from wishes and hopes for a new scheme
or system of living (1969:8).
Outstanding instances of specific, as opposed to general, social 
movements are reform movements and revolutionary movements. "A specific 
social movement,” reports Blumer, ”is one which has a well-defined 
objective or goal which it seeks to reach. In this effort, it develops 
an organizational structure, making it essentially a society” (1969:11).
A  social movement of the specific type does not come into existence with
such a structure and organization already established. Instead, its 
organization is developed in the course of its career (Blumer, 1969:11).
It should be pointed out that agitation is of primary importance 
in a social movement. It is a prime mover so to speak. For a movement 
to begin and to gain impetus, it is necessary for people to be jarred 
loose from their customary ways of thinking and believing (Blumer, 
1969:13). Agitation is therefore a means of arousing the interest of 
people while at the same time jarring them loose from their tradi- 
tionalistic views. The necessary agitation may come through the
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discrediting of the prevailing order by men of words with a grievance. 
According to Hoffer, "the man of words undermines established 
institutions, discredits those in power, weakens prevailing beliefs and 
loyalties, and sets the stage for the rise of a mass movement" (1951: 
120)o He goes on to say: ". „ . the faultfinding man of words, by
persistent ridicule and denunciation, shakes prevailing beliefs and 
loyalties, and familiarizes the masses with the idea of change" 
(1951:127).
SOME OTHER SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF VIOLENCE
Violence as a Social Response
History has shown that people often turn to violence as a last 
resort. Lerone Bennett was quoted earlier as saying: "Revolutions are
usually the last link in a long chain of events, and they are usually 
preceded by a long period of social unrest" (1965:2). The step-by-step 
process leading to violent behavior may look something like this: A
person has problems--he seeks relief--he obtains no satisfaction--he 
becomes bitter. When solutions to his problems are not forthcoming, he 
is forced into protest-oriented action. Bienen claims that violence can 
be "attributed to a failure to solve problems which arise under a number 
of objectively specifiable conditions" (1969:75). It comes about, for 
example, when groups cannot obtain a hearing or when they feel they have 
a vested interest in suppressing voices being raised. Toch reasons that 
violence arises "as a reaction against unmet aspirations and consists of 
retaliation against the symbols of perceived ^ inresponsiveness" (1969: 
233). It follows, then, that the objects of violence are often those 
persons and agencies who remain unresponsive to group aspirations.
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The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention- of Violence 
spent eighteen months deliberating the broad subject of violence in 
American society. In the course of its deliberations, the Commission 
identified some themes of challenge for the American people. One of 
these themes is particularly worth noting as relevant for continuing 
the discussion on violence;
Historically, when groups or individuals have been unable 
to attain the quality of life to which they believe they are 
entitled, the resulting discontent and anger have often 
culminated in violence. Violent protest today-^from middle- 
class students to the inhabitants of the black ghettos and 
the white ghettos— has occurred in part because the protestors 
believe that they cannot make their demands felt effectively 
through normal, approved channels and that "the system1’ for 
whatever reasons, has become unresponsive to them (1969:28?).
Still another factor contributing to violence today is the 
notion that the only way one can be heard is by making a loud enough 
noise to attract the attention of the news media. Increasingly, certain 
groups come to feel that they are listened to only when they become 
violent, or they find violence to be the primary means of getting 
a t t e n t i o n . 3 Menninger quotes William James as saying;
. . .  no more fiendish torture could be devised than when 
you speak, no one answers; when you wave, no one turns; but 
everyone simply cuts you dead. Soon, . . .  there wells up 
within you such hostility, you attack those who ignore you . . .
(1969:9)*
A vivid illustration of this plea to be heard was the slaying 
of eleven Israeli Olympians by Arab terrorists during the Olympic games
hen members of the American Indian Movement seized the village 
of Wounded Knee, South Dakota, in February, 1973* they correctly assumed 
that the news media would be attracted to the dramatic possibilities of 
the event (Schultz, 1973-^S)*
&
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.in Munich in September, 1972. The attack on the Israeli Olympic team, 
which was promulgated as a means of gaining the release of 200 guerrillas 
being held captive in Israeli prisons, is symptomatic of the currents of 
violence in the world today. As it turned out, the terrorists failed in 
their attempt to gain the release of the imprisoned guerrillas, but suc­
ceeded in temporarily disrupting a world sports event and, in so doing, 
drew the spotlight of international attention to their cause.
Violence as a Danger Signal
In his article on the ’’Social Functions of Violence,” Coser 
(1966:12-13) acknowledges that violence serves as a danger signal. For 
example, ”if the incidence of violence increases rapidly, be it in the 
society at large or within specific sectors of it, this can be taken as 
a signal of severe maladjustment” (Coser, 1966:13). This signal is so 
loud and drastic that even those who are not otherwise noted for their 
sensitivity to social ills can perceive it. Along these same lines, the 
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence reports:
If we are wise--if we listen carefully and x^atch closaly-- 
we will realize that violence is a social bellwether: dramatic
rises in its level and modifications in its form . . .  tell us 
that something important is happening in our political and 
social systems (1969:2).
Much as one might deplore the violence in prison riots, it is 
possible that they, too, constitute effective signaling devices to prison 
officials for, as Caldx*ell notes, ’’prison riots have from time to time 
dramatically revealed serious x^eaknesses in our prison system” (1965: 
545). To be sure, violence can be seen as a manifestation of underlying 
conditions. Yet perhaps because of this, those persons in high-ranking 
positions may feel compelled to effect changes in these conditions*
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Violence as a Safety-Valve Meehanism
In an article in The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science (197002), Gary Marx comments that some evidence of 
strain can be found in any complex body of riot data, Leinwand (1972), 
comparing life in prison to living in a pressure cooker, says: ’’There
are tensions between prisoners and those who guard them. There are 
tensions amongst prisoners themselves as hatreds mount and competition 
for minor privileges grows” (1972:35)* Others (e,g,, Wallack, 1953; 
MacCormick, 195^) have suggested that life in prison is like living on 
top of a powder keg about to explode. If it can be concluded that all 
social systems contain persistent social strains as Eckstein (196^) 
suggests, then It is conceivable that violence serves as an outlet— a 
safety-valve mechanism if one insists— for the release of strain or 
tension.
In a series of propositions distilled primarily from the 
theories of Georg Simmel, Coser writes:
Social systems provide for specific institutions which 
serve to drain off hostile and aggressive sentiments. These 
safety-valve institutions help to maintain the system by 
preventing otherwise probable conflict or by reducing its 
disruptive effects. They provide substitute objects upon 
which to displace hostile sentiments . . . .  Through these 
safety valves, hostility is prevented from turning against 
its original object. But such displacements also involve 
costs both -for the social system and for the individual: 
reduced pressure for modifying the system to meet changing 
conditions, as well as dammed-up tension in the individual, 
creating potentialities for disruptive explosion (1956:^).
In those cases where safety-valve institutions exist for the 
displacement of strain and hostility, violence, if and when it occurs,
is likely to be less intense, as some of the pressure will have already
'
been drained off. In the absence of such safety-valve institutions,
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however, violence itself must logicall:/- serve, as a safety-valve mecha­
nism for the release of pent-up feelings of hostility.
Violence as a Form of Therapy
"Rioting Is Good for Some People," says an article In a 
February 9, 1972, edition of the -Manhattan Mercury. This was the con­
clusion reached by Dr* H. A. Lyons, a consultant psychiatrist at 
Belfast’s Purdysburn Hospital, after completing a study in Northern 
Ireland, Dr, Lyons found that a man who acts out his aggressive feel­
ings, by throwing a brick or a punch, is less likely to suffer from 
depressive illness or to commit suicide than a person who represses his 
frustrations. The study revealed that the number of suicides in Belfast 
declined fifty percent as street riots intensified there several years 
ago.
Dr. Lyons studied figures showing the number of suicides in 
Belfast and the number of people with depressive illness, a serious 
mental disorder. He compared the average for relatively quiet years, 
1964-1968, with figures for the year 1969-1970, which was characterized 
by numerous riots in and around Belfast. As the riots increased, he 
reported that " ’there was a significant decrease in depressive illness 
in Belfast in both sexes and all age groups*" (The Manhattan Mercury, 
February 9, 1972:6c). On the average, the decrease worked out to about 
thirteen percent, but depressive illness was down as much as sixty- 
seven percent in the worst riot areas. For purposes of contrast,
Dr. Lyons also studied figures for the same years in a relatively non­
violent area, County Down, There he found both suicides and depressive 
illness on the increase in 1969-1970.
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¥ SUMMARY
>-Si - ,The ^receding discussion has identified ana examined, a series of
% - instances in which violence may perform important social functions. The
. approach was meant to be exploratory and tentative rather than exhaustive
-.-and systematic. Enough has certainly been said, however, to show that
I violence is far from being totally dysfunctional as persons are often
vy«\
p led to believe.
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y It was pointed out early in the chapter that violence is a per­
sistent characteristic of American social life and that it takes dif-
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v ferent forms in response to its changing social context. Some forms of
s violence are legitimate or positively sanctioned. In discussing the
h
- place of violence as a catalyst of change, various types of collective 
behavior with a propensity towards violence have bean cited. Generally 
speaking, collective violence has its inception in a condition of unrest, 
and derives its impetus from dissatisfaction with the current form of 
life and the wish for better things. Based on the preceding discussion, 
it can be inferred that violence is a correlate of change. Finally, 
some ancillary social functions of violence were discussed. Here it was 
seen that violence may serve as a (1) social response, (2) danger signal,
(3). safety-valve mechanism, and/or (4) form of therapy.
In the next chapter, a number of prison riots will be selectively 
discussed. An attempt will be made to Identify some of the causes and 
consequences of the riots in an effort to better show the correlation 
that exists between violence and change.
Chapter 3
SOME CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISON RIOTS
Violent and disruptive behavior is by no means novel to cor­
rectional institutions. Penal history has documented numerous incidents 
of open and violent rebellion in prisons across the United States. Just 
as the trend on college campuses and in the community at large has been 
one of protest over national issues and for social reform in recent 
years, so the tendencies in correctional institutions appear to follow 
similar patterns.
PRISON RIOTS: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Historically speaking, there were riots and mass escapes in the 
old Simsbury, Connecticut, copper mine as early as 1774. The same hap­
pened in the Walnut Street Jail^ in Philadelphia, at Newgate Prison prior 
to the establishment of the Auburn Prison in New York, in the early Maine 
and Massachusetts prisons, and, in fact, almost everywhere from the 
beginning of prisons in the United States (Teeters, 1953:14). Further, 
Caldwell reports:
During 1929 and 1930, serious prison riots broke out in 
many institutions throughout the country . . . .  A series 
of investigations followed and produced some sweeping prison 
reforms, one of which was the reorganization of the federal 
prison system and the establishment of the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons (1965:545).
^Built in 1775, the Walnut Street Jail ,lwas regarded as the 
first true penitentiary of the Western Hemisphere" (The Kansas City 
Star, August 13, 1973:2).
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The year 1951 Is an appropriate point or departure for a review 
of modern prison riots because a major wave of prison violence occurred 
during the years 1951-1553. MacCormick (1954:18), for example, lists 
thirty-nine riots, strikes, and other serious disturbances in prisons 
and reformatories for men in the United States during the period May, 
1951, to December 31, 1953, more than had taken place in the preceding 
quarter-century. In just eight short months, some twelve different 
states had twenty-one riots varying in length and intensity (U.S. News 
& World Report, December 19, 1952:19). The riots of greatest magnitude 
and importance began in April, 1952, when violent and destructive revolts 
that occurred almost simultaneously in the New Jersey Prison at Trenton 
and the Michigan Prison at Jackson were followed by a series of distur­
bances in prisons throughout the country.
There was a relative calm in correctional institutions until 
1955, when another series of riots began in the State Penitentiary at 
Walla Walla, Washington, and spread across the country. Although Utah, 
in 1957, and Montana, in 1959, experienced what were termed serious 
incidents because of the number of hostages involved, another major epi­
sode of prison violence did not occur until 1968, when a riot resulting 
in extensive property damage occurred in the Oregon State Penitentiary 
at Salem (Time, March 22, 1968:22). That same year, two other distur­
bances occurred at San Quentin. These disturbances were characterized 
by coordination with members of the community outside the correctional 
institution and consisted of work strikes and refusals to participate 
in weekend recreational activities.
The series of riots that occurred irr^correctional institutions 
in 1968 prompted the American Correctional Association (previously known
30
as the. American Prison Association) to revise its official position 
paper entitled, A Statement Concerning Causes, Preventive Measures, and 
Methods of Controlling Prison Riots and Disturbances, which was origi­
nally published in 1953. The revised version, similarly entitled, was 
completed in October, 1970, and is the result of work by a specially 
selected committee headed by William D. Leeke, Director, South Carolina 
Department of Corrections, It identifies the major causes of riots and 
disturbances in correctional institutions and recommends methods ox 
preventing and controlling riots, A comparison of the causes identi­
fied in the Association’s two versions of prison riots will be presented 
in Chapter 5.
There has been little relative calm in prisons since the riot 
in the Oregon State Penitentiary in 1968. During recent years, prisons 
in many parts of the nation have been the scenes ox a succession of 
riots and lesser disturbances. Some of these disturbances have resulted 
in bloodshed, many have caused property damage, and most of them have 
produced sensational headlines. As an aftermath, boards of inquiry have 
been appointed, witnesses questioned, reports made, etc. But in all 
this, the general public has seldom gotten more than a glance at the 
reform measures which have been precipitated by the riots.
RESULTS OF DATA COLLECTION
As part of the data collection effort in this study, letters were 
sent to the heads of forty-three state departments of correction request­
ing information on the incidence of riots in their institutions during
■ 'y#
the period January 1, 1968 to December 31 >1971. In all, replies were
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received from thirty-one states. Fifteen states reported incidents 
within their correctional system during the period mentioned above, 
eleven replied that there were no incidents in their systems, three 
hinted that they had had disturbances but had not conducted any studies 
and were therefore unable to provide any *'meaningful'* information, two 
completely evaded the questions asked of them, and twelve did not 
respond. The affirmative replies represented information on thirty-five 
riots throughout the United States, The following discussion is based 
on a sampling of the incidents as reported by prison and law enforcement 
officials.
Oregon State Penitentiary
As mentioned previously, a major disturbance occurred at the 
Oregon State Penitentiary at Salem on March 9, 1968, Although the 
Oregon Corrections Division did not make any reference to prisoner 
demands or underlying causes of the riot in its correspondence with 
this writer, the changes resulting from the riot seem to be large in 
both number and variety. Some of these changes are discussed below.
Unit team case management system. The penitentiary adopted a 
unit team approach to its case management procedures. The plan involves 
the delegation of decision-making authority to middle management and 
line staff members— the persons who are in most frequent contact with 
the inmates and, therefore, most knowledgeable of their total situation.
Psychiatric services. A psychiatric security unit became opera­
tional in September, 1969. The purpose of this unit is to house 
emotionally disturbed individuals and provide therapy programs which
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Hill assist in their return to regular status at the earliest possible 
time. Since the unites inception, the Oregon Corrections Division 
reports that there has been a noticeable improvement in the morale of 
the general population with th© separation and treatment of obviously 
maladjusted individuals whose behavior is personally distressing and 
disruptive to those around them.
Educational urogram, A wide rang© of educational programs is 
now being offered at the institution. This includes adult basic educa­
tion classes for nonreaders, elementary and high school courses, and a 
variety of college level courses for which formal credit may be obtained. 
General Educational Development (GSD) examinations, achievement and 
aptitude tests, civil servics examinations, and a "free school** with 
courses organized, developed, and moderated by students are also 
available.
Vocational training, A new vocational training facility was 
completed in the fall of 1971* and vocational training is now available 
for men who desire to learn a trade or wish to further their skill and 
knowledge in the craft or trade which they now possess.
Activities program, A widely diversified activities program has 
been established within the institution to serve the many and varied 
needs of individual inmates. It is reported that organized activities 
have decidedly improved the overall morale factor, provided inmates with 
a certain sense of achievement, and have directed interest toward 
socially acceptable leisure time activities.
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Medical services. The medical facility underwent extensive 
remodeling and now consists of a twenty-bed general hospital, with 
general medical, contagious, and intensive care units. Offices and 
medical facilities were relocated to enable better services and 
supervision.
Pay incentive program. In 1969, an experimental pay incentive 
program raised the opportunity for maximum pay from $1.00 to $3.00 per 
day. Key positions were identified and a pay scale established. Accor­
ding to the Oregon Corrections Division, success of the program was 
evidenced by improved morale, less sick time lost, and greater production 
by a reduced work force.
New construction. In addition to remodeling the hospital 
facility, an extensive remodeling of the visiting room was accomplished 
in the summer of 1968. Visitors are now permitted to embrace at the 
beginning and end of each visit, and wives may visit four times each 
month. Relocation of the furniture factory was accomplished in accor­
dance with the recommendations of representatives from the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons and other experts called upon during 1968. The 
previous furniture factory was converted into an indoor recreation area.
Inmate speaking engagements in the community. Increased empha­
sis on community involvement has resulted in both citizen participation 
within the institution and inmate participation in the community. This 
program has reportedly received widespread acceptance in the community 
and has provided an opportunity for the growth and. maturity of the 
indiv idua1s invoIved.
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Institutional ombudsman. In February, 1971, the position of 
Institutional Ombudsman was established on a trial basis. This provided 
an avenue of direct communication between inmates and the prison super­
intendent and top management staff.
Temporary leaves. Legislation passed in 1969 permitted the 
institution to add temporary leaves as another therapeutic tool in its 
rehabilitative program. .Such leave opportunities were designed to 
assist offenders in time of family death or serious illness, to parti­
cipate in constructive community-based activities, and, in some cases, 
simply to solidify family and/or other relationships deemed beneficial 
to the reform and rehabilitation of the prisoner (Based on personal 
correspondence between Mr. Robert L. Wright, Executive Assistant of the 
Oregon Corrections Division, and the writer).
South Carolina
South Carolina experienced four prison riots during the period 
April 1, 1968 to October 5, 1968, three of which occurred in the same 
institution. The Central Correctional Institution and Maximum Detention 
Retraining Center at Columbia each had a riot on April 1, 1968. The 
cause of the riot at Central was not given; however, the riot at the 
Retraining Center is said to have spread from an adjoining facility.
The Central Correctional Institution saw two more riots on October 1 
and 5, respectively. Again, the exact causes were not reported. The 
disturbances which hinted at the need for reforms were those that 
occurred in October, when prisoners listed employees and food among 
their grievances. Food has reportedly improved since that time, with
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the cafeteria serving almost twice as much meat as before. With regard 
to employees, the treatment staff, medical staff, and warden’s staff 
were all increased. A psychiatrist tvas employed on a full-time basis, 
and an ’’open door” policy between staff and inmates was emphasized.
Also, the ratio of black officers to white was increased, and certain 
physical changes to the prison complex were made to enable a dis­
turbance to be isolated to one area (3ased on personal correspondence 
between Mr. William D. Leeke, Director of the South Carolina Department 
of Corrections, and the writer).
North Carolina’s Central Prison
Central Prison at Raleigh, North Carolina, had a riot on April
16, 1963, which resulted in the shooting deaths of five inmates, as well
as a number of other casualties. The riot had as its basis the presenta
tion of essentially six demands by the prisoners. In substance, these
demands were as follows: (1) The inmates wanted increased visiting
time. (2) All inmates who had been locked up in the A, B, X, and J
2
blocks were to be returned to the general prison population. (3) A 
grievance committee composed of at least five inmates was to be estab­
lished to meet with the administrator at least once a month. (4) A 
system for compensating inmates from the Prison Enterprise Fund was to 
be initiated immediately. (5) The practice of serving cold cuts and 
salads during the noon meal in warm weather was to be discontinued; all 
three meals were to be served hot throughout the year. (6) Television
^The significance of this demand is nSt clear. The writer can 
only speculate that the prisoners locked up in A, B, I, and J blocks 
were considered troublemakers and, in an attempt to avoid a major inci­
dent, were segregated from the general inmate population.
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sets were to be placed in the H and E sections of the west wing cell 
blocks. Additionally, the inmates threatened not to eat, work, or 
move until the commissioner of the state department of correction came 
to the prison yard with representatives of the two Raleigh newspapers 
and, in their presence, promise to meet the prisoners1 demands.
In response to the riot, the following actions were taken:
(1) The sheet metal and stainless steel fabrication industry was moved 
from Central Prison to Blanch Prison. (2) The building which had been 
used for education classes at Central was converted to Central Youth 
Center. This facility now houses approximately 150 felons under 
twenty-one years of age. (3) Central Prison inmates working in the 
highway sign shop, the license tag plant, and the print shop were 
replaced by youthful offenders from Central Youth Center. (4) Two 
medium custody institutions, Odom Correctional Institution and 
Caledonia Correctional Institution, were upgraded and reclassified as 
close custody units; many inmates involved in the riot were then 
transferred to these two units. (5) In order to house some of the 
rioters at Odom and Caledonia, it was necessary to transfer inmates 
from these two institutions to other medium custody units. Two 
additional field units had to be upgraded and reclassified as medium 
custody (Based on personal correspondence between Carolyn H. Wyland, 
Administrative Assistant, North Carolina Department of Correction, and 
the writer).
P ennsyIvania
Pennsylvania had two riots during the period covered by this
&
study. The first occurred on May 22, 1968, at the State Correctional
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Institution at Camp Hill and was precipitated by attacks on white 
inmates by black inmates. During the racial confrontation, approxi­
mately twenty white inmates were injured. This disturbance led to the
initiation of the following reform measures: (1) Additional black
personnel were hired. (2) The regulation of black literature was 
relaxed. (3) Black studies were introduced into the prison. (4) Per­
mission was granted to hold Black Muslim services within the
institution.
The second riot took place on July 23, 1971, at the State Cor­
rectional Institution at Graterford. A spontaneous eruption between 
two inmates who had been confined to the maximum security block pro­
voked a disturbance which resulted in injuries to one inmate and eight 
correction officers. Reform measures, though vague, included some 
minor internal changes in operating procedures within the maximum 
security block, and the processing of cases in the institution on a 
temporary or transitory basis pending classification and permanent 
assignment or placement (Based on personal correspondence between Mr. 
Allyn R. Sielaff, Commissioner of Correction, Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, and the writer).
New York State Correctional Facilities
New York State experienced frequent riots and lesser dis­
turbances in its correctional institutions during the period January, 
1969 to September, 1971. With few exceptions, the New York Department 
of Correctional Services failed to acknowledge the introduction of 
reform measures in its correspondence with the writer. However, some 
of the predisposing causes of the riots were identified and are
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considered important to the discussion. Following is a listing of 
occurrences by institution.
Auburn Correctional Facility. On November 2, 1970, a general 
work slowdown took place in the plate and tailor shops at the Auburn 
Correctional Facility. Later in the day, several inmates took pos­
session of a yard microphone and urged other inmates, both black and 
white, not to go to work in honor of Black Solidarity Day. Advised of 
the tenseness of the situation, the superintendent of the prison 
declared a half holiday.
A second disturbance at Auburn occurred on December 20, 1970, 
and involved approximately thirty-four inmates in a special housing unit. 
After being released from their cells for the purpose of exercising out­
doors, they refused to return to their calls or go out for their exercise 
period.
Elmira Correctional Facility. Approximately twenty inmates 
created a disturbance in their block over the locking up of a militant 
at the Elmira Correctional Facility on July 16, 1970. The disturbance 
was contained without further incident.
Glenham Correctional Facility. A Spanish-speaking inmate at 
Glenham Correctional Facility was observed piercing his ear on July 11,
1970. When instructed to go to the hospital ward, he refused to do so 
and began cursing and shouting. Later that day, other Spanish-speaking 
inmates turned up the television and began smashing chairs and windows.. 
Considerable damage was done to two wards of the facility, and three
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officers were treated for injuries resulting from blows by broom han­
dles and chair legs.
Great Meadow Correctional Facility, Over a period of twenty 
months, the Great Meadow Correctional Facility at Comstock experienced 
five different disturbances.
On April 21, 19&9> some 335 inmates refused to come in from the 
exercise yard for the evening meal. When the deputy superintendent 
promised to discuss their grievances with them the next day, they reluc­
tantly returned to the mess hall and to their cells. On October ^ that 
same year, twenty-three inmates, who had been transferred from the 
Clinton Correctional Facility the day before, refused to eat breakfast 
and twenty-seven refused to eat supper. Eventually, all returned to 
their routines, although seven held out for almost a week. On 
November 19, 1970* inmates in the carpenter shop struck, apparently in 
protest over having to make billy clubs, and attempted to gain the sup­
port of other inmates. Leaders were locked up, and the situation 
returned to normal. This incident was followed by a sitdown strike in 
the mess hall on December 29, 1970. The superintendent addressed the 
inmates and they decided to return to work, but not without the approval 
of a militant leader. On January 11, 1971* approximately fifty inmates 
refused to leave the mess hall. Prison officials, to include a large 
group of officers, entered the mess hall and ordered the inmates to fall 
in, to which they responded without resistance. The following day, the 
entire prison population refused to leave the yard for work and school, 
but gave in shortly because of cold weather. v
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Graen Haven. Correctional Facility. A disturbance erupted in the 
mass hall of the Green Haven Correctional Facility on March 5, 1970.
The disturbance was precipitated by a black inmate who threw his tray 
of food and stood on the table and attempted to make a speech urging 
other inmates to rebel. When officers attempted to remove the agitator 
from the mess hall, fifty other inmates began to yell and run around the 
mess hall throwing trays and utensils. The disturbance subsided quickly, 
but not before several inmates and officers were injured.
New York Statefs Attica Correctional Facility. The Attica Cor­
rectional Facility had a work stoppage in its metal manufacturing shops 
on July 29, 1970. The disturbance involved approximately 450 inmates 
and resulted from agitation on the part of a group of Black Panthers and 
white militants demanding higher wages, lower commissary prices, and 
more yard time. The following day, the inmates again refused to work, 
holding out for higher wages. Prison authorities decided to call in the 
state commissioner of corrections, who talked with inmate representa­
tives and "agreed to increase wages from the previous 6 to 29 cents per 
day to 25c to $1.00 per day” (The Official Report of the New York State 
Special Commission on Attica, 1972:129). Further, an evaluation of the 
commissary operation resulted in an order from the state department of 
correctional services indicating that no commissary would operate at a 
profit in excess of five percent.
A state of unrest prevailed again on November 2, 1970, when a 
report was received that there were over 100 black inmates who stated 
that, because of Black Solidarity Day, they should not leave the 
recreation yard at the appointed time, nor would they obey any white
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man's orders. Five leaders were identified, taken from the group, and 
placed in segregation. After the seizing of the leaders by prison 
authorities, the remainder of the inmates filed into the mess hall when 
ordered to do so (Based on personal correspondence between Mr. Edward M. 
Carroll, Executive Assistant, New York Department of Correctional 
Services, and the writer).
Because of its significance, the riot that occurred at the 
Attica Correctional Facility in September, 1971* will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter. Much information concerning the causes and 
consequences of prison violence can be gleaned from the Attica riot.
It therefore lends itself particularly well to the subject at hand and 
is worthy of special consideration in a separate chapter.
Idaho State Penitentiary
The Idaho State Penitentiary had a disturbance on August 10, 
1971* during which two inmates were stabbed and approximately $15*000 
in property damage was incurred. A special investigating committee 
identified the following causes: (l) The month of August was unusually
warm with temperatures exceeding 110 degrees in the cell houses much of 
the time, making it almost impossible for the inmates to sleep. (2)
Just prior to the disturbance, an underground tunnel was found in a 
separate housing unit for long term offenders. Some of the inmates 
believed that an informant in the institution supplied the adminis­
tration with the whereabouts of the tunnel. (3) An Inmate, who had 
been sentenced to the penitentiary on a morals charge, was stabbed to 
death. At the time of the stabbing, the inmate,, was being housed on a 
tier where there was strong inmate resentment toward the offense.
. Wl
(b) Agitation by a group of* inmates prevailed. (5) Humors qf inmate 
complaints concerning unsanitary conditions relative primarily to food 
and water spread throughout the institution.
The investigating committee found other predisposing causes for 
the disturbance. One of these centered around the fact that, prior to 
March, 1969, the penitentiary had been primarily custodial-orienteci. 
However, as a result of a study by the American Correctional Association 
and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, many rehabilitative 
changes were recommended. As new programs such as counseling, psychi­
atric, educational, and medical services were implemented, there appeared 
to be some resentment on the part of the officer staff to the changes.
Some of the other predisposing causes cited by the committee are 
as follows: (l) Security personnel had failed to follow and/or read
orders pertaining to their respective posts. (2) There was no on-going 
training program in effect. (3) There was a shortage of personnel and 
a high personnel turnover. (^) The prison facilities were outmoded.
(5) Prison officials were preoccupied with a forthcoming move to a new 
site— the state had a new correctional facility under construction at 
the time. (6) There was a conflict between custodial and rehabilitative 
philosophies which was accentuated by rapid implementation of new pro­
grams. (7) The inmate population was characterized by an influx of 
assaultive, aggressive, anti-authority, drug-oriented, young inmates.
(8) There were insufficient facilities to segregate the young, assaultive 
inmates and the older, hard-core inmates front the general population.
From all indications, the disturbance was a'spontaneous eruption 
augmented by many of the problems confronting the institution during a
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period of change. According to the state director of corrections, 
inmate grievances could have been achieved through legitimate- grievance 
procedures if an appropriate report had been made. Inmate demands 
included the following: (1) The monthly commissary allowance was to be
increased from $25.00 to $40.00. (2) Two additional visits per month
were to be authorized for approved visitors. (3) Certain personnel on 
the hospital staff were to be replaced, (4) The kitchen food supervisor 
was to be removed. (5) Ventilating fans were to be installed in the 
cell-houses. (6) The inmates demanded that food preparation and sani­
tation facilities be improved. (7) Finally, it was demanded that com­
munication between staff and inmates be increased (Based on personal 
correspondence between Mr. Raymond W, May, Director of Corrections,
State of Idaho, and the writer).
Louisiana State Penitentiary
A riotous situation involving most of the black prisoners at 
the Louisiana State Penitentiary occurred on August 13, 1971. The 
disturbance took the form of an organized, planned protest attributed 
to outside agitation. No reforms or changes resulted from this 
situation, as the prisoners* demands were considered unrealistic. Some 
of their demands were reportedly already being met and the others were 
for things over which prison officials had no control or jurisdiction 
(Based on personal correspondence between Mr. J. D. Middlebrooks, Chief 
of the Louisiana State Correctional Services Division, and the writer).
California State Correctional Facilities
As in the State of New York, California has experienced frequent.
.tfi?
outbursts of mass violence in its prisons during recent years. Three
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black.inmates were killed, and a white inmate was wounded in January,
1970, when a tower guard fired his weapon to break up a fight in an 
exercise yard of the maximum security unit at the Soledad Correctional 
Training Facility. Several days later, a correctional officer was mur­
dered by three black inmates at Soledad. A second officer was murdered 
at Soledad in July, 1970, a third in March, 1971, and a. fourth in May,
1971. A strike took place at the California State Prison at Folsom in 
November, 1970. This was followed by an unsuccessful strike effort at 
the California Men's Colony, San Luis Obispo, in March, 1971. While 
standing outside the hospital cell of a prisoner who had been stabbed 
two days earlier, an officer at San Quentin was murdered by two or three 
unidentified inmates in July, 1971.
These incidents culminated in an escape attempt at San Quentin 
in August, 1971, during which three correctional officers and two inmates 
were murdered, and another inmate was killed while attempting to escape. 
The latter was George Jackson, a self-avowed revolutionary, who was 
facing murder charges as a result of the killing of the correctional 
officer at Soledad in January, 1970 (Report to Governor Ronald Reagan 
on Violence in California Prisons, 1971:4-12). Shortly after the escape 
attempt at San Quentin, Governor Reagan directed the Board of Cor­
rections to review the incident, along with other incidents of violence 
which had occurred over a two-year period in California correctional 
institutions, and to make recommendations to him regarding ways and 
means of halting the increased tempo of violence while providing for 
the safety of inmates and correction officers^alike.
45
In its report to Governor Reagan, the Board suggested that many 
of the incidents resulted from the unlawful activities of self- 
proclaimed revolutionary forces operating both inside and outside prison 
walls. At one point the report states: "Information from several
sources alleged that some outside attorneys had encouraged disruptions 
in prisons, such as hunger strikes and riots, as a means of generating 
unfavorable publicity” (Report to Governor Ronald Reagan on Violence in 
California Prisons, 1971:10), In fact, one attorney was charged with 
murder and conspiracy in connection with the escape attempt at San 
Quentin. Moreover, radical groups and underground newspapers were 
thought to take advantage of the January, 1970, tragedy at Soledad to 
launch a campaign against the California Department of Corrections and 
its programs. Reputed false and inflammatory reports were circulated 
concerning the incident, the operation of Soledad, and the prison system 
in general (Report to Governor Ronald Reagan on Violence in California 
Prisons, 1971:4).
In response to the violence and agitation in California prisons, 
the state department of corrections has made a number of program changes 
and reforms, some of which are as follows: (l) It is now generally
accepted in California that costly long-term lock-up in state prisons 
should be reserved only for those persons who cannot be safely controlled 
in the free community. This is a broad reform of considerable signifi­
cance. (2) For the first time in the history of the department of cor­
rections, double celling (the practice of assigning two men to a cell 
designed for only one) has been eliminated. (3) The department of cor- 
rections has started the nation’s largest program of family visitations
in which wives, children, and parents of inmates may visit in nrivary 
tor two-day periods. This privilege is extended only to married 
prisoners, however. (k) The community re-entry process has been' 
strengthened with the establishment of three-day passes for men and 
women nearing parole. Such temporary leaves are designed to facilitate 
the resocialization of the inmate into the free community. (5) The 
department has embarked on an intensive minority recruitment campaign 
aimed at attracting additional blacks and Chicanos (Mexican-Americans) 
to the payroll. (6) The department has expanded “work furlough’* in 
which inmates are permitted to leave institutions during working hours 
in order to hold jobs in the community.
Other significant reforms include the following: (7) New voca­
tional training courses, i.e., deep-sea diving, computer programming, 
and animal psychology, were added to the list of job training classes, 
(8) Academic programs were expanded to include junior college classes 
and black and brown studies programs. (9) The state’s pre-sentence 
diagnostic program was expanded. (10) A number of changes were made to 
head off criticisms of the indeterminate sentence. (11) An employee 
safety committee was established and represents three main employee 
organizations— California Correctional Officers* Association, Teamster’s 
Union Number 9^0, and the California State Employees* Association. 
Representatives of these organizations are designated to survey cor­
rectional institutions on a regular basis and to make recommendations 
to the warden for improving employee and inmate safety (Report to 
Governor Ronald Reagan on Violence in California Prisons, 1971:1^-20).
Vermont State Prison and House of Correction for Man
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Approximately seventy-five inmates at the Vermont State Prison 
were engaged in a major disturbance which began on September 29, 1971, 
and ended on October 3, 1971« While the general unrest which prevailed 
in prisons throughout the country at that time may have been a preci­
pitating factor, the immediate cause of the uprising was attributed to 
the removal of wooden lockers, shelving, and other combustible materials 
from the cells. Specifically, the inmates indicated that the order was 
carried out without sufficient lead time to permit them to send excess 
personal items home.
A list of demands similar to those presented at Attica and else­
where was submitted to State Corrections Commissioner Kent Stoneman.
It was, however, admittedly prepared hastily by inmates who agreed that 
some of the demands did not actually apply to Vermont. For example, 
one demand was for special food for Black Muslims when there had never 
been more than one or two blacks at any given time in the total cor­
rectional system and no one had professed to be a Muslim.
Changes made as a direct result of the disturbance included ini­
tiation of scheduled inspections of the prison kitchen by the state 
health department, establishment of an uncensored inmate magazine, and 
installation of metal storage lockers to replace the wooden lockers. A 
committee had already been appointed to review existing rules and regu­
lations for possible reform. Some of the changes made as a result of 
the committee's efforts include an end to mail censorship and elimination 
of restrictions on correspondence, greatly liberalized visiting 
privileges, and the complete revision of disciplinary procedures. Com­
missioner Stoneman points out that these latter changes would have
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occurred in any event, but he admits that the spaed with which they were 
accomplished was hastened by the fact that there had been a disturbance 
(Based on personal correspondence between Mr. Kent Stoneman, Com­
missioner, Vermont State Department of Corrections, and the writer).
Maine State Prison
There was a disorder of some magnitude at the Main State Prison 
on October 12, 1971. Tension and unrest in the prison had been 
increasing since the early part of September. This was attributed to 
disorders in others prisons, along with the highly publicized concessions 
made as a result of strikes, violence^ and disorders. Another important 
factor was the widespread emphasis on the civil rights of prisoners, 
advocates of which tend to regard prisoners as a deprived minority 
unjustly oppressed by prison administrators.
It is also believed that discontent had been intensified by the 
medium of group therapy sessions conducted by a visiting psychologist 
employed by the vocational rehabilitation program at the prison. For 
instance, it is believed that the therapy group discussed inadequacies 
of the prison and its management, and that the discussions led to pro­
posed changes which were later incorporated into a list of inmate demands. 
Prison shortcomings discussed by the therapy group, had they been known 
to the prison administration, might well have been resolved and unrest 
thereby avoided. But the psychologist apparently regarded these matters 
as privileged communications and felt that he had no other type of 
responsibility to the prison as such.
The inmate council met with the warde# on October 10, and 
reported that inmates assigned to work in the kitchen were planning a
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work strike on October 12. The main complaint of the kitchen inmates 
was that they wanted one of the officer chefs removed, apparently 
because of his sometimes abrasive and authoritarian personality. Removal 
of the chef was not considered feasible, however, under pressure from 
the inmates.
On October 11, prison officials met with the inmate council, 
during which the latter presented a list containing twenty-seven demands. 
Although many of the demands were considered reasonable and could have 
been resolved, others were not thought by authorities to be as reasonable. 
With the list came a demand that, unless the matters were resolved 
immediately, the kitchen inmates would not work on October 12, and a 
general strike would take place the following day. The meeting reached 
an impasse and the inmates scheduled to go to work in the kitchen on 
October 12 refused to do so, thus indicating that a general strike would 
occur the following day. In anticipation of the work strike, the warden 
decided to keep all but the kitchen inmates locked up and was therefore
able to maintain control over the immediate situation.
Shortly after the warden announced that inmates were not to be 
released from their cells, the disorder began. It grew steadily worse 
and continued until the instigators could be separated from the rest of 
the inmate population. After considerable property damage, noisemaking, 
and threatening remarks from the inmates, the warden made an appeal 
through the inmate council, but the council failed to respond and was
suspended a few days later.
Following is a listing of some of the changes that were made
-  . ..
subsequent to the disturbance: (1) There were several changes in prison
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regulations, the nature of which were not specified. (2) Prisoners 
were granted permission to draw $10.00 worth of canteen tickets twice 
weekly. (3) Permissible income from inmate craft work was raised from 
$1,800 to $2,400 annually. An inmate who agreed to deposit $300 each 
year in his prison account, and further agreed not to withdraw it until 
his release, would be permitted to earn up to $2,600 per year. (4)
Funds with which to install hot water plumbing in the cells were 
requested from the state legislature. (5) Although the inmate council 
was suspended, an inmate legislative committee was to be formed to work 
with the staff regarding proposed laws. (6) Plans were being made to 
establish a college level study program through the University of Maine. 
(7) An "exit" program designed to assist men being released was underway 
(Based on personal correspondence between Mr. R. D. Kennedy, Acting 
Warden, Maine State Prison, and the writer).
Tennessee Prison for Women
The State of Tennessee had a riot in its women's prison at 
Nashville in November, 1971, that resulted in an estimated $4,000 
damage. Some of the factors which led to the disturbance are as fol­
lows: (1) The inmates wanted censorship of mail banned. (2) They
thought that they were not getting the same privileges as male inmates 
at other institutions. (3) They wanted better educational facilities.
(4) They wanted better recreational opportunities. (5) They wanted to 
be treated as adults and not as children alleged to derive from "Mickey 
Mouse" rules.
In response to the grievances, the fallowing actions were taken: 
(1) Other than checking for contraband, the censorship of mail was
51
b a n n e d .  (2) Visitation privileges were improved. (3) The educational 
program was upgraded with college-level courses being offered by the 
University of Tennessee and taught behind the walls. (4) A better 
recreational program was developed, and a full-time recreation director 
was appointed. (5) The so-called "Hickey House" rules were abolished 
(Based on personal correspondence between Hr. William B. Hodges,
Director of Information, Tennessee Department of Correction, and the 
writer).
Kansas State Penitentiary
The Kansas State Penitentiary at Lansing had a minor disturbance 
on September 27, 1971, when prisoners assigned to food service details 
refused to go to work. In an article in the Topeka State Journal,
Warden R. J. Gaffney was quoted as saying: . . the work stoppage
apparently was over 'Petty grievances.1 He mentioned low incentive pay 
for working in the prison industries and said prisoners objected to 
being fed too much pork" (September 23, 1971:2). Hi a personal conver­
sation between the writer and several inmates who were at Lansing at 
the time of the strike, it was brought out that there was a lack of com­
munication between staff and inmates. Further, the inmates mentioned 
that, prior to the strike, the prison's athletic teams were comprised 
entirely of blacks and that some remarks in the dressing room one day 
led to a minor clash between blacks and whites. The inmates suggested 
that this incident may have had something to do with , the strike in 
September, 1971.
Warden Gaffney, a retired military pdlice officer and a 
reformist in his own right, is quick to boast that his institution will
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never have a riot in the strict sense of the word. He attributes this 
to a number of factors, but namely the prisons "no hostage" rule.
That is, officers would shoot to kill any convict who took a hostage 
within the prison, even at the risk of killing the hostage.
Functionally speaking, the Kansas State Penitentiary is operated 
along military lines. The rank and file resemble that of a military 
organization and, in fact, consist almost entirely of former military 
personnel, many of whom have retired from the military service. This 
has certain advantages as the majority of the employees have had cor­
rectional experience in the military service and, in many cases, their 
salary serves to supplement their retirement pay, or vice versa. On 
the average, the Lansing Prison ha3 employees who are both better paid 
and more experienced, and this would seem to lend itself to a more pro­
fessional and, hence, more effective correctional program.
Based on personal observations, the Kansas State Penitentiary 
appears to be making progress in terms of penal reform. Warden Gaffney 
has a wide variety of programs underway and others under study. These 
include programs aimed at giving prisoners training in occupations In 
which there is a shortage of workers outside prison. At present, the 
programs concentrate on such things as auto mechanics, drafting, welding., 
machine shop, woodwork, leatherwork, barbering, and even horseshoeing. 
There are also private industry-sponsored courses including a Philco- 
Ford motor repair course and a Radio Corporation of America (RCA) course 
in computer programming. Depending on his job in the institution, a 
prisoner can earn as much as thirty cents a^3ty in incentive pay. At 
last report, this amount was expected to increase to sixty-five cents
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per day. Prisoners can earn additional money through the blood donor 
program at the rate of $5.00 per week. The 1970 legislature authorized 
prisoners vzith excellent records to work outside the walls during the 
day. The prison is also experimenting with a home visitation program 
whereby well-behaved inmates can be allowed to go home three times a 
year for up to ten days at a time. In another incentive program, 
prisoners can accumulate ’’good time” to be deducted from their sentences 
at the rate of three days per month. This amount exceeds the usual 
"time-off-for-good-behavior" concept.
Long Binh Stockade
In spite of advanced policies of the United States Army in the 
field of corrections, it has not remained immune to prison violence.
For example, the author personally witnessed what has emerged as perhaps 
the worst prison riot in the modern history of the United States Army at 
the military stockade at Long Binh (or L.B.J. for Long Binh Jail, as its 
inmates called it) in South Vietnam during the summer of 1968.
Although the stockade was built to accommodate a maximum of 400 
prisoners, at the time of the riot it was overcrowded with approximately 
700 military prisoners whose crimes ranged from going AWOL or smoking 
marijuana to theft and murder. As it turned out, however, overcrowding 
had little to do, at least directly, with the trouble at Long Binh.
The riot began with a disturbance between a relatively small 
number of blacks and whites in the medium security section of the 
stockade. Military policemen armed with nightsticks entered the com­
pound to separate the prisoners, but were overpowered and relieved of 
their keys. Moments later the riotous prisoners, their behavior
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reinforced by their initial success, unlocked the gates of the medium 
security area and rushed into the stockade's central courtyard. There, 
led by a group of blacks, the rioters overpowered the guards on duty, 
leaving some of them beaten and bloody on the ground* The prisoners 
then proceeded to unlock the maximum security cell block and to set fire 
to a number of tents and buildings, several of which, including the 
administration building, burned to the ground.
About an hour after the riot started, military police rein­
forcements arrived at the stockade. Thus bolstered, the tower guards 
ordered the rioters to "cease and desist." Many obeyed. About 250 
hardened prisoners, the majority of them black, refused and shouted 
obscenities at the guards. When a force of military policemen advanced 
with fixed bayonets, throwing tear gas grenades as they approached, the 
blacks fought back with sticks, rocks, and metal rods. Xn the melee, a 
number of military policemen, including the confinement officer, and a 
large number of the rioters were injured. One white prisoner was killed, 
reportedly clubbed to death by black prisoners.
When order was restored, military police sorted the prisoners 
into "cooperatives" and "uncooperatives." The uncooperatives, all black 
except for several Puerto Ricans, were locked in an enclosed part of the 
stockade. With this action, stockade officials assumed that the 
rebellion was over. This, as it turned out, was a premature conclusion. 
Secure in the knowledge that their records had been destroyed along with 
the administration building, the black militants gave false names and 
service numbers. Many of them shed their uniforms and donned white 
kerchiefs and African style robes fashioned from Army blankets.
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Keenly aware of the sensitivity of the civil rights -issue at 
the time, military officials decided not to take the uncooperatives 
by force, but, rather, to wait them out. Each day, cases of C-rations 
were tossed over the fence into the area in which the uncooperatives 
were confined. Army investigators and stockade officials, questioned the 
"prisoners" about their grievances. Many of them indicated that they 
wanted out of the Army and out of Vietnam. Besides expressing the 
customary stockade grievances, some of the blacks asserted that white 
guards had abused them verbally and had given white prisoners far better 
treatment. By military standards, the handling of the holdouts was per­
missive and, to a degree, the policy of restraint worked. Three weeks 
after the riot broke out, only thirteen prisoners were still defying 
stockade discipline.
The riot at Long Binh would seem to have importance both for 
the Army and American society as a whole. Since the late President 
Harry S. Truman integrated the armed forces in 1943, the Army has been 
proud of the opportunities it offers its black soldiers. For the most 
part, relations between white and black troops in Vietnam had been 
good, especially in combat areas where they shared common needs and 
common dangers. In the Long Binh Stockade, with these bonds dissolved, 
black soldiers felt they faced the prejudice that they had faced in the 
ghettos of the United States and rediscovered their resentment of 
authority. In the end, the riot seemed to suggest that the egalitar­
ianism of the Army cannot, by itself, erase the tensions that exist 
between black and white Americans.
As in most incidents of this nature ^ there was no single, iden­
tifiable cause. The compound in which the riot started was predominantly
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Negro, and racial tension was certainly a factor. The racial problems 
did not appear to be directly related to stockade operations. Rather, 
they were a consequence of society’s ills, the environment, and the 
often observed phenomenon of minority members grouping together against 
a common enemy, real or Imagined. Discipline had apparently been lax 
in some instances and unjustly administered in others. Because prisoner 
grievances are unique to a given environment and tend to fluctuate with 
the mood of the prisoner population, specific grievances, other than 
those already mentioned, could not be identified.
Reform measures evolving from the riotous situation at the Long 
Binh Stockade included replacement of the confinement officer with a 
’'no nonsense** military police officer whose basic philosophy was control, 
fair discipline, and meaningful work. Work programs were selected to 
insure productivity and effective utilization of the prisoner's time. 
Last, but not least, the basic plant itself was reconstructed.
SUMMARY
This chapter has represented an attempt to identify some of the 
causes and consequences of prison violence with a view toward estab­
lishing a general cause-effect relationship between violence and change 
in penal institutions. One of the more obvious conclusions that can be 
reached from the preceding discussion is that the causes and effects of 
prison riots are not always readily apparent. This problem will be 
addressed in Chapter 5.
The prison disturbances represented in this chapter occurred in
■
state institutions of varying age, size, and quality: the oldest,
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Vermont’s 164-year-old State Prison and House of Correction for Hen; 
the newest, South Carolina's Maximum Detention Retraining Center at 
Columbia, opened in 1968; the largest, the 3,834 man California Men's 
Colony; and one Of the smallest, the 100-inmate Tennessee Prison, for 
Women (Directory: Correctional Institutions and Agencies, 1970:4-81).
Riots in the Maine State Prison and the South Carolina Maximum 
Detention Retraining Center are believed to have spread by knowledge of 
disturbances in other correctional institutions. In at least two 
prisons, i.e., the Idaho State Penitentiary and the Vermont State Prison 
and House of Correction for Men, the causes of the riots can perhaps 
be traced to changes in the prison system, thus reversing the cause- 
effect relationship. At the Louisiana and California State Prisons, 
it was believed that the riots may have been provoked by agitation or 
revolutionary forces outside the prison. A number of persons were 
convinced that the riot at Attica in September, 1971, was the result 
of a long-planned revolutionary plot. The New York State Special 
Commission on Attica found no evidence to this effect, however.
Complaints concerning food service were made in at least five 
of the prisons examined. Also, it will be noted in Appendix B that 
better food service was among the demands submitted by the inmates at 
the Attica Correctional Facility in September, 1971. The monotony of 
prison diets can be a major source of discontent, and the dining room 
has often been the focal point of prison disturbances. Therefore, good 
food, plentiful and well prepared, would seem to be important in main­
taining harmony within the prison. Although food may occasionally
2#
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become a substitute target for other complaints, it also becomes a 
primary source of pleasure to men deprived of many of the comforts of 
normal life.
While racial tension is known to exist to varying degrees in 
prisons, only two of the riots discussed involved direct confrontations 
between blacks and whites. These occurred in the Pennsylvania State 
Correctional Institution and the Long Binh Stockade. Several other 
disturbances, e.g., those which occurred at the Louisiana State 
Penitentiary in August, 1971, and the Attica Correctional Facility in 
March 1970, and September, 1971, respectively, had what might be con­
sidered racial overtones, meaning that racial issues may have been 
involved. However, there is no indication that these uprisings involved 
overt racial conflicts between blacks and whites. This is not to 
suggest that interracial conflicts do not occur in prisons. Quite the 
contrary. Based on the evidence presented, however, race riots, in the 
usual sense of the term, would seem to be more the exception than the 
rule in penal institutions.
The positive consequences of prison riots are diverse and 
cover a wide range of reforms and innovative programs. Throughout 
this chapter it can be seen that these reforms do not always emanate 
from prisoner demands or grievances. In short, the causes and conse­
quences of prison riots are both complex and varied, thus making a 
systematic analysis of these phenomena extremely difficult.
The next chapter will be devoted to a detailed discussion of 
the riot that occurred in the Attica Correctional Facility in New York 
State in September, 1971. This discussion will develop a profile of a
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major prison, disturbance which will shed light on the dynamics of 
prison violence.
Chapter 4
THE RIOT AT ATTICA: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION
This chapter will concern itself with a critical examination of 
the riot that occurred at New York State's Attica Correctional Facility 
between September 9 and 13, 1971. The purpose here is to indicate some 
of the social forces that come to bear on the prison and provoke violent 
behavior.
Following the riot, a special fact-finding team, known as the
1
New York State Special Commission on Attica, was appointed by Chief 
Judge Stanley Fuld of the New York Court of Appeals and asked to recon­
struct the events that occurred during the rioting and to determine why 
they had happened. The Commission was comprised of nine members, 
including a former inmate, and was headed by Robert B. McKay, Dean of 
the New York University School of Law.
Much of the information contained in this chapter is based on 
the Commission's official report, which was published in September,
1972. The report is germane to this study for several reasons. First, 
to the writer's knowledge, it is the most completely documented report 
compiled on what actually happened at Attica and has general application 
to other prisons. Second, it documents in considerable detail almost 
every aspect of the life and structure of the prison as a major social
^Except where otherwise noted in this chapter, the term "Com­
mission" will refer to the New York State Special Commission on Attica.
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institution. Third, and most important, it is a thorough study of some 
of the causes and consequences of collective violence in a correctional 
institution.
Although the conditions at Attica may not have been identical 
to those in other prisons, it is felt that the problems in that 
institution at the time of the riot are sufficiently representative of 
the prison universe to justify some generalizations. As the Commission 
itself points out: "Attica is every prison; and every prison is Attica"
p(The Official Report of the New York State Special Commission on Attica, 
1972:xii).
For the sake of clarity ana convenience, this chapter will be 
divided into three sections: Attica Before the Riot; Attica During the
Riot; and Attica Following the Riot. Accordingly, the following 
chronology of events will help to explain what happened before, during, 
and after the riot.
ATTICA BEFORE THE RIOT
The Prison
Attica Prison, as it was formerly called, was opened in 1931, 
and had the capacity to accommodate 2,370 inmates (Directory: Cor­
rectional Institutions and Agencies, 1970:52). It is said that Attica 
was to have been the answer to the problem of prison uprisings which 
occurred in the late 1920*s. When it opened, for example, "it was 
widely hailed as the ultimate prison" (The Official Reportv 1972:14).
1 ■■ ■
^Hereafter designated as The Official Report.
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In July, 1970, it was redesignated a ''correctional facility"; however, 
security, rather than rehabilitation, is said to have been the dominant 
theme.
A total institution* Attica is almost completely self-sustaining. 
It has its own powerhouse, commissary, hospital, laundry, chapel, bake- 
shop, and kitchen-mess hall complex. The main housing area consists of 
four cell blocks, lettered A through D (See Figure 1). Each block, 
which holds about 500 inmates, is divided into cell groups called 
"companies.” Inmates live on three floors in each of the four cell 
blocks. A central hallway divides the floors into two cell areas, each 
containing two rows of cells called "galleries." Narrow corridors 
(tunnels) run from the middle of one block to the block opposite it and 
divide the central area into four exercise yards, also lettered A 
through D. The tunnels intersect at a juncture called "Times Square."
C Block
B YardC Yard
A
B
1
o
c
Times
A Tunnel Square % Tunnel c
A Yard D Yard
D Block
Figure 1. Main Cell Blocks and Exercise Yards 
Attica Correctional Facility
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The Inmates
There were 2,243 inmates confined in Attica when the riot began 
on September 9, 1971. Fifty-four percent of these ware black, thirty- 
seven percent white, and nine percent Puerto Rican. Almost eighty 
percent of the inmates were from urban ghettos, and nearly forty 
percent were under thirty years of age. Sixteen percent of the prisoner 
population had completed high school or its equivalent. Only twelve 
percent of the population had no prior police record, and almost seventy 
percent had served time in a state, federal, or local prison before 
coming to Attica. More than half of the inmates had a maximum sentence 
of seven years or less. Murder, robbery, burglary, felonious assault, 
and dangerous drugs head the list of criminal offenses for which 
committed (The Official Report, 1972:490-493).
After conducting extensive interviews with inmates, correction 
officers, observers, and prison experts and administrators, the Com­
mission concluded:
. . . the Attica rebels were part of a new breed of 
younger, more aware inmates, largely black, who came to 
prison full of deep feelings of alienation and hostility 
against the established institutions of law and government, 
enhanced self-esteem, racial pride, and political aware­
ness, and an unwillingness to accept the petty humiliations 
and racism that characterize prison life (The Official 
Report, 1972:105).
The Correctional Staff
At the time of the riot, the correctional staff consisted of 
398 correction officers and supervisors. Oddly enough, there were no 
black officers and only one Puerto Rican on t]he correctional staff. 
Unlike the inmates, correction officers were drawn largely from rural
communities in western New York State and, therefore, were unfamiliar 
with the life-styles of the inmates under their control and supervision. 
There was no formal training program at Attica for correction 
officers between World War II and the late 1 9 5 0 fs, "More than one- 
third of the officers at Attica on September 9 began their jobs during 
that period" (The Official Report, 1972:27). Those who started after 
that were given two weeks training, but many reportedly found the 
instruction useless. As a result, most of the correction officers 
were not properly trained to communicate with the inmates, nor did 
they consider it their duty to understand or resolve inmate problems, 
Beginning in April, 1970, correction officers were allowed to 
"bid" for job openings on the basis of seniority, and many took advan­
tage of this system to transfer from posts involving inmate contact. 
Written examinations, rather than job performance and ability to relate 
to inmates, were the key to promotion among correction officers.
Prison Life in General
Life in prison was generally monotonous and routine. Prisoners 
were required to spend fourteen to sixteen hours (eighteen to twenty 
hours in the case of new inmates) alone in their cells each day. For 
many inmates, weekends signaled increased idleness in their cells. 
Inmates left their cells at the same time each day for meals, recreation 
in the yard, and for work or school. They could talk until 8:00 P.M., 
but then had to read, write, or study until lights went out at ii:00 
P.M. This routine varied very little through the entire term of their 
sentences. *0
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Work programs, MIn theory, work was not compulsory at Attica.
3
But inmates had the choice of working or being keeplocked without pay 
until they changed their minds” (The Official Report, 1972:36). In 
reality, there were too many inmates for too few jobs at Attica. For 
example, there was work for only 250 of the 450 inmates assigned to the 
metal shop. The metal shop was considered by inmates to be the worst 
assignment at the institution and it became a sort of "dumping ground" 
for new inmates and those without job assignments. The vast majority 
of those assigned to the metal shop were black and Spanish-speaking, 
and they saw in their assignment merely another form of exploitation 
of minority labor. There was considerable racial discrimination in 
job assignments with white inmates dominating the more desirable jobs. 
Although he was aware of charges of racial discrimination, the deputy 
superintendent claimed that he had introduced a quota system to insure 
racial balance in jobs and that racial discrimination no longer existed 
in the institution. The Commission found evidence which would tend to 
indicate otherwise.
Educational program. Twelve percent of the inmates were 
enrolled in the prison1s school program. Those "inmates who scored 
below 5.0 on the Stanford Achievement Test administered during the 
reception period were compelled to attend school until they reached 
at least that level" (The Official Report, 1972:41). Students 
received a fixed wage of twenty-five cents a day. Such a meager wage
As the term implies, "keeplocked" simply means that an inmate 
is kept locked in his cell.
discouraged some inmates who might otherwise have been interested in 
furthering their education and increased the resentment of those who 
were forced to attend school. Since the number of inmates in a class 
could be increased without affecting security appreciably, the school, 
like the metal shop, was used by the administration as a ''dumping 
ground" for inmates who could not otherwise be employed.
Recreation. Recreational opportunities at Attica were limited. 
There was no gymnasium and no trained recreation director on the staff. 
Virtually all recreation took place in the yards. Unfortunately, the 
yards were crowded and chaotic, and baseball players often collided 
with basketball players. Inmates were free to spend an hour to an hour 
and a half in the yards on weekdays, and about six hours on weekends, 
weather permitting.
Clothing and personal hygiene. Prison uniforms were coarse, 
drab, and ill-fitting, and were reissued to inmates until they wore 
out. The clothing, made in the prison tailor shop, was too hot in the 
summer and too cold in the winter. Toilet articles, such as tooth­
brushes, toothpaste, shampoo, and razors and blades had to be purchased 
at the inmate's expense or sent to him by friends or relatives. There 
was no hot water in the cells and the majority of the prison population 
could shower only once a week.
Meals. "In his 19/1 annual report, Superintendent Mancusi 
wrote that Attica provided 'meals which are tasty, possess eye appeal 
and contain the necessary nutritional ingredients to provide a 
balanced diet*" (The Official Report, 1972:47). In sampling the food,
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however, the Cotnmission found that it did not meet Mancusi's description.
Although the ingredients were of good quality, the preparation rendered
some food virtually inedible. Muslims ware forbidden by their religion 
to eat pork. However, frequent recourse to the prisonfs swine herd for 
main dishes and cooking fats was a means of holding down food costs.
It was once rumored that pork products were being described as beef on 
the menus.
Reading material. Although the prison library contained 
approximately 50,000 volumes, the law library collection was limited.
For security reasons, inmates were not permitted to go to the library 
and browse. Instead, they had to make selections from a catalog kept 
by another inmate. There were no newspapers available in the library. 
Seventeen different magazines were received by the library, but there 
was only one copy of each issue for over 2,000 inmates. Prior to
March, 1971, all publications were censored by the prison's director of
education. In March, 1971, a media review committee was established to 
insure that incoming material was acceptable reading for inmates.
Visitations. As a rule, inmates were allowed to receive visits 
from their wives, children, parents, brothers, sisters, attorneys, 
clergymen, and certain others with special approval. However, for many, 
the right to receive visitors was illusory. Most inmates were poor and 
from New York City. Transportation from New York to Attica was pro­
hibitive, both in terms of travel time and money, for many families and 
relatives. r,When visitors did come, the experience was degrading for 
both visitors and inmate” (The Official Report, 1972:61). The inmate,
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for example, was subjected to a thorough body search before and after 
the visit. A mesh screen between inmate and visitor prevented all but 
minimal contact. Throughout the visit, inmates and their visitors 
were under the watchful eye Of two correction officers positioned at 
one end of the room.
Medical care. According to the Commission, ”medical care was 
one of the primary inmate grievances'* (1972:63). The medical staff was 
headed by two doctors who were also engaged in general practice in 
nearby communities. When queried by the Commission, both doctors 
expressed strong negative feelings, even antagonism, toward many of the 
inmates. Little time was spent with a patient, and the normal doctor- 
patient relationship was missing. If an inmate took issue with "the 
doctor's disposition of his complaint, he was often threatened with 
commitment to the psychiatric ward . . . "  (The Official Report, 1972: 
66). Jerry Haleva, a consultant for a legislative committee investi­
gating prison conditions in California, says:
In most prisons, doctors' attitudes are little better 
than the facilities. "Medical care is dispensed with a 
different standard in prisons than it is in the community"
. • o • "Inmates are thought of as prisoners first and 
patients second" (Time, July 9, 1973:36).
Dental care. The prison had two full-time dentists. When 
inmates were examined upon admission to the institution, their teeth 
were found to be in generally poor condition. Since their schedules 
did not allow for extensive restorative work, little effort was made 
to save teeth. Many prisoners refused all but emergency dental work
'v>jr
for fear of the pain involved.
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Psychiatric care. A large portion of the psychiatrists1 time 
was spent evaluating inmates for parole hearings, transfers to other 
institutions, and in response to special requests from agencies outside 
the prisono Therefore, psychiatrists were unable "to provide other 
than an occasional consultation and direct supervision when a true 
crisis occurred” (The Official Report, 1972:70), Even when inmates 
had appointments, they sometimes had to wait months to be seen by a 
psychiatrist. Inmates with possible mental or emotional disorders 
were sometimes given tranquilizers and other supportive drugs in hopes 
that these would help avert serious or repeated episodes of uncon­
trollable behavior. Lacking proper treatment during the early stages, 
some inmates became worse than they would have been otherwise, and this 
led to increasing numbers of highly disturbed inmates. In this regard, 
the Commission points out:
. • .the build-up of emotional tension, the increased 
number of emotionally disturbed inmates, and the lack of 
effective means of defusing the increasing pressures as 
these were generated were all anticipated and identified 
by the supervising psychiatrist before the uprising and 
he had expressed his fears and misgivings about the 
rising tension and disturbed climate within the prison 
on several earlier occasions to the prison authorities 
(1972:71).
Religion. Only fifteen percent of the prison population
attended church services regularly. Those who did, did so because it
gave them the opportunity to leave their cells and socialize. The
prison was without a minister for the Black Muslims, although efforts
had been made to obtain one. As a consequence, no meeting place or
organized services were available to the Black Muslims. Instead, they 
$
took advantage of recreation periods in the yard to worship and engage
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in physical fitness activities as encouraged by their religion. The 
Commission determined that:
The administration and officers never understood the 
Muslims. They were never given information about what 
Muslims believed, and .Muslims saw no reason to explain 
themselves to hostile officers. Officers, ignorant of 
Muslim beliefs, assumed that a black group which conducted 
itself with an internal, almost military, discipline and 
conditioning was committed to violence (1972:73).
Prison rules. The rules at Attica were selectively enforced 
and poorly communicated. After November, 1970, rule books were no 
longer distributed to inmates upon their arrival at the institution, 
and there were no other provisions for communicating the rules to 
inmates or, for that matter, correction officers. In the absence of 
generally understood guidelines, new officers were instructed essen­
tially as follows: '‘Until you are familiar with what is allowed, tell
inmates 'No* when they ask for any special permission*' (The Official 
Report, 1972:74). Accordingly, correction officers had great discretion 
in interpreting and enforcing the rules. This made favoritism, dis­
crimination, and harrassment by officers easy. Inmates were kept off 
balance not knowing what to expect from day to day, and often learned 
the rules only when they broke them. Although the administration was 
aware that this situation existed, little or nothing was done about it. 
Many rules were senseless and served no useful purpose. As the Com­
mission reflected in its report:
. . .Inmates at Attica, but not at other prisons, were 
prohibited from chewing gum, because discarded gum had 
created a housekeeping problem; they were required to march 
to the mess hall and to their jobs with^their hands at 
their sides, to stand up in their cells when they were 
counted, to avoid loud conversation in the halls, to 
turn out their lights at a prescribed hour; they could
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not wear hats Indoors, grow a mustache, or have sideburns 
of more than a prescribed length (1972:75-76).
Although the prison commissary sold items which required heating, i.e.,
4coffee, tea, and soup, "droppers" were prohibited in cells.
Inmate security. Inmates had little sense of security at Attica, 
particularly during the first weeks of imprisonment. The unwary were 
subjected to sexual advances and often had to choose between fighting 
or submitting. If the inmate submitted, he was likely to be labelled a 
'homo." Thereafter, ,!his only hope of companionship and protection from 
frequent assault was in continuing submission" (The Official Report, 
1972:78). The apprehension of being sexually assaulted caused many of 
the younger inmates to carry homemade knives for self defense. Because 
of the low officer-inmate ratio, correction officers could not maintain 
the degree of surveillance necessary to preclude sexual assaults. As 
a result, inmates had little confidence in the ability of the officers 
to protect them.
Racism between officers and inmates. It was reported that "the 
relationship between most officers and inmates was characterized by 
fear, hostility, and mistrust, nurtured by racism" (The Official Report, 
1972:80). Although segregation was supposedly abandoned at Attica in 
the mid-1960*s, the Commission found that it still pervaded the prison 
in varying degrees. Except during their military service, many Attica 
officers had never been exposed to blacks before. Some officers
^A dropper is a homemade immersion^coil used by inmates to heat 
water or other liquids in their cells.
actively discouraged black-white relationships by threatening to with­
hold certain privileges. The Commission acknowledged that "racism amon 
Attica officers may be no greater than what is present in society at 
large, but its effect is more intense at Attica" (1972:81). It was 
also noted that racism existed among the inmates, most of whom carried 
prejudices with them to Attica. "Racial attitudes," reports the Com­
mission, "were an undeniable factor among the tensions leading to the 
uprising" (1972:82). The Commission made the following additional 
observations:
. • . Aggressive responses to racial bias are increasingly 
common outside prison, and this trend exists inside as well.
Inmates today feel that they have the right, even as prisoners, 
to rebel against being further put down on the basis of race.
Racism has always been an unsettling force in this country.
The openly rebellious reaction to it developed gradually, but 
by now must be recognized as an explosive reality, within 
prison as well as "outside." While it is a microcosm 
reflecting the forces and emotions of the larger society, 
the prison actually magnifies and intensifies these forces, 
because it is so enclosed. In prison there is no possible 
escape from oppression (1972:82).
Parole practices. "In practice, the Parole Board--not the 
judge--decides how long an inmate will serve time," says the Commission 
(1972:93). Inmates, parole officers, and corrections personnel all 
agreed that the parole system was a primary source of tension and bit­
terness within the walls of the Attica facility. Under existing laws, 
offenders can be sentenced to minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment 
After serving the minimum sentence, the inmate becomes eligible for 
release or parole. Occasionally, the decisions of the parole board
are arbitrary. For example, some inmates with a long record of
■ )j&
offenses may receive parole, while others, including first offenders,'
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may be denied parole. The Commission points out in its discussion: 
''Inmate frustration is probably inherent in any system which can make 
a determination to deny him freedom, but procedures in effect in New 
York have the result of magnifying the frustrations" (1972:95). Parole 
conditions were well known by the inmates at the time of the uprising 
at Attica. The Commission observes:
. • • These conditions were a major factor in the per­
vasive discontent of those who awaited parole with eagerness 
despite what they knew to be the frustrations. Even a 
substantial improvement in conditions inside the prison 
walls will not alleviate anxiety and frustration among 
inmates unless the system which opens the gates not only 
is--but appears to be--equitable (1972:101).
Inmate discussion groups. Prior to the uprising, there was a 
growing tendency for inmates in the exercise yards to get together in 
groups and discuss their problems. In addition, an inmate-instructed 
sociology class was organized in the prison’s school. Although the 
class was developed for the purpose of discussing a wide range of socio­
logical topics, it became a forum for the interchange of information 
about what was happening in the prison and among the different groups. 
Discussions turned to analyses of general prison conditions, the status 
and rights of prisoners in the institutions and society, and the various 
techniques of protest to effect change in society. No program for 
action was ever developed by the class, however, and the class was 
recessed at the time of the riot.
Reforms Sought
Russell G. Oswald, who became Commissioner of the New York State 
Department of Correctional Services in January, 1971, inherited the
74
responsibility of restructuring the entire prison system in New York. 
This included converting the penal system from a purely custodial to a 
rehabilitative system. As Oswald put it, his job "was ‘to give the 
whole system a new flavor1" (The Official Report, 1972:20). Giving 
priority to those areas which had already coma under attack in the 
courts, Oswald*s first reforms granted:
o o o mail and visiting privileges to inmates* coramon- 
law spouses; revised censorship procedures to permit inmates 
to correspond with attorneys and public officials; and 
allowed greater accessibility of news media to prisons to 
increase public knowledge of conditions (The Official 
Report, 1972:131).
In July, 1971, a group of five inmates, who called themselves 
the ''Attica Liberation Faction" and claimed to represent all races and 
social segments of the prison, sent Commissioner Oswald a letter con­
taining a manifesto setting forth a series of demands. These demands 
centered largely on improving conditions of imprisonment. More 
specifically, they demanded:
. . . legal representation before the Parole Board; 
improvement in medical care, visiting facilities, food 
and sanitary conditions in the mess hall, personal hygiene, 
clothing, recreational facilities, and working con­
ditions in the shops, a uniform set of rules in all 
prisons, adjustment of commissary prices; and "an end 
to the segregation of prisoners from the mainline 
population because of their political beliefs" (The 
Official Report, 1972:134).
The inmates emphasized in their letter that they were trying to 
present demands in a democratic fashion and wanted Oswald to be aware 
of their needs, as well as the need for prison reform. Other letters 
followed, but promised that the inmates would continue to strive for
*£7
prison reform in a democratic fashion. Commissioner Oswald responded 
by assuring the inmates that changes had been made and would continue
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to be made. But he also acknowledged that complete change takes time.
In spite of their peaceful lobbying attempt, inmates were unsuccessful 
in effecting "such simple changes as clean trays from which to eat In 
the mess halls, or more than one shower a week during hot summer 
months1' (The Official Report, 1972:138). Thus, tensions at Attica con­
tinued to mount and culminated in the riot on September 9. Following 
the riot, guards and inmates alike commented: ’"The tension was so
thick around here you could cut it with a knife*" (The Official Report, 
1972:141). All that was needed was a spark to set it off.
ATTICA DURING THE RIOT
The Spark: Wednesday, September 8, 1971
The initial disruption came on Wednesday, September 8, in 
reaction to an incident In A yard which provoked anger and resentment 
among inmates in two companies in A block. Several correction officers 
observed what they thought was a fight between two inmates when, in 
actuality, the inmates were merely engaging in friendly horseplay.
When the inmates ignored instructions to stop what they were doing, two 
of the officers went across the yard to summon them. The refusal of 
one of the inmates to leave the yard led to an unusually intense con­
frontation between officers and inmates, during which a lieutenant was 
struck by an inmate. Surrounded by a large group of inmates, the 
officers were forced to back down and leave the yard. That evening, 
the two inmates who had engaged in horseplay were removed from their
cells and taken to housing block Z (HBZ),^ or "box" as it is commonly
k?'
^Housing block Z is a special disciplinary housing unit for 
troublesome inmates. In effect, it is a prison within a prison.
76
called in prison jargon. This precipitated angry name-calling, hurling 
of objects from cells, and vows of revenge along the two galleries.
Many inmates ve~e convinced that the two inmates were beaten on
the way to HBZ (though in fact they were not) even though officers in
the yard that afternoon had promised them that this would not occur.
The Commission discovered that:
. . o There is a widespread belief among inmates at Attica
that when a man is taken to the box, especially if at night,
he is brutally beaten on the way, in the elevator going up to 
HBZ, and in the segregation center itself. Because inmates 
have no way to verify the facts, rumor becomes a dominant 
fact of life in prison, and when the rumors are repeated 
often enough, they are believed (1972:149).
Hans Toch makes the observation that "persons who tend to interpret
situations as threatening, or goading, or challenging, or overpowering
can turn harmless encounters into duals, purges, struggles for survival,
or violent escapes" (1969:189).
The Explosion: Thursday, September 9
The following morning, uneasiness lingered on in Five Company, 
one of the two companies from which the two inmates had been removed 
the previous evening to segregation. This company of forty inmates was 
used as a repository for men considered to be troublemakers. The 
members of Five Company included numerous men with long disciplinary 
histories and an unusual concentration of what the Commission referred 
to as "that new breed of inmate: young, politically active and aware,
avowedly defiant in thought and rhetoric" (1972:151) .
An inmate who had been locked in his cell for throwing a full 
can of soup at an officer the previous evening was released from his 
call by fellow inmates. A decision was made to return Five Company to
7their cells after breakfast and, when the inmate was again confined to 
his cell, to release the rest of the company to the exercise yard. The 
door to the yard was locked and a lieutenant, who had assured the 
inmates the day before that nobody would be beaten, approached the 
company as it was lined up in A tunnel awaiting word as to T^hy the 
door to the exercise yard was locked. As he reached the column of 
inmates, he was attacked before he had a chance to speak, and the 
uprising was underway.
Three correction officers came to the lieutenant's rescue, but 
were immediately attacked by the inmates. Relieving one of the 
officers of his keys, the inmates began opening cell doors on A block 
and freeing fellow-prisoners. Approximately 100 prisoners were already 
in the yard and, when they heard the commotion, succeeded in joining 
the rioting inmates by overpowering two officers and unlocking the door 
separating the yard and tunnel. The inmates then began equipping them­
selves with football helmets, baseball bats, rakes, pipes, sticks, and 
an assortment of homemade weapons.
The Riot Spreads
After the initial outburst of chaotic violence, the inmates 
regrouped and set upon the locked gate at Times Square, which separated 
A block from the rest of the institution. The gate gave way allowing 
the rioters access to the center square and the keys which unlocked the 
gates to the B, C, and D blocks. From Times Square, inmates spread 
throughout the prison with little resistence, attacking officers, 
taking hostages, and destroying property. As the rebellion spread, 
other inmates were urged to go to D yard where the riot was to
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culminate. Some inmates joined actively, but the majority tried to 
escape to secure areas, or were simply caught up in the tide. On one 
gallery, inmates took a vote to determine whether or not they should 
join the rioters. Only three voted to go to the yard. However, the 
vote was ignored, and armed inmates surrounded them and ordered them 
to D yardo
A group of rebellious inmates also broke into E block which 
housed selected inmates who were part of an experimental DVR (Department 
of Vocational Rehabilitation) program. Many of these inmates were 
invalids or otherwise suffered from physical or emotional handicaps. 
Nevertheless, they were moved through the tunnels to D yard along with 
the other inmates.
The authorities were slow in responding, due largely to the 
absence of a riot control plan, the lack of available manpower, and an 
antiquated communications system. Connected with other parts of the 
prison only by single-line telephones, those officials in the ad­
ministration building could not immediately appreciate the full extent 
of the trouble nor summon help. A steam whistle located in the power­
house was the only means of sounding a general alarmhowever, it was 
not sounded until approximately one-half hour afcer the riot began.
Within two hours, the inmates had control of four cell blocks 
and all of the yards and tunnels, and 1,281 inmates had gathered in D 
yard with over forty hostages.^ The Commission reports that "32 Attica 
employees were injured during the uprising on September 9" (1972:187).
______________ _ ____  ,zfj
^During the four-days, a total of fifty persons, including 
civilian employees, were taken hostage by the inmates.
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Seven correction officers were injured seriously enough to require 
hospitalization and were released by their captors. One of them was 
struck on the head when inmates first broke into Tines Square and later 
died as a result of his injuries. Numerous inmates who had resisted or 
gotten in the way of the rioters were also injured.
Rudimentary Inmate Society
During the early hours of the riot, leaders of various factions 
in the prison were vying for authority or, as one inmate put it, "'play­
ing king of the mountain'11 (The Official Report, 1972:198). Eventually, 
however, a self-professed inmate lawyer emerged as a leader and started 
issuing instructions and urging the inmates to pull themselves together. 
Shortly thereafter, inmate spokesmen began calling for the presentation 
of demands for reform. One of them laid down some ground rules, e.g., 
hostages were not to be harmed, the use of drugs was forbidden, homo­
sexual relations were outlawed, fighting among inmates was prohibited, 
etc.
Another development during the early stages of the riot was the 
formation of a unified internal police force or security guard among 
the inmates. One of the primary functions of the security guards was 
to keep the nearly 1,300 inmates within the confines of D yard. After
the riot, a number of inmates testified that they would have left the
yard if it had been possible to do so. The inmate security force also 
broke up fights between inmates, organized a fire detail to put out 
fires they had set earlier, collected and stockpiled weapons, and even
set to work making new weapons. -x?
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Immediate Demands Drawn Up
After the initial rhetoric had subsided in the yard, a small 
group of inmates began drafting a list of immediate demands. There 
were only six demands at first and these were addressed to President 
Nixon and Governor Rockefeller. The demands included: (i) complete
amnesty for the rioters; (2) speedy and safe transportation to a non- 
imperialistic country; (3) intervention by the federal government; (k) 
the reconstruction of Attica by inmates or under the supervision of 
inmates; (5) negotiation through a group of outside observers; and (6) 
the conduct of all communication within the inmates* domain.
Negotiations Develop
The tradition in correctional institutions is not to negotiate 
with inmates holding hostages. Based on this tradition, the staff at 
Attica expected that the prison would be retaken immediately, regardless 
of the danger involved. However, thinking that he could reach a 
peaceful solution, Commissioner Oswald decided to negotiate with an 
informally elected inmate committee. The negotiations were not 
planned— they just developed. When the Commissioner first arrived at 
Attica, the police were not prepared to retake the prison, By the time 
sufficient assault forces had been summoned, the negotiations were 
under way and the Commissioner, reluctant to undertake any action which 
would imperil lives, chose to continue the talks. Before the day was 
over, Oswald was to depart from other long accepted norms. For 
instance, he decided to admit newsmen and television cameras to D yard, 
and to negotiate with the inmates through an observers* committee as 
the inmates had demanded.
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Commissioner Oswald had little control over who became an obser­
ver, and many observers merely invited themselves. The observers were 
placed in the position of acting as intermediaries between the inmates 
and the state. The observers* committee was not constituted to serve a 
mediation function, however. It was unwieldy in number— consisting of 
over thirty members— and was characterized by marked ideological dif­
ferences, Some observers were affiliated with organizations which were 
openly identified with inmates and their demands. Others identified 
with the administration and were largely unsympathetic to inmate com­
plaints. Still others "were more concerned with bringing about a 
peaceful solution on any terms than with seeing the uprising become a 
catalyst for penal reform" (The Official Report, 1972:235).
When Oswald first entered D yard, he was immediately presented 
with a number of preconditions which inmates demanded be met before they 
would begin to negotiate. For example, they demanded that food, water, 
and radios be provided. Oswald acceded to each of these demands without 
hesitation, "Before leaving the yard, Oswald was presented with a new 
set of 15 ’Practical Proposals* (The Official Report, 1972:
222). The proposals (demands) were prepared at the suggestion of one of 
the outside observers who considered the list of immediate demands 
impractical. According to the Commission, "the new proposals dealt with 
specific internal conditions which had long been among the grievances 
voiced by inmates; wages, religious freedom, censorships parole, 
medical care, food, education, and recreation" (1972:222)* In respond­
ing to the pronosals, Oswald let it be known that he agreed in -principle 
with most of them since they were consistent with his own plans for 
prison reform, b :
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On Friday, September 10, a group of observers entered D yard to 
obtain a complete list of inmate demands. After gathering their 
impressions of the inmate demands, the observers set to work developing 
a list of proposed penal reform measures which they hoped the state and 
inmates would accept. Oswald agreed to twenty-eight of the thirty- 
three proposals.^ The Commission comments that "many of the principles 
embodied in the 28 Points were major advances in penal reform" (1972: 
257).
Saturday evening, the observers entered D yard to discuss the 
twenty-eight points with the inmates. Much to their disappointment, 
however, the inmates attacked the proposals as trickery, stating that 
they were Inadequate and that criminal amnesty, which Oswald did not 
agree to, was a necessity if negotiations were to continue. With the 
rejection of the proposals, the negotiations were, in effect, dead.
The observers placed their remaining hopes in a plea to Governor 
Rockefeller to come to Attica. Some of the observers felt that the 
Governor's presence would not only buy time, but would lend credibility 
to the twenty-eight proposals by showing that the state was genuinely 
concerned. Believing that no purpose would be served by his appearance, 
the Governor refused. After the inmates rejected a last minute appeal 
on Monday morning to accept the twenty-eight proposals, Oswald, with 
the Governor's concurrence, ordered the assault.
?A verbatim listing of the reform, measures proposed by the 
observers to Commissioner Oswald and the twenty-eight to which he 
agreed is contained in Appendix B of this study.
■
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Sensing that, an assault was imminent, inmates led eight hostages, 
blindfolded and their hands bound, to the A and 3 catwalks where they 
were fully visible to members of the assault force. Each of the hostages 
was held by at least one inmate, most with knives at their throats or 
torsos. Also, a number of the hostages in the yard were held with knives 
at their throats. At 9 : ^  A.M., September 13* the electricity in the 
prison was shut off and, at 9:^-6 A.M., a National Guard helicopter
o
dropped CS gas on Times Square where the hostages were standing. As 
the gas descended, inmates on the catwalks began to move downward, 
pulling hostages with them. After the first downward motion, state 
troopers commenced firing.^
The' Toll
Although the shooting lasted only six minutes, the assault took 
the following toll:
. . .  10 hostages and 29 inmates were dead or dying of 
bullet wounds inflicted by the authorities; 3 hostages and 
85 inmates had suffered non-lethal gunshot wounds, and one 
trooper . . . suffered leg and shoulder wounds from shotguns 
fired by troopers trying to protect him. No hostages were 
killed by inmates on September 13 • • • •
Almost 10 percent of all persons in the yard were struck 
by bullets or shotgun pellets, and 13 of the 38 hostages were
CS (OrthoChI orobenzalmatononitrile) is an irritant chemical 
agent which was adopted by the Army in 1959* A white crystalline pow­
der, it is generally dispensed as an aerosol from burning or bursting 
type grenades, or from bulk irritant agent dispersers. It is immedi­
ately effective and physically, but temporarily, incapacitating.
% t a t e  troopers had been instructed to fire only at inmates 
engaged in overt, hostile acts against hostages and troopers. However, 
there was no explanation of what constituted a^hostile act, and each 
trooper was left to use his own discretion in determining whether a 
situation warranted the use of firepower. .
killed or wounded by the gunfire (The Official Report,
1972:373-374) .
Four of the hostages on the catwalks, two of whom were killed by gun­
fire, suffered neck or throat lacerations. Shortly after the assault, 
the two surviving hostages reported to authorities "that they heard the 
gunfire a split second before they felt the knives across their throats" 
(The Official Report, 1972:377-378).
Use of Excessive Force
State police participating in the assault used the weapons 
available to them. For the most part, these included high-powered 
rifles with telescopic sights, sidearms (.38 caliber pistols), and 
„12-guage shotguns. While the rifles and handguns were considered 
appropriate for their intended use in the assault, the shotguns, loaded 
with "00" buckshot pellets^ which spread in flight and hit unintended 
targets, created a high risk of injury and death to unresisting inmates 
and hostages.
Individual members of the assault force provided detailed, 
explanations of hostile or threatening inmate activity which, they 
claimed, occasioned their fire. However, other accounts and objective 
evidence--i^e*, photographs--were inconsistent with many of the explana­
tions offered by the assault forces. From an analysis of all of the 
available evidence, the Commission concluded that there was much unneces­
sary shooting. Troopers shot into tents, trenches, and barricades with­
out looking first. In addition, even where the firing may have been
 : :—     ■ .
 ^ IOhqqh buckshot cartridges contain nine or twelve pellets, each 
of which is approximately 0.33 inch in diameter and a potentially lethal 
missile. : : . h 7
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jastirled--as in the case of a state police lieutenant assaulted by an 
inmate in D yard--the use of shotguns loaded with buckshot in the 
heavily populated areas of D yard led to the killing and wounding of 
hostages and of inmates who were not engaged in any hostile activity 
(1972:335).
ATTICA AFTER THE RIOT
Credibility Gap
The aftermath of the riot began with a credibility gap created 
when prison officials, without any authoritative verification, informed 
the public what had happened on the morning of September 13. Relying 
on exaggerated accounts of troopers and correction officers, Attica 
officials announced that several hostages had died of slit throats and 
that others had been stabbed and beaten with clubs and pipes. Although 
some of the dead hostages bore the marks of beatings, autopsy findings 
revealed that all had died of gunshot wounds. The first reaction of 
some officials was to search for ways to dispute or discredit the 
autopsy reports. They even went so far as to accuse the medical 
examiner of being a ’"radical left-winger1" (The Official Report, 1972: 
460). Once it had been established that all nine hostages died from 
the gunfire of peace officers during the assault, Oswald confirmed the 
findings to newsmen.
Treatment of the Wounded
The authorities were well aware that the assault might result 
in a large number of casualties. However, they failed to make adequate 
provision in advance for the evacuation and treatment of the wounded.
When the shooting stopped, there were oyer 120 dead and wounded inmates 
and hostages. Yet there were only ten medical personnel inside the 
walls, and only two of them were doctors. A National Guard unit carable 
of evacuating casualties and rendering immediate first aid had been 
mobilised, but had not yet reached the facility when the shooting 
stopped. Doctors at local hospitals, who possessed the necessary exper­
tise, professional assistants, and equipment to perform emergency 
surgery, were not asked to come to Attica until after the assault. In 
short, no one assumed responsibility for making the necessary medical 
arrangements.
Reprisals
State officials expected physical reprisals against inmates in 
the aftermath of the riot, but did nothing to prevent them. A federal 
court order consented to by Commissioner Oswald, as well as the twenty- 
eight proposals to which he agreed, contained provisions against repri­
sals. Nevertheless, correction officers and, to a lesser extent, state 
troopers and sheriffs* deputies engaged in frequent and systematic acts 
of retribution against inmates.
Physical reprisals, accompanied by verbal abuses, began as 
inmates were moved out of D yard to be stripped and searched, continued 
as the inmates were run through a gauntlet to cells in A block, and did 
not subside even after they were locked in their cells. Reprisals were 
especially severe in HBZ, where suspected leaders of the uprising were 
taken. Eight days after the assault, doctors assigned to make a 
physical inventory reported finding bruises, lacerations, and broken
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bones among forty-five percent of the inmates who had been in D yard 
(The Official Report, 1972:441).
Prison Reforms Instituted
In the months following the riot, Attica underwent many changes. 
Some of the reforms demanded by the inmates in D yard were instituted, 
others were not. After the uprising, the Commission quoted Oswald as 
saying "that he did not consider himself bound by the twenty-eight points, 
since the inmates had not released the hostages unharmed. However, he 
said he would not be deterred from continuing his plans for improvement s'* 
(1972:467). Although there were changes yet to come when the Commission 
completed its report, some of the changes which had already been 
implemented are enumerated in the following paragraphs.
The officer-inmate ratio improved with the reduction of the 
inmate population^ and the hiring of new correction officers, including 
twenty black and Spanish-speaking officers. A  number of female nurses 
were also added to the staff. A shipment of new, well-fitting light­
weight olive-green summer clothing was distributed to the inmates to 
replace the drab prison uniforms. New gun towers were constructed in 
the yards to improve physical security. A new inmate rule book was in 
the process of being prepared at the time the Commission made its report. 
New internal communications equipment was on order to replace outmoded 
equipment. A  new commissary had been built and, when opened, would
reportedly offer soft drinks for the first time.
*
■^^Within nine days after the uprising ended, 947 inmates, sixty- 
five percent of than black, were transferred to other prisons. When the 
Commission last visited Attica in August, 1972, the population was 1,308*
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Major changes ware made in the visiting rules at Attica.
Inmates could now receive visits from almost anyone without obtaining 
prior approval. Woman, both married and single, visit married or unmar­
ried inmateso Former inmates may now visit after gaining the approval 
of the superintendent and, if applicable, their parole officer. There 
is no longer any restriction on the frequency of visits. The screen in 
the visiting room has been removed and inmates may embrace their visitors 
at the beginning and end of visits, and hold hands during the visit. 
Visiting children may sit with inmates during visits. Finally, inmates 
may examine photographs and pass notes, provided they are first read by 
the officer in charge.
Inmates are now permitted to go to the yard for evening 
recreation until dark two evenings per week. Black and white television 
sets in the yards were replaced with color sets. Inmates are allowed to 
take two showers per week instead of one. Telephone booths were installed 
for use by inmates to make one collect call per month. The new superin­
tendent granted inmates approval to leave lights and cell radios turned 
on all night. Inmates now receive a gratuitous issue of toilet articles, 
to include toothbrushes, toothpaste, razors, blades, etc. Prior to the 
uprising, visits to the commissary were scheduled in the order of 
inmates' admission to the prison. Inmates now go to the commissary 
according to job assignments. A liaison committee was elected by the 
inmates to establish a formal channel of communication with the adminis­
tration concerning grievances and common problems.
A number of changes were also made in job assignment procedures. 
Prior to the riot, inmates were assigned jobs based primarily on two
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criteria— job vacancies and the inmates* skills and preferences. How­
ever, inmates were often unaware of the vacancies that existed and were 
therefore unable to express a preference. Even the job assignment board 
did not always have current information on job vacancies. The assignment 
board is now kept abreast of job openings, arid all inmates are inter­
viewed by the board before being placed.
Inmates can now visit the library two days a week. They have 
also been given access to the Wyoming County Library which absorbs the 
mailing costs of books sent to inmates. The department of correctional 
services has started circulating "a list of acceptable literature con­
taining 360 periodicals, including Black Scholar, Playboy, and the 
Amsterdam.News, and riO books on black studies" (The Official Report, 
1972:57-58). Publications on the approved list are passed on to the 
inmates without review. As a result of a federal grant to the depart­
ment of correctional services, the law library collection was updated 
and expanded.
Inmates* correspondence rights were broadened. For example, 
the new rules require only that a correspondent be willing to receive 
mail from an inmate and that the permission of the superintendent be 
obtained in those cases where an inmate wishes to correspond with 
"unrelated minors, married women, co-defendents, inmates in other 
institutions, and parolees" (The Official Report, 1972:60-61),
SUMMARY
The uprising at Attica has major significance in any study of 
prison violence because it provides considerable insight into what
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occurs before, during, and after a major prison disturbance. A review 
of the literature on prison riots indicates that many of the conditions 
that existed at Attica exist to a greater'or lesser extent in other 
correctional institutions. Therefore, some of the lessons learned at . 
Attica help to explain why riots occur in other prisons and, in this 
instance, are much more fully documented.
A society in microcosm, Attica magnifies the forces and emotions 
of the inmate society, as well as the larger society. Many of its 
inmates, for example, came to the institution bitter and angry as the 
result of their experiences in the ghetto streets and were therefore 
little different than those who walked the streets as free men. For the 
most part, the so-called new inmate was. shaped by the same experiences, 
expectations, and frustrations that culminated in the urban ghetto dis­
turbances of the I960*s.
Contrary to popular views, the Attica uprising was not planned 
or organized in advance by a group of militant inmates. Rather, it 
began as a spontaneous burst of violent anger and was the product of 
frustrated hopes and unfulfilled expectations after efforts to bring 
about peaceful change had failed. While there was racial discrimination 
and considerable racial tension within the walls, the disturbance was 
not a race riot. Blacks and whites remained solidified.
In the following chapter, some fundamental causes of prison riots 
will be analyzed in detail. Also, some of the problems involved in 
determining a causal relationship between prison violence and prison 
reform will be considered, followed by a presentation of some of the 
major reforms that have arisen as a result of contemporary prison riots.
Chapter 5
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF PRISON VIOLENCE
It is evident in the preceding chapters that the exact causes of 
prison riots and disturbances are sometimes difficult to determine pre­
cisely. This is partially because, as with other upheavals in social 
structure, there is no single cause. Rather, the causes are exceedingly 
complex and emerge from a welter of factors which differ somewhat in 
their importance from one institution to another. The riots themselves 
are complex phenomena for which simple explanations do not exist.
Prison riots resemble a jig-saw puzzle of many and varied 
pieces. Imagine, if you will, spread before you some 500 or 600 small 
pieces, awaiting your experienced hand to fit them together. The 
finished picture— in this case a four-walled institution housing several 
thousand men— is clear in your mind. This same picture, however, cannot 
be complete, nor the puzzle solved, until every single piece is con­
sidered in relation to the whole. Large or small, each piece is of
equal importance to successful completion of the picture. So it Is in
the case of prison riots. Only when all pieces are considered together 
can an understanding of why riots occur be reached.
SOME THEORIES ON THE CAUSES OF PRISON RIOTS
Authorities in the fields of penology ^ and criminology have
advanced a number of theories which purport to explain the causes of
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prison riots. Ruth Cavan (1962), for example, points out that riots, 
when they do occur, are likely to coma in series. According to this 
contagion theory, "a riot in one prison is likely to be followed by a 
series of riots in other prisons’* (Cavan, 1962:435). Frank Flynn (1953: 
74) hypothesizes that rumors of substantial.'concessions gained by riots 
spread from institution to institution. Wallack (1953:7), on the other 
hand, believes that the basic cause of prison riots lies almost wholly 
within the social body. "They are caused," he says, "because our 
citizens do not demand nor are they willing with their present outlook 
to pay the cost of a modern, humane penal system" (1953:8). In his 
book, The Prison Community, Donald Clemmer theorizes that prison riots 
are usually "caused by a long series of Abuses,* which, over a long 
period of time, are brought to the attention of the inmate body by 
leaders" (1958:148).
In assessing twenty-four disorders in twenty-three cities that 
took place during the summer of 1967, the National Advisory Commission 
on Civil Disorders (1968) found that disorders did not erupt as a result 
of a single triggering or precipitating incident. Instead, they were 
generated out of an increasingly disturbed social atmosphere, in which 
a series of tension-heightening incidents over a period of weeks or 
months became'linked in the minds of many persons in the Negro com­
munity with a reservoir of underlying grievances. This conclusion is 
particularly relevant in assessing and understanding the causes of 
prison violence. To elaborate further, the National Commission on the 
Causes and Prevention of Violence states:
Violence has usually been the lava, flowing from the top 
of a volcano fed by deeper fires of social dislocation and
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injustice, it has not been stopped solely by capping the top, 
but has usually subsided when our political and social 
institutions have managed to make the adjustments necessary 
to cool the fires below (1969:17).
Inmate demands, which are frequently included among the under­
lying causes of prison riots, are many and varied. Some typical 
demands, mentioned by both Flynn (1953) and Cavan (1962), include such 
things as better food, removal of unpopular personnel, cessation of 
harsh disciplinary practices, and better parole systems. Flynn also 
mentions demands for more adequate medical facilities, segregation of 
sex offenders, and more recreation. Lloyd Ohlin (1956) points out that 
the demands of inmates are often made up after riots have started. He 
feels they show "little conscious awareness of the underlying causes, 
of tension and unrest in the institutional community" (1956 :24) .
SOME BASIC CAUSES OF PRISON RIOTS— PAST AND PRESENT
Stimulated by the mass violence that occurred in American pri­
sons during the early 1950*s, the American Prison Association (hereafter 
referred to as the American Correctional Association) released a study 
of the causes and preventive measures and methods of controlling prison 
riots and disturbances in June, 1953. The beginning of a new series of 
prison riots-and disturbances in 1968 prompted the Association to revise 
its official position paper in 1970. Although the Association identified 
some fundamental causes of prison riots in both papers, it prefaced its 
remarks in the original paper by stating:
The immediate causes given out for a prison riot are usually 
only symptoms of more basic causes. Bad food usually means N 
inadequate budgets reflected in insufficient supplies, poor 
equipment, poor personnel and, often, inept management. Mis­
treatment of prisoners, or lax discipline, usually has behind
9^
it untrained employees and unwise or inexperienced management 
(A Statement Concerning Causes? Preventive Measures, and Methods 
of Controlling Prison Riots and Disturbances, 1953'!)•
A comparison of the basic causes identified by the Association
in its two papers is shown in Table I below.
TABLE I
A Comparison of the Causes of Prison Riots 
Past and Present
Causes as reported in 1953 Causes as reported in 1970
Inadequate Finances
Inept Management
Insufficient Constructive,
Meaningful Activity-
Inadequate Personnel Practices
Inadequate Facilities
Inequities and Complexities in 
the Criminal Justice System
Unnatural Institutional Environment
Antisocial Characteristics of Inmates
Insufficient Legitimate Rewards
Basic Social Attitudes
Unrest in the Larger Community
Lack of Meaningful Rewards
Sources: American Prison Association Committee on Riots, 1953*7;
American Correctional Association Committee on Riots and 
Disturbances, 1970:1.
Inadequate Financial Support
Sub-standard Personnel
Enforced Idleness
Lack of Professional Leadership 
and Professional Programs
Excessive Size and Overcrowding 
of Institutions
Sentencing Practices
Political Domination and 
Motivation of Management
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The causes enumerated in Table I are by no means all-inclusive, 
and some of them overlap. For the sake of convenience and discussion, 
these causes will be divided into three basic categories— general 
causes, internal causes, and external causes. Also, attention will be 
centered primarily on the causes in the revised list, for it is felt 
that they have greater contemporary relevance. These causes are shown 
under their respective headings in Table II below.
TABLE II
Causes of Contemporary Prison Riots by Category
Gen eral Causes
Unnatural institutional Characteristics of the
environment inmate population
Internal causes External causes
Poor Management ' Basic Social Attitudes
Inadequate Personnel Practices Unrest in the Larger Community
Inadequate Facilities Inadequate Finances
Insuffic ient Constructive, Inequities and Complexities in the
Meaningful Activity Criminal Justice System
Insufficient Rewards Lack of Meaningful Rewards
General Causes
Unnatural institutional environment. The Executive Director of 
the American Correctional Association was quoted in a newspaper article
as saying: "Zoos nowadays strive for a more natural habitat for their
■■ . f l . .  y  1 ■ k ? '  ' , •  ■/ /. . . ■
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animals and prisons should do the same for inmatesw (The Leavenworth 
Times, August 14, 1973:12A). Gut off from the larger society by 
physical barriers, a prison is an unnatural environment which almost 
invariably contributes to the emotional stress of those incarcerated. 
This unnatural environment is best described by Erving Goffman in his 
discussion of the characteristics of total institutions:
First, all aspects of life are conducted in the same 
place and under the same single authority. Second, each 
phase of the member's daily activity is carried on in the 
immediate company of a large batch of others, all of whom 
are treated alike and required to do the same thing together.
Third, all phases of the day's activities are tightly 
scheduled, with one activity leading at a prearranged 
time into the next, the whole sequence of activities 
being imposed from above by a system of explicit formal 
rulings and a body of officials. Finally, the various 
enforced activities are brought together into a single 
rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill the official 
aims of the institution (1961:6).
The removal of man from society and the attendant loss of freedom and 
independence, as well as the strict routine of everyday living, and the 
loss of privacy, result in a depersonalized human environment. It is 
not difficult to imagine that in certain inmates the combined deper­
sonalization of human and physical environment can result in emotional 
stresses which seek release, and sometimes this release takes the form 
of violence.
Characteristics of the inmate population. The characteristics 
of the inmate population must not be overlooked as a basic causa of 
riots and disturbances in correctional institutions. The correctional 
institutions in the United States are heavily populated with inmates 
from the lower socio-economic strata of society. '*They are over­
whelmingly the poor, the black and the young," say Bagdikian and Dash
97
(1972:12). Although nonwhites in America are approximately thirteen 
percent of the total population, they are forty to fifty percent of 
the prison population (Bagdikian and Dash, 1972:152). Inmates are 
frequently the products of broken homes, poorly educated, unskilled, 
and have unstable work records. Also, they are likely to have a prior 
criminal record,^ low self-esteem, and lack meaningful goals in life. 
Platerial failure is the most common denominator of offenders1' (Causes, 
Preventive Measures, and Methods of Controlling Riots and Disturbances 
in Correctional Institutions, 1970:3).
As mentioned previously in this paper, the New York State 
Special Commission on Attica concluded that the inmates in that facility 
were part of a new breed. According to Bagdikian and Dash, "the most 
noticeable new kind of prisoner in the United States is the black 
militant" (1972:153). Black militants frequently refer to themselves 
as political prisoners rather than as criminals. They see themselves 
as martyrs of the cause of racial justice and social equality. Some of 
those who make news for allegedly having committed certain crimes, such 
as George Jackson and Angela Davis, stir sympathy among less newsworthy 
convicts. Black militants act to organize their fellow inmates. A 
polarization along racial lines gives modern prison riots deeper under­
currents as in the case of race riots that occur outside prison.
Although the vast majority of prisoners are poor, a number of 
affluent middle-class Americans have found their way into prisons as a
^At the beginning of 1971, approximately fifty-six percent of 
all inmates incarcerated in New York State correctional institutions 
alone had served prison terms before (The Official Report, 1972:16).
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result of civil protest, drug offenses, draft evasion, etc. Middle- 
class Americans expect to be treated civilly and justly. "When con­
fronted with primitive prison conditions, cruelty and capricious 
handling, they are not so likely as a ghetto veteran to accept it as 
the inevitable harshness of a harsh world” (Bagdikian and Dash, 1972: 
l60). Some middle-class prisoners are committed to varying degrees of 
social reform or revolution, and have attempted to dramatize prison 
conditions with strikes, fasts, and passive resistence.
Prison riots may occur because there are more hardened criminals 
in prison in proportion to the number convicted of a crime. In the 
past, the retributive and deterrent aspects of punishment were pre­
dominant factors in sentencing a convicted criminal to prison. Today, 
some judges prefer to avoid incarcerating first-time offenders if they 
can possibly do so. Probation attempts to keep the less hardened 
criminal out of prison, and parole, in some cases, offers the prisoner 
an incentive for good conduct and thus a shorter term. With the in­
creasing use of probation and parole, the percentage of "hardcore” 
offenders who are prone to violence will increase. "Hardened criminals 
with long prison records and long sentences are inclined to feel that 
they have little to lose by starting a disturbance or participating 
in a riot” (Leinwand, 1972:^).
Internal Causes
Poor management. There is an old saying that prisons operate 
the way the prisoners want them to operate. Despite this partial truth, 
a prison, as with any other social institution, must have competent,
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professional management if it is to operate successfully. Some of the 
symptoms of poor management practices which may precipitate a riot or 
d is t urbane e ar e :
. . . Vague lines of authority and administrative respon­
sibility, absence of clearly defined and easily understood 
rules and regulations, poor communications, partiality in 
dealing with inmates and staff, and indecisive action on 
legitimate grievances (Causes, Preventive Measures, and 
Methods of Controlling Riots and Disturbances in Cor­
rectional Institutions, 1970:3-4).
Vague lines of authority and administrative responsibility are 
a basic symptom of poor administration and can result in staff conflicts, 
inefficient management of the correctional institution, a lack of credi­
bility in the administrator's ability, and, above all, inmate frustra­
tions and hostility. The effective correctional administrator must not 
only develop clearly defined lines of authority and administrative 
responsibility, he must also insure that inmates and staff understand 
and follow the chain of command (Causes, Preventive Measures, and 
Methods of Controlling Riots and Disturbances in Correctional 
Institutions, 1970:4).
The lack of a well-defined chain of command has been one of the 
outstanding characteristics of prisons in which major disturbances have 
occurred. To gain the support of his staff and the cooperation of the 
inmates, the correctional administrator must demonstrate professional 
competence as an organizer and leader. A correctional institution that 
is poorly organized and administered is likely to create disharmony 
among both staff and inmates. As the American Correctional Association 
comments in it3 report:
. . .  Discord between administrative and line personnel 
within a correctional institution, . . . , will diminish the
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effectiveness of treatment programs as well as increase the 
level of emotional stress and discontentment among the inmate 
population (1970:4).
Either of these results can strengthen the power base of inmate dissi­
dents and precipitate a riot within the correctional institution.
Poor communications within the correctional institution is 
another indication of poor management. Several writers point out that 
communications between staff and inmates are likely to be poor. Erving 
Goffman, discussing total institutions in general, says:
In total institutions there is a basic split between a 
large managed group . . .  and a small supervisory staff . . . .
Each grouping tends to conceive of the other in terms of 
narrow hostile stereotypes, staff often seeing inmates as 
bitter, secretive, and untrustworthy, while inmates often 
see staff as condescending, highhanded, and mean (1961:7).
The American Correctional Association’s Committee on Riots 
recommends that a concerted effort be made to insure that staff and 
inmates alike are kept informed of matters affecting their welfare. It 
is also important that the prisoners know from official sources, and 
not from rumors, what the management is doing or planning which affects 
their welfare. To accomplish this, it is essential that open channels 
of communication, both formal and informal, exist between the cor­
rectional administrator and his staff, between the staff and inmates, 
and between correctional administrators and inmates. Staff and inmates 
are likely to have a higher state of morale and better working 
relations if they are kept informed (Causes, Preventive Measures, and 
Methods of Controlling Riots and Disturbances in Correctional 
Institutions, 1970:4)*
The American Correctional Association says ,rit is important 
that the correctional administrator communicate to the staff and to the
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inmates his understanding of their needs and their areas of. concern or 
grievances" (1970:4). Whan, administrative action is warranted, it 
should be taken as quickly as possible and the individuals concerned 
notified. In those cases where no action is merited, the administrator 
should, explain his reasons for not acting. This is perhaps one of the 
errors made by Commissioner Oswald at Attica prior to the riot in 
September, 1971. He had promised that certain reforms would be forth­
coming; however, when they failed to materialize according to the 
inmates1 expectations, Oswald merely explained that he needed more 
time. Thus, the inmates began to question his credibility.
Both staff and inmates should be properly prepared for forth­
coming changes. Conceivably, riots caused by a change in institutional 
policy can be prevented if effective channels of communication exist 
between inmates and officials. When the necessity for the changes are 
clearly understood before they are initiated, the likelihood of hostile 
reaction to these changes will be significantly reduced. It will be 
recalled that the inmates at Vermont State Prison rioted when lockers 
and shelving were removed from their cells without first notifying them 
of what was to happen* Unaware of the basis for the relaxation of 
rules and discipline at Attica, correction officers felt that their 
authority was being undermined and that their superiors were not sup­
porting them. When it is necessary to make immediate changes, the 
correctional administrator should provide explanations at the earliest 
possible date to alleviate the anxieties which the changes produce.
Reed Cozart (1955:122) advocates the use of inmate advisory 
councils, primarily as a means of communication. Since the council's
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prime functions are airing inmate complaints and identifying for all 
the factors leading to official decisions, they might prove useful in 
easing inmates into a new disciplinary system. Organization of an 
inmate council (liaison committee) was, of course, one of the innova­
tions that came about as a result of the riot at Attica.
Poor administration is frequently reflected in partiality being 
shown to members of the staff, as well as to members of the inmate 
population. To show favoritism to either staff or inmates means that 
others are, or feel that they are, being discriminated against. This 
discrimination can produce discontentment which may erupt into 
rebellious behavior. Inmates are acutely aware of any unfair treatment 
and, naturally, resent it. According to Sanford Bates:
A warden who rules his prison with fairness, firmness, 
justice, and partiality can usually maintain discipline even 
among the most incorrigible of men. But the minute he begins 
to show partiality for one inmate over another a vital 
element of control slips from his hands (1955:108).
The impartial treatment of inmates and staff may not prevent grievances; 
however, if the staff and inmates feel that they are being dealt with 
impartially, their grievances are less likely to result in a distur­
bance within the correctional institution (Causes, Preventive Measures, 
and Methods of Controlling Riots and Disturbances in Correctional 
Institutions, 1970:7).
Inadequate personnel practices. The quality of prison manage-^ 
ment depends heavily on the training, experience, professional 
standards, and morale of the personnel who work within the walls. The
American Correctional Association observes that:
. . . Many of the causes for riots and disturbances in 
correctional institutions stem directly from lack of staff
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training and experience, inadequate professional standards, 
and conflicts of philosophy and goals of the overall staff 
of the institution (1970:8).
To obtain qualified personnel, a vell-structured recruiting and hiring 
program is needed0 Personnel must be recruited and hired on the basis 
of realistic standards and qualifications, and all should be screened 
by competitive examinations. In order to attract quality personnel, 
heavy emphasis must be placed on salaries. Low salary scales result 
in low standards of recruitment, heavy turnover rates, and in excessive 
temptations to dishonest conduct, such as the acceptance of bribes. 
According to an article in The Christian Science Monitor, a breakdown 
of the salaries for prison guards shows that "36 percent earn less 
than $6,000 a year; 43 percent earn between $6,000 and $8,000 a year;
16 percent earn between $8,000 and $10,000; and 5 percent earn more 
than $10,000” (December 17, 1971:7). The annual starting salary for 
correction officers in Missouri is approximately $5,100. One cor­
rection officer, who has worked at the Missouri State Penitentiary 
for more than eight years, makes only $5,900 a year. The low pay 
scale has resulted in a high turnover rate in guard personnel ”and a 
work force in which half of the employees are working at at least two 
jobs” (The Kansas City Star, August 22, 1973:1B). In order to obtain 
capable men to administer correctional institutions, it may be 
necessary to pay more than the wages such men could receive in jobs 
outside the prisons.
In addition to attracting and retaining qualified personnel, 
Cavan (1962) and Bennett (1952) indicate the need for in-service 
training of personnel. All too frequently, correctional personnel .
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have had little or no prior training in corrections. The American 
Correctional Association explains that Mthis lack of training together 
with no prior experience can be a volatile combination in a correctional 
institution” (1970:8). A comprehensive, well-organized training program 
is s must at every correctional institution and should include pre­
assignment training, as well as in-service training. One*of the lessons 
learned at Attica is that the ability to act and react immediately and 
appropriately to problems can mean the difference between preventing a 
disturbance and quelling a riot.
Staff and line personnel should share the basic goals and philo­
sophies of the institution. There seems, however, to be some disagree­
ment among correctional administrators concerning the precise functions 
of prisons, particularly as to whether they exist to protect society, 
to rehabilitate or reform offenders, or to punish persons who have 
broken the law. According to the Manual of Correctional Standards, the 
basic goal of a correctional system is:
. . . to provide public protection by aiding in the 
prevention of crime.
The primary methods employed to realize this objective 
include control of offenders, correction of offenders, 
coordination of programming with other public and private 
resources, research and evaluation and participation of 
citizens (1966:1).
In theory, the routine at Attica was intended to rehabilitate criminals. 
In practice, however, rehabilitation gave way to custody, and the pri­
s o n s  staff became preoccupied with security. Whatever the basic goals 
or philosophies of a correctional institution may be, they should be 
shared by staff and line so as to reduce staff conflict and insure uni­
formity in the -treatment of inmates. -k®
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Inadequate facilities, Many correctional institutions today 
are outmoded, poorly designed, and overcrowded. The irritations and 
frustrations which arise from such conditions encourage prisoners to 
riot, Pilots do not always occur in outmoded facilities. Obviously, 
they can and do occur in some of the most modern penal facilities.
For example, a newspaper article in July, 1973, stated:
The Lucasville £ohio]] prison, so new it still has not 
been officially accepted by the state from the contractors, 
has been the site of successive episodes of trouble.
There have been guard strikes, inmate fasts, inmate 
strikes and a multitude of difficulties with the physical 
plant that is costing the state $32.5 million (Des Moines 
Register, July 25, 1973:7).
In any event, the physical inadequacy of an institution Is a contri­
buting factor which can lead to disturbances.
Ruth Cavan (1962:437-438) cites four chief causes of cor­
rectional institution riots which are directly related to institutional 
design. First, many correctional institutions are too large to enable 
individual treatment of inmates. As institutions increase in size, the 
ability to control the inmate population is often decreased. Large 
populations require regimentation, impersonal management, and cause 
perpetual crises in control. Second, the institutions are frequently 
overcrowded. The Missouri State Penitentiary, which opened in 1835, 
has a normal capacity of 1,800 inmates,*although it reportedly housed 
4,000 inmates at one time (The Kansas City Star, September 13, 1973:3). 
Further, the 121-year-old California State Prison at San Quentin, which 
has a normal capacity of 2,743 inmates, had an average population of 
3,605 inmates in 1969 (Directory: Correctional Institutions and
Agencies, 1970:4). Overcrowding makes it impossible for the prison to
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conduct required activities since space and equipment will generally 
be inadequate. Further, the more congested the conditions under which 
inmates must live, the more conducive is the situation to the moral 
degeneration and the mass development of frustration and anger. Third, 
correctional institutions are outmoded. Approximately twenty-five of 
the nation's state and federal prisons are over 100 years old; a few 
are more than 150 years old (U.S. News & World Report, December 27, 
1971:39). Fourth, inmates lack work. Obviously, they cannot work if 
shops and schools are not provided for them.
Insufficient constructive, meaningful activity. In analyzing 
the fundamental causes of prison riots, Austin MacCormick (1954:24), an 
astute observer of prison conditions, cited enforced idleness as the 
biggest single factor in prison unrest. Similarly, the American Prison 
Association's Committee on Riots acknowledged that enforced idleness 
"is one of the direct causes of the tensions which burst forth in riot 
and disorder" (1953:10). Enforced idleness of able-bodied prisoners is 
certainly one of the great anomalies of modern prison administration.
"A successful prison," says the American Correctional Associa­
tion, "must be a prison filled with 'purposeful activity.* Any com-
v
promise with this objective will be punctuated with periodic episodes 
of 'destructive activity'" (1970:12). Not only does purposeful activity 
provide an alternative for enforced idleness and the resultant rise in 
tension, but it helps to relieve the financial burden on the taxpayer. 
Constructive programs, for example, can substantially reduce the cost 
of prison operations. More importantly, some programs allow inmates to
10?
l e a r n  m a r k e t a b l e  s k i l l s  w h i c h  e n a b l e  t h e m  t o  e a r n  a n  h o n e s t  l i v i n g  
o n c e  t h e y  a r e  r e l e a s e d  f r o m  p r i s o n .
Interesting and satisfying work is a basic factor in maintaining 
emotional stability. Much prison work, however, is repetitious and 
boring, and does not bring with it the satisfactions that come from 
performing a socially useful task. The work is sometimes unskilled, 
and poor prisoners, lacking in skills and education to begin with, 
leave prison as unprepared to lead honest lives as before entering the 
institution.
In a newspaper article, an Inmate at the Federal Penitentiary 
at Leavenworth, Kansas, referred to the prisonfs factories as "employers 
of ’slave labor’ and contended that no one can learn a skill in the 
factories useable on the outside” (The Kansas City Star, August 1, 
1973?8a ). This statement, though somewhat exaggerated, contains a 
certain element of truth. Consider the production of license plates, 
for example. While this has been a major source of employment for many 
inmates during their incarceration, there is little demand for such a 
skill outside prison.
The absence of constructive work does not necessarily mean that 
hundreds of prisoners are assigned to idle groups. For the most part, 
they may be dispersed about the prison doing maintenance work, making 
minor housekeeping repairs, or doing work in the scattered, greatly 
overmanned productive industries. At the time of the uprising' at 
Attica, approximately sixty percent of the inmates worked at jobs 
related to the maintenance of the prison (The Official Report, 1972*36)»
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Insufficient rewards. The lack of a legitimate system of 
rewards in a correctional institution can result in a lack of motivation 
and a sense of hopelessness and despair. This, in turn, can result in 
a heightening of tension and can turn into a breeding ground for riots 
and disturbances. Constructive program planning should include a 
viable system of rewards for inmates who participate in various pro­
grams. Inmates who are otherwise faced with enforced idleness may find 
participation in planned treatment programs rewarding in itself. The 
opportunity to continue their education may be a reward to some inmates, 
while the opportunity to learn a useful skill may be sufficiently
rewarding to others. "If participation in programs is used as a reward
for good behavior this constructive activity will serve as a stronger 
deterrent to disturbances in the institution" (Causes, Preventive 
Measures, and Methods of Controlling Riots and Disturbances in Cor­
rectional Institutions, 1970:12).
External Causes
Basic social attitudes. The American Correctional Association 
observes that: "Underlying many inmate grievances about correctional
institutions are social attitudes which are basic to men both In the 
institution and in the outside community. One of these attitudes . . .  
is apathy" (1970:12). If the overall treatment plan within a cor­
rectional institution is to be effective, the staff must not be
apathetic about its roles. Yet staff members often receive little sup­
port for their position from the community at large. The general 
public is often more concerned about having -ah offender incarcerated, 
thus removing the "disruptive" agent from society, than it is with the
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p o l i c i e s  a n d  t r e a t m e n t  m e t h o d s  o f  t h e  c o r r e c t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n ,  T h i s  
a p a t h y  o f t e n  p e r v a d e s  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n ,  a n d  t h e  i n m a t e s  r e a c t  t o  t h i s  
f e e l i n g  i n  a  v a r i e t y  of w a y s .  T h e  r e s u l t  is often a p a t h y  within the 
inmate population, with little motivation or enthusiasm on the part of 
either inmates or staff to participate in treatment programs (Causes, 
Preventive Measures, and Methods of Controlling Riots and Disturbances 
in Correctional Institutions, 1970:12), Gresham Sykes states that what 
correctional institutions need most is a public interested in supporting 
”an enlightened penal philosophy'* (1959*^01)•
The punitive attitude of a large segment of society is a basic 
prepossession that permeates the correctional institution and underlies 
many major disturbances. Often line personnel reflect this attitude of 
punishment as opposed to treatment. Some criminologists (e.g.,
Caldwell, 1956; Tappan, i960) hold that punishment has three main pur­
poses: retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. There is con­
siderable controversy about which of these purposes will best serve 
the needs of society. However, punishment as retribution seems to be a 
dominant element in American society. Retributive punishment is based 
on the theory that society has a right to get even with those who have 
broken the law and is society's way of retaliating against the criminal. 
Although criminals are supposedly sent to prison as punishment and not 
for punishment, a prison is nevertheless a punitive institution. Its 
environment is rigid, hostile, and designed to inflict punishment in 
various ways.
Unrest in the larger community. Durjng the early 1950's, prison 
riots were attributed largely to conditions which existed inside the
110
prison. However, during the 19607s and early 1970?s, it is beginning 
to appear that prison riots might also be a reflection of conditions 
outside the prison, namely social unrest. In its revised report, the 
American Correctional Association states: ,7Today, as never before, 
the correctional institutions are feeling the impact of unrest in the 
larger community" (1970:15). Even though an institution may be remote, 
it cannot isolate itself completely from the larger community. Parole 
violators and newly admitted inmates are constantly bringing community 
attitudes to the institution, and this, coupled with news media 
coverage, keeps the inmates well informed about unrest in the general 
community. The New York State Special Commission on Attica noted that 
"the young inmate was conscious of the changes in attitudes in the 
black and Puerto Kican communities, on the campuses, in the churches, 
and in the antiwar movement" (1972:106).
The report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis­
orders (1968) showed how pervasive discrimination and segregation, 
black inmigration, and white exodus have been in aggravating problems 
in black ghettos ,7where segregation and poverty converge on the young 
to destroy opportunity and enforce failure71 (1968:10). The Commission 
reports that "crime, drug addiction, dependency on welfare, and bitter­
ness and resentment against society in general and white society in 
particular are the result" (1968:10).
The civil rights movement of the previous decade left 
frustrated hopes, feelings of powerlessness, and a climate tending 
toward approval and encouragement of violence as a form of protest.
The Commission on Civil Disorders found that "a new mood has sprung up
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among Negroes, particularly among the young, in which self-esteem and 
enhanced racial pride are replacing apathy and submission to the 
‘system’" (1963:11). Student protests, civil rights movements, and 
anti-war protests seemed to many alienated members of society to have 
accomplished what the democratic processes had not accomplished~~to 
have focused attention on the need for basic change.
The moods and attitudes discussed above seem to be finding their 
way into prisons and may well be the ingredients of the mixture which 
has exploded in some state penal institutions during recent years. The 
nation’s prisons are by no means insulated from these changing social 
moods.
Inadequate finances. Inadequate financing of prison facilities 
and programs is an underlying cause in many,.if not most, prison riots. 
Lack of money affects almost every other cause of riots. Personnel 
problems are caused largely, although not entirely, by lack of money.
As the American Correctional Association points out, "correctional 
administrators must often face problems of inadequate facilities, poor 
salaries, lack of treatment personnel, and too few correctional person­
nel because of inadequate finances" (1970:15). These problems can be, 
and sometimes are, directly related to prison riots and disturbances.
In the larger, overpopulated institutions, inmates may be confined in 
dormitory-type housing units rather than individual cells. When this .. 
occurs, the propensity to violent behavior increases considerably. In 
some instances, the initiation of constructive treatment programs can 
serve as a possible countermeasure for overcrowding. However, if 
adequate finances are not available, the treatment programs cannot be
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properly staffed, ’’The result is a system in which there is very little 
constructive treatment and a potential for the eruption of violence and 
disorder” (Causes, Preventive Measures, and Methods of Controlling 
Riots and Disturbances in Correctional Institutions, 1970:16),
Inequities and complexities in the criminal justice system. 
Today’s criminal justice system is very complex and contains a number 
of inequities, ’’The most frequent target of attack,” says the American 
Correctional Association, ”is the disparity of the sentencing practices 
of various courts” (1970:16). Frank Flynn (1953) acknowledges that 
variations in the length of sentences for- various crimes creates dis­
content. An article in The Christian Science Monitor (December 1^, 
1971:9) illustrates some of the disparities that exist in sentencing 
practices. A house painter in New Orleans, for example, was sentenced 
to fifty years in prison for selling a matchbox full of marijuana to 
undercover agents. In March, 1971# & ju^y SLn Odessa, Texas, found a 
man guilty of selling $10,00 worth of heroin to an undercover agent 
and sentenced him to 1,800 years in prison. The following month, a 
jury in Dallas, Texas, sentenced a man with a previous record to 2,500 
years in prison for armed robbery and murder. The problem of disparity 
of sentences is further complicated by the folk wisdom that money buys 
a good attorney, which often means that the rich man goes free and the 
poor man goes , to prison.. The sons of TV personality Johnny Carson and 
the late Robert F. Kennedy, for example, did not go to prison when 
they were arrested for possession of drugs.
Another possible Inequity of the criminal justice system has to 
do with parole, Flynn says: "Despite its emergence in the guise of a
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reformative influence, parole is a major cause of unrest in a large 
number of states" (1953:83). He goes on to say that "the process of 
parole selection is fraught with numerous difficulties which may have 
reverberations in the prison community" (1953:83). In a matter of 
minutes, the parole board must determine whether the prisoner has suf­
ficiently reformed to be entitled to release prior to expiration of his 
sentence. Decisions are sometimes arbitrary and regarded as harsh and 
unfair by the inmate. The prisoner seldom has any recourse in case of 
an adverse decision. Nor does he always know the basis upon which the 
board made its decision or whether*he has been fairly treated. A 
denial of parole may bring about discontent, resentment, and frustration 
in the individual, thus encouraging violent behavior.
According to an article in the Kansas City Star (August 26,
1973:33A), 17,600 parole cases were decided during fiscal year 1971; 
however, reasons for denial were not given. Under a reorganization 
plan announced by Maurice H. Sigler, Chairman of the United States 
Parole Board, prisoners would not only be given written reasons for 
denial of parole, but ,!would have the right to be represented by 
attorneys at parole hearings and would have a means of appeal" (The 
Kansas City Star, August 26, 1973:33A).
Lack of meaningful rex^ards. A less obvious external cause of 
riots in correctional institutions is the lack of meaningful rewards.
The restrictions imposed on the correctional program by the basic social 
attitudes of the general public may deny the offender of any reward.
An example of this is the difficulty some e-Sr-offenders face when 
attempting to find legitimate work following release from prison even
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though they may have completed, a comprehensive training program while 
incarcerated. Another example is the restriction placed on the prison 
industries program by the community. For instance, institutional 
industries can be utilized only for specified purposes, and the mar­
keting of commodities produced in prison is severely limited so as not 
to compete with civilian enterprise. "These restrictions . . . impair 
the efforts of the correctional system to offer meaningful rewards in 
the form of either financial remuneration or meaningful work oppor­
tunities" (Causes, Preventive Measures, and Methods of Controlling 
Riots and Disturbances in Correctional Institutions, 1970:16).
It must be reiterated that the foregoing causes of prison riots 
are not all-inclusive and, in some cases, may merely be symptoms of more 
basic causes. Nonetheless, it should be clear that prison disturbances 
can be precipitated by factors or conditions which exist both inside and 
outside the prison. Although the prison administrator may have little 
or no control over outside influences, he must not overlook their impor­
tance as potential causes of prison violence. Having now discussed some 
of the underlying causes of prison riots, the remainder of this chapter 
will be devoted to a general discussion of some of the positive effects 
of prison disturbances.
SOME FUNCTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF PRISON VIOLENCE
Based on the data' presented in Chapters 3 and 4, there appears 
to be sufficient evidence to support the contention that prison riots 
can and do have functional consequences. As in the case of causes, 
however, the functional consequences of prisoneriots are somewhat
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elusive and difficult to assess. This is because a cause-effect 
relationship is not always easily determined. In one or more of the 
cases discussed in Chapter 3, it was reported that certain prison 
reforms were in the process of being instituted before the riot 
occurred; the riot merely expedited the process. In the case of the 
riot at the Vermont State Prison in September, 1971, changes were 
found to be the basic underlying cause, rather than the result, of the 
disturbance, although additional changes were introduced following the 
riot.
Another consideration that complicates the relationship between 
prison riots and prison reforms is the fact that some reforms take time 
to implement. As Flynn points out: "Any consideration of prison reform
must take into account the fact that progress is going to be slow" 
(1953:85). Although some reforms are a direct result of prison violence, 
they often take weeks, even months, to effect. Some riot-related 
reforms, for example, were still being instituted at Attica more than 
a year after the September, 1971, riot occurred. In those cases where 
reforms are not immediately forthcoming, the cause-effect relationship 
can become obscured by the passage of time.
The positive consequences of prison riots rarely receive as 
much public attention as the negative consequences. On the one hand, 
the mass destruction of property, the taking of hostages, and the 
infliction of injury or death by a society of captives all have 
particular appeal to the news media. On the other hand, the changes * 
which result from prison riots are rarely as glamorous as their causes, 
and, therefore, arouse little or no interest on the part of the media.
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The writer recalls the enormous amount of press coverage given to the 
riot at Attica, but he is unable to recall any publicity being given 
to the reforms which were introduced following the riot.
While it may be speculative on the writer’s part, there are 
perhaps several other reasons why prison reforms receive so little 
attention. First, once the violence has subsided, the public quickly 
falls back into a pattern of indifference and forgets that the riot 
and, for that matter, the prison, ever existed. The New York State 
Special Commission on Attica wrote:
. . . The worrisome reality is that prisons, prisoners, 
and the problems of both are essentially invisible in the 
United States. We Americans have made our prisons dis­
appear from sight as if by an act of will. We locate 
them mostly in places remote from view, and far removed 
from the homes of the inmates; . . .  and we manage to 
forget inmates and custodians alike by pretending that 
the prisoners will not return to our cities and our 
villages and our farms (1972:xii).
Second, by'drawing attention to prison reforms, particularly those 
resulting from prison riots, public attention is drawn to the inade­
quacies of the prison system and, in some-cases, to the administration, 
which may or may not prove embarrassing to the latter. Third, poor 
relations between the prison administration and the news media may 
have a less than positive effect on the positive consequences of prison 
disturbances. In its revised report, the American Correctional 
Association states:
The news, media . . .are important means by which the 
public is informed about the institutions their taxes sup­
port* Correctional institutions should acquire and maintain 
good press relations. The press should be informed of 
significant events of both a positive and negative nature.
An air of secrecy lends credence to irresponsible inmate 
allegations (1970:20).
Elsewhere the Association reports:
The news media have a responsibility to keep the public 
informed of newsworthy events and correctional administrators 
have a responsibility to keep the media informed of the. 
activities within their institutions, Regrettably, many 
correctional administrators have overlooked this administra­
tive responsibility. The correctional administrator should 
be diligent in his efforts to establish an honest and 
constructive relationship with members of the mass media. • • • 
the new3 media can be Invaluable allies to the correctional 
administrator in his efforts to gain public support for his 
Institution and its programs (1970:7).
There is yet another possible explanation concerning the lack 
of attention devoted to prison reforms emanating from prison riots. 
Because few people condone violence as a legitimate means of bringing 
about change, the dysfunctional consequences of prison violence have 
had a tendency to overshadow the functional consequences. As a result, 
investigators have focused their attention almost entirely on the 
causes of prison riots, and on ways and means of preventing them.
While some contemporary authors (e.g., Leinwand, 1972% Bagdikian and 
Dash, 1972) have recognized the need for prison reform, their sug­
gestions and recommendations along these lines have received little 
public recognition and support.
Prison Beforms Introduced
In addition to the reform measures discussed in Chapters 3 and.
4, many other changes have evolved from the series of prison riots which 
occurred during the late 1960*s and early 1970*s. Some of these 
reforms may be enumerated as follows;
1. As part of a major prison reform movement, the United States 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) has begun to funnel 
larger sums of money into state and local prisfons. For example, grants
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to state and local prisons have been Increased from two million to 250 
million dollars over a three-year period., Federal aid is being used 
by prison officials to Implement a variety of reforms, some of which 
are:
a. Prisons in California and Mississippi "are experi­
menting with allowing inmates to have conjugal visits with their wives 
as a deterrent to homosexuality** (U.S. News & ¥orld Report, December 27,
1971:3?)■
b. Officials in Arizona have devoted over a million 
dollars to establish probation services for persons convicted of mis­
demeanors so that they may be placed on probation in lieu of going to 
prison. Arizona has also constructed a number of halfway houses "where 
convicts coming out of prison can live until they can find jobs and 
rejoin society** (U.S. News & World Report, December 27, 1971:37)#
c. In Indiana, LEAA money is being, used in part for work- 
release programs that allow convicts with good records to work at jobs-, 
outside the prison as they approach the end of their prison term.
While in a work-release status, "the prisoners live in minimum-seeurity 
centers near their jobs** (U.S. News & World Report, December 27* 1971: 
37).
d. Eight million dollars in LEAA money is going for a wide 
range of reforms in New York, "including new clothing, vocational 
education, improved food and law libraries for inmates and statewide 
training programs for employees** (U.S. News & World Report, December 
27, 1971:37). Further, the 1971 riot at Attica "led to the establish- 
ment of a medical reviaw board within the state department of cor­
rections and increased salaries to attract qualified physicians to
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the institution1’ (Time, July 9, 1973:36).
e. One of the projects being pursued in Maryland aims to 
improve the education of those state prisoners (about thirty-eight 
percent) who have less than a fifth-grade education (U.S. News 6c World 
Report, December 27, 1971:37).
2. At the direction of President Nixon, the United States 
Department of Justice "has embarked upon a comprehensive, 10-year plan 
to make the federal prison system a model for reform" (U.S. News &
World Report, December 27, 1971:37). As a result, the budget of the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons was doubled over a three-year period.
3. A staff training center has been established at the Federal 
Reformatory at El Reno, Oklahoma. The center offers "two weeks of 
intensive orientation for new prison employees" (U.S. News & World 
Report, December 27, 1971:38-39).
4. Federal and state courts have begun to develop a code of 
prisoners* rights. Additionally, "prisoners* rights projects have been 
developed by the Legal .Aid Society of New York, the American Civil 
Liberties Union, and the law schools" (The Official Report, 1972:xx).
5. In addition to the expansion of prisoners* rights, 
prisoners* unions have been formed outside the prison walls to act as 
collective bargaining agents for inmates within the walls. One of the 
leading prisoners* unions in the country was founded in California in 
the spring of 1971, by a group of former inmates headed by John Irwin, 
an ex-inmate turned sociologist (The Christian Science Monitor, December 
15, 1971:9).
6. The American Bar Association rfhas undertaken a major study 
of correction problems through a Commission on Correctional Facilities
120
and Services « . .*• (The Official Report, 1972;xx)»
Proposed Reforms Announced
A national conference on corrections, called by President Nixon 
in December, 1971* proposed some additional reforms, five of which are 
briefly described below.
1. The Federal Bureau of Prisons will build a national cor­
rections academy for the training of correction personnel for federal, 
state, and local facilities (U.S. News & Uorld Report, December 27* 
1971:37).
2. The Federal Bureau of Prisons will build a national behav- 
ioral-research center in an effort to find out why criminals violate 
the law and how they can be stopped or prevented from doing so again 
(U.S. News & World Report, December 27* 1971:37).
3. To help improve educational programs for prisoners, the 
LEAA is funding a clearinghouse on correctional education (U.S. News & 
World Report, December 27* 1971:37).
In an attempt to reduce racial tensions between inmates and 
guards, prison officials have been urged to hire more blacks and 
Spanish-speaking Americans. "The Bureau of Prisons has set a goal of 
one-third minority employment in all new hiring** (U.S. News & World 
Report, December 27* 1971:37).
5. Under the Omnibus Correctional Reform Act, some of the 
nation*s older and larger penal institutions will be replaced with 
smaller, community-based institutions (U.S. News & fforld Report, December 
27* 1971:37). This will bring inmates closer to the community from which 
they came and make prisons as they are presently known obsolete.
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There is no denying that prison riots, either singularly or 
collectively, have had certain positive effects as evidenced by the 
preceding discussion. Many of the positive effects which, accrue are 
often offset by negative effects, however. Although riots have drawn 
attention to some of the inadequacies that exist in penal institutions, 
prison reform,has been slowed by a lack of public support and financial 
assistance. For these and other reasons already mentioned, inmates have 
often been hampered in their attempt to bring about certain reforms 
through the use of violence. Accordingly, not all prison riots produce 
the desired results.
SUMMARY
The causes of riots and disturbances in correctional institutions 
are varied and complex. It is not possible to identify a cause or set 
of causes, the presence of which will always precipitate a riot and the 
absence of which will always prevent a riot. Conditions xtfhich exist or 
incidents which occur in a particular institution may precipitate a riot* 
In another institution, these same conditions may exist or the same 
incidents may occur without appearing to have any significance. There­
fore, the causes must be viewed as complex, interrelated variables 
which contribute to the total problem.
The underlying causes of prison riots may be related directly 
to the unnatural institutional environment, the typical characteristics 
of the inmate population, the management practices of the correctional 
administrator, or some policy or procedure within the institution 
which promotes dissension. At times, however, riots may result from.
what has here been referred to as external causes or variables, i.e., 
basic social attitudes, unrest in the larger community, inadequate 
financial support, etc. The importance of internal causes notwith­
standing, |the author is of the belief that external causes, particularly 
those having to do with social unrest in the larger community and 
inadequate finances, have taken on added significance in recent years.
The fact that a series of major prison disturbances occurred during a 
period of social unrest and turbulence in the late 19o0*s cannot be 
dismissed as mere coincidence.^ Furthermore, many of the other funda­
mental causes of prison riots can be traced to a lack of sufficient 
funds with which to establish and maintain adequate facilities and 
meaningful programs and activities
The positive functions of prison violence are sometimes difficult 
to trace for several reasons. First, it is not always easy to distin­
guish those reforms which were in process prior to a riot from those 
resulting directly from a riot, thus obscuring the cause-effect relation­
ship. Second, the passage of time between the occurrence of a riot and 
the implementation of reforms becomes an intervening variable which 
further complicates the understanding of direct causal relationships, 
Third, prison reforms receive little publicity, thereby all but 
escaping public awareness and leaving a dearth of information in the 
research literature.
Attention in this chapter has been focused on some of the funda­
mental causes and consequences of prison violence. In the next chapter, 
attention will be turned to an examination of some theoretical perspec­
tives on prison riots and reform, The purpose? of this examination will
123
be to provide a somewhat different approach to the study of prison dis­
turbances and, In this connection, to further Illuminate the complex 
subject of violence and change as it relates to penal institutions.
&
Chapter 6
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRISON RIOTS
This chapter will be taken up with some generalizations and an 
attempt at an analysis of prison riots in terms of a number of 
theoretical perspectives. While these perspectives may appear to be 
oversimplified in certain instances, they nevertheless provide several 
alternative approaches to the study of prison violence. The first of 
these perspectives suggests that prison riots may occur as a result of 
relative deprivation within the inmate population. The second proposes 
that there is a cultural lag between correctional progress and techno­
logical progress. The third perspective states that prison riots are 
cyclical in nature and form a reasonable step in a pattern of repeated 
prison reform. Finally, the fourth perspective proposes that prison 
riots serve as equilibrium-maintaining mechanisms, and, as such, help 
to re-establish and maintain stability within the prison.
RELATIVE DEPRIVATION
In his book, Why Men Rebel, Ted Gurr (1970) develops a number 
of hypotheses and theoretical models which help to explain some of the 
underlying causes of collective violence. A brief description of 
several of these models will be useful in further analyzing and dis­
cussing the causes of prison violence.
According to Gurr, the "potential for collective violence is a 
function of the extent and intensity of shared, discontents among
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members of a society . . . " (1970:8). These discontents are said to be
the result of relative deprivation, which Gurr defines as "a perceived 
discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capa­
bilities" (1970:13). 'Value expectations are the goods and conditions 
of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled" (Gurr, 
1970:13). Value expectations may also be thought of as wants, goals, 
or aspirations. Value capabilities, on the other hand, "are the goods 
and conditions . . .  £ peopleJ think they are capable of attaining or 
maintaining, given the social means available to thera" (Gurr, 1970:13).
Further on, Gurr elaborates by stating:
The "value expectations" of a collectivit^r are the average 
value positions to which its members believe they are justi­
fiably entitled. 'Value position" is the amount or level of 
a value actually attained. Value expectations refer to both 
present and future conditions. Men ordinarily expect to keep 
what they have; they also generally have a set of expectations 
and demands about what they should have in the future, which 
is usually as much or more than what they have at present . . . .
"The value capabilities” of a collectivity are the average 
value positions its members perceive themselves capable of 
attaining or maintaining. Value capabilities also have both 
present and future connotations. In the present, value capa­
bilities are represented by what men have actually been able 
to attain or have been provided by their environment: their
'Value position." In the future, value capabilities are what 
men believe their skills, their fellows, and their rulers will, 
in the course of time, permit them to keep or attaint their 
'Value potential" (1970:27).
Gurr identifies three patterns of relative deprivation which 
can be cited as causal or predisposing factors for violence. One of 
these patterns, the aspirational deprivation model, is shown graphically 
in Figure 2.
According to this model, men's value expectations increase with- 
out: a corresponding increase in value capabilities. The perceived 
discrepancy (aspirational deprivation) between expectations and
capabilities gives rise to frustration and discontent. The deprivation- 
induced discontent incites action and, when shared by a collectivity 
of persons, provides a general impetus to collective violence (Gurr,
1970:13-50)• Propositionally, the greater the divergence between value 
expectations and value capabilities, the greater the propensity toward 
violence.
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Figure 2. Aspirational Deprivation
Ghetto dwellers are particularly good targets of aspirational 
deprivation. Surrounded by a highly visible, affluent society, they 
come to share some of the value expectations of the society around 
them. Deprived of legitimate means of attaining these expectations, 
however, ghetto dwellers have sometimes found it necessary to resort 
to illegitimate means of attaining the conditions in life to which 
they feel they are rightfully entitled. This is borne out by the 
ghetto riots of the 1960*s. Oppressed and downtrodden, many of these 
same individuals find their way into prison full of alienation and
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hostility against their oppressors--the established, institutions of
law and government--and a propensity to rebel against these institutions. 
The New York State Special Commission on Attica hit upon this problem 
in its official report which states:
Attica, like most of our prisons, had become largely a 
black and Spanish-speaking ghetto, and the new inmate was 
shaped by the same experiences, expectations, and frustrations 
that culminated in eruptions in Watts, Detroit, Newark, and 
other American cities . . . .
The new inmate came to Attica bitter and angry as the 
result of his experiences in the ghetto streets and in the 
morass of the criminal justice system (1972:106).
The foregoing not only serves to illustrate the role that relative
deprivation may play in precipitating violent behavior, but points out
the need to consider the effects of outside influences when studying
the causes of collective violence in prisons.
The decremental deprivation model illustrated in Figure 3 is 
also helpful in analyzing predisposing causes of prison violence. Under 
this model, men's value capabilities are perceived to decline while 
their value expectations remain virtually unchanged. Men who find them­
selves in this situation may become angry over loss of what they once 
had or thought they could have rather than over the non-attainment of 
new or intensified expectations (Gurr, 1970:46).
Conditions that decrease men's value capabilities without also 
decreasing their value expectations increase felt deprivation and, 
accordingly, the intensity of discontent. Such conditions exist in the 
prison community. Convicts bring with them to prison the aspirations 
and capabilities they develop while members of the free community. Once 
incarcerated, however, they lose certain rights and privileges, to
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include the means (capabilities) with which to attain their aspirations 
(value expectations). The resultant discrepancy (decremental depriva­
tion) can be expected to give rise to discontent and the propensity to 
riot. The problem confronting penal administrators, if the probability 
of violence in prisons is to be reduced, becomes one of how to reduce 
the discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities. It 
is at this point that prison reform enters the picture. Effective 
vocational training programs, for instance, provide inmates with the 
opportunities to learn marketable skills or improve existing skills 
which, in turn, increase their value potential and their chances for 
success on the outside. Computer programming courses being offered in 
the Kansas and California state penitentiaries are good examples.
Where these and other constructive programs are nonexistent, inmate 
value capabilities, both present and future, will diminish appreciably.
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Figure 3. Decremental Deprivation
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A third pattern of deprivation, referred to as progressive 
deprivation, is shown in Figure 4. In this case, steady improvement 
in men's value position generates expectations about continued improve­
ment. If value capabilities stabilize or decline after such a period 
of improvement, progressive deprivation results (Gurr, 1970:52-53).
Gurr cites the following situation as an example of how progressive 
deprivation might occur:
The income of Negroes relative to whites of comparable 
education increased rapidly towards equality between 1940 
and the early 1950*s, but then began to decline, so that 
by 1960, half the relative gains of the earlier period were 
lost (1970:54).
The progressive deprivation pattern, then, is most likely to occur in 
societies undergoing change.
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Figure 4. Progressive Deprivation
Applying the concept of progressive deprivation to a 
hypothetical penal situation, suppose that a prison warden, who has 
earned the reputation of being a reformist, is succeeded by a more
Value Expectations
Value Capabilities
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conservative warden. During the reformist's tenure, there was a 
substantial acceleration in inmate expectations and capabilities since 
many of the reforms which had been introduced benefited the inmates 
personally and improved their value position within the prison. When 
the successor assumed his duties, he followed through on several 
reforms which were already in process and then concentrated on main­
taining the status quo. Although the inmates1 expectations continued 
to rise, their capabilities began to decline when reforms were no 
longer forthcoming. This led to progressive deprivation on the part of 
the inmate population, or major segments thereof, and a propensity to 
resort to violent action as an alternative means of gaining what the 
inmates had come to regard as justifiably theirs.
Progressive deprivation is apparently the sort of thing Eric 
Hoffer was speaking of when discussing the characteristics of mass 
movements in his book, The True Believer. At one point, he claims: 
"Discontent is likely to be highest when misery is bearable; when con­
ditions have so improved that an ideal state seems almost within 
reach" (1951:33). It is the taste of better things--not actual 
suffering--that excites people to revolt. Accordingly, frustration is 
likely to be greater when people have much and want more than when they 
have nothing and want nothing.
It is worth noting that the riot at Attica occurred at the end 
of a summer of mounting tensions between inmates and correction officers 
and of rising expectations and improving conditions. Prison discipline 
had become more relaxed. The courts had responded to inmates1 com- 
plaints and begun to order limited reforms. Commissioner Oswald had
131
liberalized, rules and was promising new programs, new facilities, and a 
new attitude toward inmate problems. Although reforms were being 
introduced at Attica, at least as far as the inmates were concerned, 
they were not being introduced quickly enough. With their hopes set 
on bigger and better things, the inmates turned to violence as a means 
of speeding up the reformation process.
Before leaving this section, it should be pointed out that rela­
tive deprivation may also "arise when individuals compare their own 
situation with that of a reference group which has what they want and 
think they should have" (Gurr, 1970:105). For some people, mere expo­
sure to, or knowledge of, a better way of life is assumed to raise 
expectations. Accordingly, expectation levels may be accelerated by 
the "demonstration effect" of other groups that are improving while 
one's own group is not (Gurr, 1970:52). Denis Brogan (1951), for 
example, observed that the new ways and new wealth of the Industrial 
Revolution impelled many intellectuals to revolutionary fervor.
The demonstration effect may help explain the contagious nature 
of certain prison riots. As a case in point, the riot at the Maine 
State Prison in October, 1971, was attributed, at least in part, to the 
highly publicized concessions made as a result of strikes, violence, and 
disorders in other prisons. In this case, it is possible that the 
prisoners1 expectations were aroused by concessions gained (demonstra­
tion effect) in other institutions, rather than in the institution to 
which they were confined.
C U L T U R A L  L A G
Some writers contend that prison reforms have not kept pace 
xtfith technological progress in the larger society. Hancock, for one, 
says that "American correctional progress has not kept pace with social, 
economic, and industrial change” (1969:19). According to Donald 
Clemmer, prisons are behind times and, therefore, 'have not kept step 
with advances on other frontiers" (1958:319). The National Commission 
on the Causes and Prevention of Violence points out that:
. . . our political and social institutions and the programs
they manage are not changing rapidly enough to keep up with the 
speed of change in the environment they are intended to support 
(1969:86).
In effect, these authors are addressing what William. Ogburn referred to
as the theory of cultural lag. According to this theory, a cultural lag
occurs when one of two correlated parts of culture changes before or in 
greater degree than another part does, thereby causing a maladjustment 
between the two parts (Ogburn, 1922:200-201).
Ogburn distinguishes between the two. aspects of culture by 
referring to one as material and to the other as the nonmaterial. The 
material culture may be thought of as the technological culture, and 
the nonmaterial culture may be thought of as the nontechnological or 
adaptive culture. Since, at least according to Ogburn, the material 
culture tends to outpace the nonmaterial culture, the former becomes an 
independent variable and the latter a dependent variable. Because the 
two parts of culture are considered to be correlated and interdependent, 
a rapid change in the material culture requires changes in the non-
-jj
material culture. When changes in the nonmaterial culture fail to keep
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pace with, changes in the material culture, there is a lag which may 
last for varying lengths of time, sometimes even years. During this 
lag, strain and maladjustment between the two cultures occurs. There­
fore, Mit is desirable to reduce the period of maladjustment, to make 
cultural adjustments as quickly as possible” (Ogburn, 1922:201) if the 
stress created by the two change rates is to be reduced.
In attempting to apply the theory of cultural lag to prisons, 
two interrelated problems are immediately encountered. First, the idea 
of cultural lag is meaningless until one decides what lags behind what. 
Second, it is not clear, nor is it necessarily to be taken for granted, 
that changes in the nonmaterial culture follow, rather than precede, 
changes in the material culture as Ogburn suggests. There is, then, 
several different ways to approach the subject of cultural lag as It 
relates to penal institutions.
One approach might be to treat the prison as one culture and 
the larger society as another. Since prisons may be considered a part 
of the larger society, the culture of the prison reflects the culture 
of the society at large. Therefore, any changes in the culture of the 
larger society will necessarily affect the culture of the prison. When 
prisons fail to keep pace with these cultural changes, maladjustment 
occurs. In an attempt to reduce the period of maladjustment, necessary 
adjustments are made through changes forced by prison violence. Once 
this happens, synchronization between the two cultures is reached, and 
a period of relative calm in the prison may prevail until an intolerable 
lag between changes in the prison culture and changes in the culture 
of the larger society develops again.
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The foregoing illustration is, of course, an over-generalized 
application of the culture lag theory. An alternative and perhaps more 
meaningful approach is just the opposite of Ogburn*s theory and suggests 
that changes occur more rapidly in the nonmaterial culture than in the 
material culture. In this case, prison facilities--that is, the physical 
plants and equipment therein--are regarded as the material culture, and 
man's accumulated knowledge of prison reform is regarded as the non- 
material culture. Prison facilities are therefore treated as the 
dependent variable and man's store of knowledge concerning prison reform 
the independent variable. Applying the theory of culture lag in this 
manner, one would expect changes in the nonmaterial culture to generate 
corresponding changes in the material culture. The evidence presented 
in this paper tends to indicate that changes in prison facilities have 
not kept pace with the increasing body of knowledge pertaining to prison 
reform.
Prisons, like other social institutions, are the creation of 
human intelligence and ideals, and reflect man's accumulated knowledge 
about himself and his environment. There comes a time, however, when 
man's knowledge outstrips physical monuments of an older generation, 
necessitating their replacement with something more relevant to the 
times. It is therefore conceivable that some prisons may be better 
adapted to the nonmaterial culture and correctional philosophy of years 
gone by than to the nonmaterial conditions that exist today. Some 
relief may be in store in this respect as, for example, plans are being 
made to replace the 140-year-old Missouri State Penitentiary with a
it?
series of urban treatment complexes at Kansas City and St. Louis (The 
Kansas City Star, October 26, 1973:4).
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identifying many of the physical inadequacies of prison facilities, 
but have given rise to the development of innovative methods and tech­
niques of improving institutional facilities. Although these innova­
tions have added to man’s background of knowledge, many have yet to be 
implemented. As it stands, man’s knowledge of prison reform is more 
advanced than the prison facilities themselves, thereby creating a lag 
and, hence, maladjustment between these two parts of culture.
Prison facilities have failed to keep pace with the growing body 
of knowledge concerning prison reform for a variety of reasons. Some of 
these reasons have been discussed in detail in Chapter 5. At the risk 
of being redundant, however, several will be repeated here for illustra­
tive purposes. There is first the problem presented by obsolete 
physical plants and equipment. The American Correctional Association 
describes the problem succinctly in its Manual of Correctional 
Standards *
The physical plant of all leading prisons and reformitories 
and of the early reform schools as well, has always handicapped, 
and often completely frustrated the rehabilitative ideals and 
methods of correctional administrators. This was true in 1830, 
and it is especially striking and disastrous in the second half 
of the Twentieth Century, for too few of the fundamental 
characteristics of penal architecture have changed since the 
building of the Eastern Penitentiary and the Auburn Prison, 
while correctional ideals and techniques have been and are 
being revolutionized. Hence, the gap between correctional ideals 
and correctional construction has become even greater through the 
years (1966:329).
Many of the existing penal institutions are poorly designed, with inade­
quate or non-existent facilities for treatment or training. To a large
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degree, these institutions ware built prior to 1900. The average age 
of the prisons discussed in Chapter 3, for example, is approximately 
eighty years. Nine of the prisons mentioned, are more than 100 years 
old. These antiquated facilities make the introduction of constructive 
programs extremely difficult, if not impossible.
Coupled with the problem of outmoded structures are the con­
gested conditions created by overcrowding, a situation certain to insure 
the defeat of any attempt at program planning or implementation. Cells 
doubled up, two and sometimes three decker beds crowded together in 
improvised dormitories is not an uncommon condition in some of the older 
prisons. The Missouri State Penitentiary formerly housed seven 
prisoners to a cell and, today, overcrowding in that institution pre­
cludes the proper segregation of inmates and inhibits a viable rehabili­
tation program (The Kansas City Star, September 13, 1973:3). Federal 
institutions, which have generally been considered ”a cut above” most 
state systems, are also susceptible to overcrowding. For example, the 
United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, has been unable to 
convert two and six-man cells to,singles due to lack of funds.
Many of the nation*s prisons, to include some of the newer ones, 
are too large, and most of them do not lend themselves to the application 
of modern penological knowledge. According to the American Correctional 
Association, ”the maximum population for a prison for adults should 
not exceed 1,200 . . . .  Any institution operating as a single unit 
becomes increasingly inefficient and unsafe as its population exceeds
1,200” (Manual of Correctional Standards, 1966:341-342). Yet the  ---------------------
average capacity of the prisons examined in Chapter 3 is about 1,700.
137
Millions of dollars are being invested in obsolete and decrepit prison 
plants that are too large to permit individual treatment. Because of 
costs of entirely new plants, the public is hesitant to abandon 
existing facilities. Instead, it spends more money to make them still 
larger and more unwieldy.
Although other reasons for the cultural lag between prison 
facilities and accumulated knowledge of prison reform could be cited, 
suffice it to say that prison plants have changed with changing needs 
and changing ideas. Thera has, however, been a vast change in the 
practical application of correctional ideas and concepts, especially 
during the past thirty years or so. Most of the prisons of the country 
were built before that time. Many of those built since then have 
merely been copies of those built previously, with little regard for 
any needed change in the physical plant to meet changing correctional 
philosophies.
THE CYCLICAL NATURE OF PRISON RIOTS
Penal history, has shown that prison riots tend to repeat them­
selves. Although hardly a year has gone by in which a prison riot has 
not been reported, major prison disturbances seem to occur in clusters 
at somewhat irregular intervals. Although it has not been mentioned 
elsewhere in this paper, a series of riots occurred in American penal 
institutions in 1912 and 1913. A  series of riots also occurred during 
the years 1929-1930, 1951-1953, and again in 1955. These were followed 
by yet another series of riots in 1968-1971. In other words, five 
episodes of major prison violence have occurred in the United States in
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Vernon Fox, Chairman of the Department of Criminology at Florida 
State'University, claims that prison riots "tend to pattern in five 
stages, four during the riot and one afterward" (1971:10). These 
stages are generally as follows: (l) triggering event, (2) emergence
of Inmate leaders, (3) interaction with prison officials, (4) surrender 
of the inmates, and (5) investigations and administrative changes (Fox, 
1971:10) .
The present writer submits that prison riots tend to pattern in 
seven, rather than five, stages, with one stage occurring prior to and 
two following the riot. According to this view, there is (l) a buildup 
of tension and discontent inside the walls, followed by (2) a preci­
pitating event which "triggers" the riot, after which (3) self-appointed 
inmate leaders emerge and (If-) interact with prison officials, leading 
(5) peaceful or forceful termination of the riot and (6) the intro­
duction of reforms, followed by (7) a lapse into public forgetfulness. 
Once the riot has passed through all seven stages, violence incubates 
for a period of time and then the cycle repeats itself again.
During stage one> there is a buildup of tension and discontent 
which creates a predisposition or readiness to riot. This buildup may 
be rapid or gradual, and may result from a variety of factors. - A 
sudden increase in discontent could come about as a result of an 
unannounced change in prison policy which affects the welfare of the 
general inmate population. Inmates at the Attica Correctional Faciliity,
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for example, became humiliated when lists of package items which they 
could receive ware frequently changed without notice. On the other 
hand, tension and discontent may occur gradually as a result of a series 
of events felt to be humiliating and frustrating. Whatever the case 
may be, Horton and Hunt (1972) claim that the impetus to collective 
action is dependent on a shared belief among the actors. This belief 
"identifies the source of the threat, the route of escape, or the 
avenue to fulfillment" (Horton and Hunt, 1972:384).
When a predisposition to riot is present, a precipitating event 
is needed in stage two to "trigger" or "detonate" the riot. According 
to Horton and Hunt, "some dramatic event, or a report thereof, sets the 
stage for action" (1972:384-385). This event may be planned or spon­
taneous. Frequently, planned disturbances take the form of sitdown 
strikes, work slowdowns, hunger strikes, or mass escape attempts. A 
spontaneous event, on the other hand, may be almost anything from some­
one throwing a tray in the dining hall, to a fight in the yard that 
expands (Fox, 1971:10) into a full-scale riot. An example of a spon­
taneous riot occurred in the New Haven Correctional Facility in New 
York in March, 1970, when a black militant threw a tray of food and 
then proceeded to implore other inmates to rebel. Other riots have 
occurred spontaneously as a result of mass contagion--that is, based on 
news of disturbances in other institutions. Once a group becomes 
emotionally aroused, it "may act upon the first suggested action which 
is in line with its impulses" (Horton and Hunt, 1972:387). Clemmer 
acknowledges that, although prison riots may.be either planned or 
staged, they are usually spontaneous (1958:148).
1*M>
Cnee the riot has been precipitated, innate leaders* tend to 
emerge in stage three, Gresham Sykes reports that "prison riots 
depend heavily on the rise to leadership of the mere violent, aggressive 
and unstable prisoners who can fuse the many dissatisfactions of prison 
life into an organised plan of action** (1959;^!)* Korton and Hunt 
suggest that most collective behavior is initially unstructured and 
without leadership. Therefore, ’’anyone may be able to assume leader­
ship by simply calling out suggestions and commands** (Horton and Hunt, 
1972:389) and can thus be expected to emerge during a riot.
In their discussion of collective behavior, Horton and Hunt 
observe that?
The leadership profoundly affects the intensity and 
direction of crowd behavior. Given a collection of frustrated, 
resentful people, a skillful demagogue can convert them into 
a vengeful mob and direct their aggression at any "enemy" 
who is included among their antagonisms. Likewise, a leader 
can sometimes calm or divert a crowd by a strategic sug­
gestion or command (1972:389),
The inmate leader takes a sort of "middle-of-the-road** position 
where he can test moderate the extremes and maintain communication with 
both the inmates and the prison hierarchy. In those cases where 
hostages are taken, some inmates may want to kill them, as was the 
case at Attica. Other inmates may want to give up and surrender to 
the administration. The inmate leader attempts to control these two 
extremes in a variety of ways and, .by doing so, stabilises the inmate 
group (Fox, 1971:10).
During the fourth stage, interaction takes place between 
inmates and prison officials. This is usually the time when inmates 
make their demands or grievances known to thei-administration. This
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stage also assists in identifying the alternatives available for the 
resolution of the riot. Although the administration is under no 
obligation to negotiate with the rioters, it has often done so, 
particularly when hostages are involved. Of course, the chances for 
the use of force or the threat of force are greater when the prisoners 
do not hold hostages. Vernon Fox points out:
When the inmate group is cohesive and their morale is 
good, the prisoners will maintain the riot situation, 
whether faced with force or negotiation. When the group 
cohesion begins to disintegrate by some inmates wanting 
to surrender, others wanting to retaliate, and the 
leadership wanting to maintain the status quo, the 
administration may manipulate it for an early surrender.
This disintegration of group cohesion may be promoted 
by negotiation or by force or threat of force, depending 
upon the situation (1971:11).
An approach other than force or the threat of force is to wait for
inmate cohesion to disintegrate by periods of inaction which place
strain on the inmate leadership to hold the group together (Fox,
1971:11) .
Prison riots normally end during stage five with the surrender 
of inmates either after negotiation or the use of force or threat of 
force. The important thing during this stage is the regaining of con­
trol by prison authorities. If the administration decides not to 
negotiate with the inmates and the latter do not surrender, the use of 
force or threat of force is inevitable if the riot is to be quelled 
quickly. Ten guards held hostage by 270 inmates at the Illinois State 
Penitentiary at Stateville in September, 1973,. were released when 
state police threatened to flood the cell block with tear gas (The 
Kansas City Times, September 7, 1973:3). As -'indicated, out-waiting 
the inmates is one approach in certain situations. Following an
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uprising at the Indiana State Prison in September, 1973, the warden 
was quoted in a newspaper article as saying that "he had only two 
recourses: rush the cell blocks or play a waiting gama" (The Kansas
City Times, September 4, 1973:1). He decided to do the latter. The 
use of force is a most delecate matter, for it is risky for both the 
assault groups and rioters. Further, the use of force is becoming 
decreasingly effective in American society, and it invites derision 
from certain segments of the public. The student riot at Kent State 
University, not to mention the riot at Attica, was f,the last straw" as 
far as the public was concerned in the handling of protestors by 
"strong-arm" methods.
Stage six is the aftermath where investigations are initiated, 
reports rendered, and reforms introduced. In some respects, this is the 
most important stage. The introduction of reform measures following the 
riot must help to restore order and confidence in the remaining power 
structure by rectifying the undesirable situation that produced the 
riot. Even in those cases vzhere inmate demands or grievances are not 
considered legitimate, prison riots may result in changes or reforms.
During phase seven, the general public can fall back into a 
state of indifference, quite ready to forget the prison problem until 
it is reminded once more by the mass media that violence has broken out 
behind the walls of some prison. As Cozart once remarked: "We think
about prisoners only when they rebel against bad prison conditions or 
when the press or some specially interested group carries on a program 
for reform" (1955:18).
FRISCH RIOTS AS B ALANC3-MAINTAINIKG MECHANISMS
In order to better assess the place of collective violence in 
the prisons transformation through time, it is perhaps helpful to look
at prison riots in terms of their usefulness as equilibrium-maintaining
mechanisms. As a riot progresses, the prison appears to nova in a cyclic 
rhythm from equilibrium to disequilibrium to equilibrium. During 
periods of tranquility, the prison may be considered to be in a state 
of equilibrium or relative stability. When a riot breaks out, dis­
organization occurs and the disequilibrium helps to bring about changes 
in the prison's 3ocial structure, and these changes act to restore 
order and re-establish equilibrium.
Seen in this light, the function of prison riots can be compared 
with that of earthquakes. Lewis Coser quotes an article in the New York 
Times:
There is nothing abnormal about an earthquake. An 
unshakeable earth would be a dead earth. A quake is the
earth's way of maintaining Its equilibrium, a form of
adjustment that enables the crust to yield to stresses 
that tend to reorganize and redistribute the material 
of which it is composed . • . • The larger the shift, 
the more violent the quake, and the more frequent the 
shifts, the more frequent the shocks (1967:27).
Following this analogy, a riot i3 the prison's way of making adjustments
in Its social structure, enabling it to maintain equilibrium.
To suggest that the period preceding a riot is one of relative 
stability is not to deny that certain events occur which tend to reduce 
the effectiveness of stabilizing elements within the prison social struc­
ture. As a case in point, there was a series of nonviolent protests at 
Attica in the months preceding the riot in September, 1971. Some were
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moderately successful in gaining concessions, but others ended ty’ith the 
isolation or transfer of suspected ringleaders and troublemakers. Fur­
ther, the killing of George Jackson at California's San Quentin Prison 
in August, 1971, resulted in a day of protest at Attica during which 
inmates wore black armbands and refused to eat. There was also some 
talk about organizing a prison-wide sitdown strike, but it never 
materialized (The Official Report, 1972:108). These events had a dis­
ruptive effect on the equilibrium of the prison's social structure by 
challenging custodial personnel to maintain control during a period 
of increased tension and strain.
Disequilibrium may come about in a number of ways_during a 
prison riot. If the disturbance is spontaneous, there is usually mass 
confusion and social disorganization at the outset. Such was the case 
at Attica in September, 1971. The rioters were at first without 
leadership and a plan of action. Custodial personnel, lacking proper 
training and a carefully prepared riot control plan, were equally con­
fused and disorganized. In short, the stability of the prison organi­
zation was displaced by disorder.
Another source, or possibly even an effect, of disequilibrium is 
the struggle for power that takes place between the administration and 
inmate population during a disturbance. In a riot such as that at 
Attica, there is a partial or temporary transfer of power or control 
from the rulers to the ruled. This power struggle does not end until 
prison officials regain control of the prison.
There may also be a power struggle within the inmate population 
itself. As suggested previously, the occurrence of riots in the prison
1^5
depends heavily on the emergence of influential prisoners into positions 
of leadership. However, there may "be a shift in the elements exercising 
leadership as.the riot progresses. That is, inmates may compete with 
one another for positions of power and authority. This occurred at 
Attica when members of various factions within, the prison vied for posi­
tions of authority. Such struggles lead to a temporary disruption of 
stability as the inmate society goes through a series of adjustments or 
transformations,
Many types of informal relationships among inmates, and between 
inmates and authorities in the prison system, remain hidden during the 
course of normal prison operations. However, the importance of such 
relationships comes more clearly to light when their normal operation is 
disrupted. In one of his works on social conflict, Lewis Coser comments:
When changes in the equilibrium of a society lead to the 
formation of new groupings or the strengthening of existing 
groupings that set themselves the goal of overcrowding 
resistence of vested interests.through conflict, changes 
in structural relations, as distinct from simple "maladjustment," 
can be expected (1967:3*0.
Thus, out of the struggle for power during a riot, whether it be among
inmates or between inmates and prison officials, emerges a new set of
relationships, and these relationships may very well carry over into the
new social structure following the riot.
Disturbances to the equilibrium of the prison brings about 
changes whd.ch act to restore the social order and re-establish equilib­
rium. In those cases where inmate demands are considered legitimate, 
they may be accommodated through the introduction of various innovations 
and reforms which seek to correct the conditions that precipitated the 
riot. Until these conditions are corrected, the prison*s equilibrium
will remain tenuous. A stats of balance will be maintained only so 
long as changes in the prison system are commensurate with changing 
social nesds and expectations.
SUMMARY
This chapter has been an attempt to analyze prison riots in 
terms of four different theoretical perspectives. The first of these 
dealt with the theory of relative deprivation which, stated in its 
simplest terms, is a perceived discrepancy between what a person has and 
what he thinks he should have. Three different patterns of relative 
deprivation were distinguished--aspirational, decremental, and progressive 
Aspirational deprivation is most likely to occur in the free community, 
whereas the decremental and progressive deprivation patterns may occur 
to a greater or lesser extent in the prison community. Although the 
patterns of deprivation occur under somewhat different circumstances, 
they all have the same potential effect; they may each result in varying 
degrees of frustration and discontent. In brief, as the gap between 
what a person has and what he wants increases, there may be a cor­
responding increase in the intensity of discontent and the propensity 
to resort to violent behavior.
A second perspective is based on Ogburn's cultural lag theory 
which holds that changes in the material or technological culture tend 
to outpace changes in the nonmaterial or nontachnological culture.
Under some circumstances, however, changes in the nonmaterial culture, 
may occur at a faster rate than those in the material culture. That ' b 
this may be so was demonstrated to some extant this chapter by . : 
treating prison facilities as the material culture and man’s accumulated
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knowledge of prison.reform as the nonmaterial culture. Substantial 
evidence can be brought to show that prison facilities have progressed 
at a slox.7er rate than man's store of knowledge concerning penal reform. 
It was generally concluded that prison riots may occur as a result of 
the stress created by the two' change rates and, further, that these 
riots may aid in reducing some of the stress by forcing adjustments in 
prison facilities so that they might become better adapted to new non­
material conditions.
A third perspective focused on the cyclical nature of prison 
riots. Here it was proposed that the cycles of prison riots and reforms 
take place in recurring patterns. More specifically, riots and reforms 
in prisons are seen in seven different stages labelled as follows:
(1) buildup of tension and discontent, (2) precipitating event, (3) 
emergence of inmate leaders, (4) interaction with prison officials,
(5) termination of the riot, (6) introduction of reforms, and (7) lapse 
into public forgetfulness. The sixth stage is considered the most 
important for purposes of this thesis, as it is during this stage that 
reforms are introduced with the intention of rectifying the undesirable 
conditions that precipitated the riot.
Finally, a fourth perspective suggests that prison riots may 
be viewed as equilibrium-maintaining mechanisms. During riotous con­
ditions, the prison moves from equilibrium to disequilibrium to 
equilibrium. Although riots temporarily disrupt the equilibrium of the 
prison, they also bring about changes which help to restore a new 
order and re-establish a new equilibrium. Father, new roles and 
relationships among inmates and between inmates and prison officials
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may develop in the prison social structure during prison disturbances. 
The new relationships may help to relieve previously existing tension 
and develop a spirit of cooperation between inmates and prison 
authorities.
It should be emphasized that a full account of prison riots must 
consider the complicated interrelationships of many factors and that an 
adequate theory of prison disturbances cannot be developed until more 
extensive and detailed knowledge of the nature of the prison social 
structure is acquired. Yet even if the perspectives discussed herein 
stand in need of more evidence and development, they have the initial, 
presumptive advantage of analyzing prison disturbances not as isolated, 
fortuitous events, but as integral to the nature of imprisonment.
Chapter 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
'SUMMARY'
This study has examined some of the functions of violence in 
terms of change which it may bring in social structure. Because the 
terms violence, change, and social structure subsume a great deal, 
attention has been focused on prisons as a special type of social 
structure, on prison riots as a major form of violence, and on prison 
reform as a specific type of change. The study originally attempted to 
determine whether or not a cause-effect relationship exists between 
prison riocs and prison reform. However, it became both more and less 
than that, for it turned into a broad inquiry and synthesis of prison 
violence and reform.
To the writer*s knowledge, no study of the functional conse­
quences of prison riots has been published. The majority of social 
scientific studies which have been done on prison riots have dealt with 
the causes, rather than the consequences, of the riots. This study, 
therefore, has attempted to explore, in a tentative and preliminary 
manner, an otherwise neglected field of inquiry..
For the most part, the study is a secondary analysis of quali­
tative data. Although it is based largely on public and published 
materials, data were gathered from a variety of sources Including noa- 
participant observation and personal correspondence with forty-three
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state departments of correction. Some of LeX'/is Coser’s works served 
as a general theoretical framework within x/nich to analyze the functions 
of prison riots and disturbances. Attention has been focused almost 
exclusively on state penal institutions in order to reduce the number 
and Lypes of variables that one could expect to encounter if he x^ere 
to mingle state institutions with federal institutions. Further, the 
study concentrates primarily on those riots which occurred during the 
period January 1, 1968 to December 31, 1971. This period was considered 
particularly appropriate for investigation as it not only encompassed 
a new series of riots and disturbances in correctional institutions, 
but also was an era of considerable unrest in the larger society. 
Accordingly, it was felt that certain of the riots would reflect some 
of the currents of unrest x^hich prevailed in the free community and 
thus provide a clearer conception of the sociology of the prison 
.community.
The study began in Chapter 2 x^ith a general discussion of some 
of the social functions of violence. The purpose of this discussion 
was to show the place of violence in bringing about social change and 
to point out that violence is far from being totally dysfunctional as 
many people have been led to believe. Attention then turned to an 
examination of a series of contemporary prison riots in Chapter 3.
Here an attempt was made to identify some of the causes and, cotise- , ^
■ * 1 ' ' '' ' ■ ■ ■ ' .  ■
ciuenees of. the riots, in order to show relations between violence and
• . c h a n g e *  y n ' V '  X  ■*.' ' t  /  v**? ' ' , X  -.v. ' v
In Chapter 4, the riot that occurred^pt New York State *s Attica 
Correctional Facility in September, 1971, was examined in detail with ••
. a View toward explaining what happened before, during, and after the f ; ,:
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uprising. This chapter is particularly important to the study, for it 
discusses in detailed language the social structure of the prison and 
the many problems confronting it. From this discussion emerges a pro­
file of a major disturbance which helps to explicate the many social 
forces, both internal and external, which come to bear on the prison.
A number of the causes and consequences of prison riots were 
analyzed in Chapter 5. Some of the fundamental causes of prison riots, 
both past and present, were compared and divided into three basic cate­
gories --general causes, internal causes, and external causes--for more 
detailed analysis. In the latter part of the chapter, some of the com­
plexities involved in studying the relationship between prison riots and 
prison reforms were discussed, followed by a synopsis of some of the 
major penal reforms which have undoubtedly evolved from prison riots in 
recent years.
Finally, Chapter 6 consists of an analysis of prison riots in 
terms of several theoretical perspectives. One of these perspectives 
hypothesizes that prison riots may occur as a result of relative depri­
vation among inmates. Another suggests that prison riots come as a 
result of cultural lag between prison facilities and man's accumulated 
knowledge of prison reform. A third perspective suggests that prison 
riots are cyclical in nature and form a natural step in a pattern of 
repeated reform. Still another perspective theorizes that /prison riots 
serve as equilibrium-maintaining mechanisms and, as such, help to
.restore social order and maintain stability within the prison s social
■ %  ' V / y ;  ■■■ / - ; / •  n  ■ . : /  ■ T / /  V ;  ■- ' ■ > - y  •;■//.*/ r  ■
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Prison riots are by no means totally dysfunctional in their 
consequences. Indeed, they serve a number of positive functions.
Prison disturbances occur in part because the rioters believe that they 
cannot effectively communicate their demands through normal, approved 
channels and that prison administrations have become unresponsive.
Thus, the riots serve to dramatize grievances and bring them to public 
and higher official attention. Prison riots also signal the presence 
of maladjustments within the prison social structure. For example, 
they reveal inadequacies or weaknesses which need to be remedied in the 
prison structure if social order is to be maintained. Further, prison 
riots help to relieve structural strain by draining off hostile and 
aggressive sentiments which have built up. Further still, prison riots 
often bring about changes which help to restore the prison to a state 
of normalcy and relative stability.
That some prisons are more susceptible to riots than others is 
obvious and indisputable. The fact remains, however, that no prison is 
completely insulated against collective violence. Available data indi­
cate that a substantial number of . the nation*s prisons are outmoded and 
inadequate by present day standards. . It cannot be stated unequivocally 
that antiquated facilities cause riots and that all disturbances occur 
in ...old,, inadequate institutions. . ^ Obviously, disturbances occur in sprne^ . 
of the more modern facilities, but physical inadequacy is a contri-’ 
touting factor which cannot b e ;overlooked. One is brought to the con- 
elusion that correctional administrators .must ^ therefore;be ^ constantly p 1 - 
aware .of innovative methods for improving institutional facilities^ ; .
The emphasis on physical inadequacy should not overshadow the 
personal inadequacies and characteristics of the inmates themselves.
It must be remembered that prisons, unlike most other types of social 
institutions, house men who, in some cases, are mentally deficient, 
emotionally unstable, prone to violent and other socially deviant 
behavior, and who have been convicted of greater or lesser crimes*
When violence-prone men find themselves in institutions which fail to 
respond to their needs and appeals, the socially explosive ingredients 
of a riot are present. Whether or not there is a new breed of inmates 
in prison today as the New York State Special Commission on Attica sug­
gests is a moot point. However, one thing is certain? inmates are 
shaped by many of the same experiences, expectations, and frustrations 
which have culminated in civil disturbances outside the prison*
The factors precipitating a riot are complexly interrelated 
and vary in their importance from one institution to another. Despite 
these complexities, certain fundamental matters are clear* Of these, 
the most fundamental is the fact that prison riots do not erupt as a 
result of a single "triggering” or "precipitating” event. Instead, they 
are the outgrowth of an increasingly disturbed social atmosphere in 
which a series. of tension-heightening incidents over a period of weeks 
or months become, in the minds of inmates, linkffd with a reservoir of 
grievances. At some point in a mounting tensioni^an^added’incident 
becomes the breaking point and thetension Is transformed into "violence; 
This conclusion does not discount the fact that some riots erupt as a 
result of a "demonstration effect," but a greater number result from
.I' "V f * - .'"'■'"'J- .. ‘ V.™.' '.t-t' ■ ' ■ V »’S- - 1" v-.>v C-'-'fx. ■ ■ ~ f ■•s...'' ,
adverse conditions which exist in many Aaericanf penal institutions
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Another conclusion that might ba drawn is that racism is more 
intense, more vicious, and more inhumane in prisons than elsewhere.
What seems to be happening in prisons is essentially what is happening 
in larger or smaller degree throughout the greater society. Black 
people and other minorities have become more vocal and.militant in 
demanding basic rights that are being denied them. Outside .rthe ..prison, 
the "system1- has given in to some degree and made changes; however, 
inside the prison, changes are interpreted as slow in coming, and 
, inmatestfeel that they must resort to violence as a means ;of gaining 
what they feel are basic rights. While racial tension exists to 
varying degrees in prisons, the evidence presented in this paper does 
not support the notion that prison riots are typically racial in nature, 
although some of them obviously have what might be considered racial 
overtones.
A study of the aftermath of prison riots leads to the conclusion 
that the exact origin~|6f^prison-reform is ..sometimes difficult to trace. 
For example, from the data available, <a clear distinction cannot.always 
be drawn between those\reforms which occurred as a.direct result of the 
riot and ; those which might have .-been in; process; prior >*to the riot. 
SeB^af^feiie^pas sage^rbf t ime~'be tween "the >oc cur r ence&of *:the '%'iot i£an4 -iany 
subse^iptntlifeforms^acts.ras^an 'Intervening variable,;^thus Complicating 
an understanding*iof • thevcausal* relationshipJrt?Third^theipbsitive 'Ait-r 
effects;• of ^ prison «riots lusually^receive\far< less^ublicity^than their .
, causVs^and s h a v ^ e ^ ^ e d ^ h e ^ o b - j j e i t t e s e a ^ i h . : • 
i?.?'' r-The foregoing conclusions dead to a final and obvious one: a
great deal more research is needed before the picture lo f rprisori violence
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can be complete* One area requiring further exploration -is that having 
to do with the influence of external variables as precipitants of prison 
violence* Studies to date have dealt almost exclusively with internal 
variables— that is, conditions within the prison— thereby leaving a 
large void in the research literature on prison violence. Another 
area, the functional consequences of prison violence, must also be 
investigated more thoroughly if the causes and effects of prison riots 
are to be fully explained and understood. To know why men rebel is one 
thing, but to know what must be done to prevent them from rebelling is 
quite another thing.
IN RETROSPECT
Throughout this study, the author has acted on the premise that 
to reach an understanding of the social context of contemporary prison 
violence, a broad-ranging inquiry must be conducted into areas where 
questions abound but simple answers and explanations do not. Aware of 
an over-ambitious approach, the writer has nonetheless concluded that 
this sort of inquiry is the only way to achieve an appropriate perspec­
tive on violence and change in American penal institutions.
It should be made clear that collective violence in prisons may 
be functional or dysfunctional, depending on the viewpoint of the obser­
ver. Although certain forms of violence in America are considered legit­
imate, the general tendency has been to regard prison violence as 
illegitimate andr consequently, to disregard its positive functions.
For this reason, conventional approaches to the^study of prison vio­
lence sometimes obscure rather than illuminate this" important field 
of inquiry, ■ "f*' v -. '
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The present study has taken on the difficult task of identifying 
some of the positive functional consequences of prison violence by 
focusing attention primarily on the reforms which have evolved after 
violent incidents. While the study represents only a beginning, it has 
succeeded, if only in snail measure, in accomplishing what it set out 
to do; that is, to demonstrate that prison violence may serve important 
functions, not the least of which are the changes it brings about in 
the prison social structure. The nature of these changes and the 
direction that-they, take depends on many factors, but most have been i 
aimed at making prisons more humane institutions on the one hand and 
more effective institutions for rehabilitation of prisoners on the 
other.
The negative consequences of prison violence notwithstanding, 
penologists and social scientists alike can be reassured by the know­
ledge that the key causes of such violence are remediable through con­
structive reforms. It would be utopian to suggest that reforms are a 
panacea for all that ails American penal institutions. Granted, much 
could be done with more money, more highly trained personnel, higher 
salariesmodern physical plants, and greater prestige for prison 
employees , .but all,of these factors, even if realized, probably would 
not offer permanent solutions to the.problem of prison violence. Never­
theless, they would go a long way toward reducing or neutralizing the 
conditions that foster violence in prisons.
|^In closing, the reader Is left with the following remark jmade by
Austin MacCormick some years ago: i;!*The-lessoi^of "the riots is that we
cannot reform our prisoners until we have reformed our prisons” (1954:
- ' ' '.,k
27). This statement seems to remain relevant today. I
APPENDIX A
A Note About the Study and Its Author
While the writer advocates change on the one hand, he does not 
necessarily sanction violence on the other, although he is a member of 
a social organization that does--the United States Army. Because of 
this, it is not entirely unusual that the subject of violence was 
singled out for investigation. What may be unusual in this investigation 
is the attempt to give violence the appearance of being functional or a 
necessary evil in a society; in this case, the special prison society. 
Very simply, the approach used in this paper was chosen because it was 
considered to be at variance with customary thinking and intellectually 
challenging.
Not only is the author interested in the study of violence and 
change, but he is also interested in the field of corrections. He 
received training in corrections while attending the U.S. Army Military 
Police School at Fort Gordon, Georgia, and has commanded a correctional 
training unit at the U.S. Army Retraining Brigade (formerly known as 
the U.S. Army Correctional Training Facility) at Fort Riley, Kansas.
While assigned to the Retraining Brigade, he worked closely with members 
of the Seventh Step Foundation, an organization comprised of former 
convicts. Further, he became involved in a number of pilot programs 
designed to improve the training, evaluation, and correctional treat­
ment of military prisoners in a structured environment. During his
second tour of duty in the Republic of Vietnam,' he had staff responsi­
bility for the confinement of all United States military prisoners.
APPENDIX B
Listing of Proposed Demands at Attica
The following listing, taken verbatim from the Official Report 
of the New York State Special Commission on Attica (1972:251 -257)» pro­
vides a breakout of the demands proposed by the observer committee, 
including the twenty-eight demands to which Commissioner Oswald acceded.
Observers* Proposals
1, Provide adequate food and water 
and shelter for this group.
2. Replace Superintendent Maneusi 
immediately.
3. Grant complete administrative 3* 
and legal amnesty to all per­
sons associated with this 
matter.
Proposals Acceptable 
to Commissioner Oswald
1. Provide adequate food, water, 
and shelter for all inmates.
2. Inmates shall be permitted to 
return to their cells or to 
other suitable accommodations 
or shelter under their own 
power. The observers* committee 
shall monitor the implementation 
of this operation.
Grant complete administrative 
amnesty to all persons 
associated with this matter.
By administrative amnesty, the 
state agrees:
a. Not to take any adverse 
parole actions, administra­
tive proceedings, physical 
punishment, or other type 
of harrassment such as 
holding inmates in-communi- 
cado, segregating any 
inmates, or keeping them in 
isolation or in 24-hour 
1ockup.
b. The state will grant-legal 
amnesty in regard to all
. r civil actions which could ' 
arise from this matter.
159
Observers 1 Proposals
Proposals Acceptable
to Commissioner Oswald
c . It is agreed that the State 
of New York and all its 
departments, divisions, and 
subdivisions, including the 
State Department of Correc- 
tions and the Attica Cor­
rectional Facility, and its 
employees and agents shall 
not file or initiate any 
criminal complaint or act on 
complaints in any criminal 
action of any kind or nature 
relating to property, 
property damage, or property- 
related crimes arising out 
of the incidents at the 
Attica Correctional Facility 
during September 9, 10, 11, 
1971.
d. The District Attorney of 
Wyoming County, New York, 
has issued and signed the 
attached letter as of this 
date.
• Place this institution under 4. 
federal jurisdiction.
Establish by October 1, 1971, a 
permanent ombudsman service for 
the facility staffed by appro­
priate persons from the 
neighboring communities.
Apply the New York State min- 5. 
imum wage law to all work done 
by inmates. STOP SLAVE LABOR.
Allow all New York State pri- 6. 
soners to be politically 
active, without intimidation 
or reprisal.
Allow true religious freedom. 7.
End all censorship of news- 8.
paper, magazines, letters, 
and other publications from 
publishers.
Recommend the application of the 
New York State minimum wage law 
standards to all work done by 
inmates. Every effort will be 
made to make the records of pay­
ments available to inmates.
Allow all New York State 
prisoners to be politically 
active, without intimidation 
or reprisal.
Allow true religious freedom.
End ajyi censorship of newspaper, 
magazines, and other publica­
tions from publishers, unless 
there is determined by qualified
id:
Observers* ProDosals
Proposals Acceptable
to Commissioner Oswald
authority which includes the 
ombudsman that the literature in 
question presents a clear and 
present danger to the safety and 
security of the institution. 
Institution spot censoring only 
of letters.
9. Allow all inmates on their own 
to communicate with anyone 
they please.
9. All inmates, at their own ex­
pense, to communicate with any­
one they please.
10. When an inmate reaches condi­
tional release, give him a full 
release without parole.
11. Institute realistic, effec- 10. 
tive rehabilitation programs
for all inmates according 
to their offense and personal 
needs.
12. Modernize the inmate educa- 11. 
tion system.
13- Provide a narcotics treat- 12.
ment program that is effective.
14. Provide adequate legal assis- 13. 
tance to all inmates requesting 
it.
15- Provide a healthy diet; 14.
reduce the number of pork 
dishes; serve fresh fruit 
daily.
16. Reduce cell time, increase 15.
recreation time, and provide 
better recreation facilities 
and equipment.
Institute realistic, effective 
rehabilitation programs for all 
inmates, according to their 
offense and personal, needs.
Modernize the inmate education 
system, including the estab­
lishment of a Latin library.
Provide an effective narcotics 
treatment program for all pris­
oners requesting such treatment.
Provide or allow adequate legal 
assistance to all inmates 
requesting it or permit them to 
use inmate legal assistance of 
their choice in any proceeding 
whatsoever, in all such pro­
ceedings, inmates shall be 
entitled to appropriate due 
process of law.
Provide a healthy diet; reduce 
the number of pork dishes;' 
increase fresh fruit daily.
Reduce cell time, increase 
recreation facilities and 
equipment, hopefully by 
November 1, 1971.
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17. Provide adequate medical
treatment for every inmate, 
engage either a Spanish­
speaking doctor or inter­
preters who will accompany 
Spanish-speaking inmates to 
medical interviews.
18. Provide a complete Spanish 
library.
19. Educate all correction 
officers in the needs of 
inmates.
20. Institute a program for the 
employment of significant 
number of black and Spanish­
speaking officers.
21. Establish an inmate grievance 
delegation comprised of one 
elected inmate from each com­
pany which is authorized to 
speak to the administration 
concerning grievances, and 
develop other procedures for 
community control of the
institut ion.
22. Conduct a grand-jury investi­
gation of the expropriation 
of inmate funds and the use 
of protits from the metal and 
other shops.
23. Cease administrative resen­
tencing of inmates returned 
for parole violation.
24. Conduct Menechino hearings 
in a fair manner.
Proposals Acceptable
to Commissioner Oswald
16. Provide adequate medical treat, 
ment for every inmate; engage 
either a Spanish-speaking 
doctor or inmate interpreters 
who will accompany Spanish- 
speaking inmates to medical 
interviews. (See point II 
above.)
17. Institute a program for the 
recruitment and employment of a 
significant number of black and 
Spanish-speaking officers.
18. Establish an inmate grievance 
commission comprised of one 
elected inmate from each company 
which is authorized to speak
to the administration concerning 
grievances, and develop other 
procedures for inmate partici­
pation in the operation and 
decision-making processes of 
the institution.
19. Investigate the alleged expro­
priation of inmate funds and 
the use of profits from the 
metal and other shops.
20. The State Commissioner of Cor­
rectional Services will recommend 
that the penal law be changed
to cease administrative resen- 
r tencing of inmates returned for 
parole violation.
21. Recommend that Menechino hearings 
be held promptly and fairly.
Observers 1 Proposals
Proposals Acceptable
to Commissioner Oswald
Permit other inmates in C 
block and the box to join 
this group.
Arrange flights out of this 
country to nonimperialist 
nations for those inmates 
desiring to leave this 
country.
Remove inside walls, making 
one open yard and no more 
segregation or punishment.
Expansion of work-release 22.
program.
End approved lists for 23.
visiting and correspondence.
Remove screens in visitation 24.
rooms as soon as possible.
Institute parole violation 25.
changes^-revocation of 
parole shall not be for 
vehicle and traffic violation.
Due process hearing for all 26. 
disciplinary proceedings 
with 30-day maximum.
Access to facility for out- 27. 
side dentists and doctors 
at inmates* expense.
Recommend necessary legislation 
and more adequate funds to 
expand work-release program.
End approved lists for corres­
pondence and visitors.
Remove visitation screens as 
soon as possible.
Paroled inmates shall not be 
charged with parole violations 
for moving traffic violations 
or driving without a license, 
unconnected with any other 
crime.
Institute a 30-day maximum for 
segregation arising out of any 
one offense. Every effort 
should be geared toward 
restoring the individual to 
regular housing as soon as 
possible, consistent with 
safety regulations.
Permit access to outside den­
tists and doctors at the in­
mates* own expense within the 
institution, where possible, 
and consistent with scheduling 
problems, medical diagnosis, 
and health needs.
■ 5^
Observers ’
Proposals Acceptable 
Proposals to Commissioner Oswald--- - ----- j--- ---------------------
28. It is expressly understood that 
members of the o b s e r v e r s '  com­
mittee will be permitted into 
the Institution on a reasonable 
basis to determine whether all 
of the above provisions are 
being effectively carried out. 
If questions of adequacy are 
raised, the matter will be 
brought to the attention of 
the Commissioner of Cor­
rectional Services for 
clearance.
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